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ABSTRACT 
 
EQUITY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN  
TURKISH FIRMS  
 
Güner Gürsoy 
Ph.D. Dissertation in Business Administration (Finance) 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan 
 
26 November 2001 
 
 
The study describes the main characteristics of ownership structure of the Turkish 
nonfinancial firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and examines the impact 
of ownership structure on performance and risk-taking behavior of Turkish firms.  
Turkish corporations can be characterized as highly concentrated, family owned firms 
attached to a group of companies generally owned by the same family or a group of 
families.  Ownership structure is defined along two attributes: concentration and identity 
of the owner(s).  We conclude that there is a significant impact of ownership structure -
ownership concentration and ownership mix- on both performance and risk-taking 
behavior of the firms in our sample.  Higher concentration leads to better market 
performance but lower accounting performance.  Family-owned firms, contrast to 
conglomerate affiliates, seem to have lower performance with lower risk.  Government-
owned firms have lower accounting, but higher market performance with higher risk. 
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ÖZET 
 
SERMAYE SAHİPLİLİK YAPISI VE SONUÇLARI: 
TÜRKİYE SERMAYE PİYASASINDA BİR UYGULAMA 
 
Güner Gürsoy 
İşletme (Finans) Doktora Tezi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan 
 
26 Kasım 2001 
 
Bu çalışma kapsamında, İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsasına kayıtlı, finansal firmalar 
ve holding firmaları dışında kalan firmaların sahiplilik yapısı özellikleri tanımlanmış ve 
sermaye sahiplilik yapısının firma performansına ve riskine olan etkileri incelenmiştir.  
Türk firmalarının çoğunlukla yoğunlaşmış sahiplik yapısında oldukları ve firmaların 
genellikle bir veya birkaç aile tarafından kontrol edildiği tespit edilmiştir.  Sermaye 
sahiplilik yapısı iki ana alt değişken grubuyla tanımlanmıştır.  Bunlar:  sermaye 
hisselerinin yoğunluğu ve sermaye sahiplerinin nitelikleridir.  Yapılan analizler 
neticesinde, sermaye hisseleri yoğunlaşmış firmaların muhasebe kayıtlarına dayalı 
performansı düşükken, sermaye piyasasındaki performanslarının yüksek olduğu 
yönünde bulgular elde edilmiştir.  Ayrıca, aileler tarafından kontrol edilen firmaların, 
holding firmalarının aksine, daha düşük performans sergiledikleri ve nispeten daha az 
riskli oldukları belirlenmiştir.  Devlet tarafından kontrol edilen firmaların ise muhasebe 
kayıtlarına dayalı düşük performanslarının yanısıra, sermaye piyasasında çok daha iyi 
bir performans sergiledikleri tespit edilmiştir.  
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Stratejik Yönetim, Firma Performansı, Risk 
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CHAPTER – I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
2.1. BACKGROUND 
The history of western developed countries shows that in the early times, 
entrepreneurs who discovered market niches, invested their capital by bearing related 
risk, and evidently collected the rewards.  Eventually, growth in firms became 
tremendous and owner managers felt themselves obliged to separate management 
and control, by assuming that agents would follow their best interests.  This state of 
affairs caused a new and long-lasting conflict between capital providers and their 
agents.  Berle and Means (1932) defined this conflict as agency conflict in their book 
“The Modern Corporation and Private Property.”  Firms centered on capital 
providers are transformed to quasi-public corporations, with their tremendous size 
and their reliance on the public market for capital, by accepting the roles and powers 
of all corporate stakeholders.  This transformation process introduced a new term 
called “governance.”  OECD looks at the term from the systems approach and 
defines it as a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled.  
Berle and Means (1991), on the other hand, call governance as an integrating term of 
guiding and controlling systems in an organization.  In the literature, governance 
may be used as a synonym for management; however, there is a difference between 
the two terms.  According to Tricker (1984) management is concerned with the 
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running of a business operation efficiently and effectively, but governance is 
concerned with the higher level activities of giving overall guidance to the company, 
supervising the managerial actions, and satisfying the demands of accountability. 
Corporate governance issues have been attracting considerable interests of 
academicians as well as practitioners from diverse disciplines since the early 1990s.  
The consequences of the equity ownership structure have become a key issue in 
understanding the effectiveness of alternative corporate governance mechanisms.  In 
the light of massive privatization efforts in former Eastern block countries, as well as 
the experiences of the developed economies of USA, Japan and Western Europe, 
researchers face vast amount of data to test various corporate governance issues 
brought out by the theory.  When we examine the firms in different countries, they 
show significant variations with respect to their ownership structures.  With public 
offerings of equity through IPOs, direct foreign investment and a large public sector 
in the economy, the Turkish market offers a very rich combination of corporate 
governance schemes to be compared.  Moreover, privatization of publicly owned 
companies is still being debated on the basis of the impact of ownership mix on 
performance.  A related issue surfaces with respect to the method of privatization.  
The merits of a public offering of equity which leads to a more diffused ownership 
versus private placement through block sales that results in a concentrated ownership 
is another controversy to be resolved.  Hence, we shall address ownership structure 
issues in the Turkish market in order to shed some light on this debate. 
The literature on corporate governance provides us with several testable 
hypotheses as well as empirical evidence from different countries.  The theoretical 
debate focuses on agency relationship.  Separation of ownership and management 
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gives rise to a conflict of interest between owners and managers as their agents.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explore the costs of agency relationship on the 
corporation.  They claim that there exist governance mechanisms, by which this 
conflict can be resolved to a certain extent.  This assertion indicates that, a 
governance scheme is likely to affect a firm’s performance.  Fama (1980) argues that 
a well functioning managerial labor market will impose the necessary discipline on 
managers.  Likewise, markets for corporate control, if they function properly, are 
expected to serve as an incentive for managers to act in the best interest of owners 
(e.g. Jensen and Ruback, (1983); Martin and McConnell, (1991)).  Grossman and 
Hart (1982), on the other hand, point out that if ownership is widely dispersed, no 
individual shareholder will have the incentive to monitor managers since each will 
regard the potential benefit from a takeover to be too small to justify the cost of 
monitoring.  Shliefer and Vishny (1986) point out that the benefit of ownership 
concentration is enhancing the functions of takeover market. 
Large equity ownership may impose potential costs on the company as well.  
Lack of diversification on the part of a large shareholder will expose him to 
unnecessarily high risks.  As he controls the strategic decisions of the firm, he may 
pass up some profitable projects on the basis of total risk, rather than merely 
evaluating the projects in terms of their systematic risk.  Large equity ownership may 
have some direct costs on other stakeholders in the firm, most notably, the minority 
shareholders and employees.  Large shareholders can divert funds for their own 
personal benefits in the form of special (hidden) dividends and preferential deals 
with their other businesses.  On the other hand, Shliefer and Vishny (1986) argue 
that large shareholders have the capability of monitoring and controlling the 
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managerial activities.  Thereby, they are liable to contribute to corporate 
performance.  The overall impact of large shareholders seems to be ambiguous.  
Actually, there are both theoretical and empirical studies suggesting a quadratic 
shaped relationship between the level of ownership and firm performance (e.g. Stulz, 
(1988); McConnell and Servaes, (1990)).  At lower levels of ownership 
concentration, companies benefit from resolution of the agency problem, however, as 
the share of large owner increases potential costs take over, surpassing the benefits. 
2.2. OBJECTIVE 
The premise of this study is to explore the impact of ownership structure, if 
any, on the performance and risk taking behavior of Turkish non-financial companies 
listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), by providing a description of ownership 
structure in Turkish listed firms and comparing the findings with those of other 
countries.  Ownership structure is defined along two dimensions: ownership 
concentration and ownership mix.  The former refers to the percentage of shares 
owned by majority shareholder(s) while the latter is related to the identity of the 
major shareholder.  Basically, two groups of variables are employed to measure 
performance: accounting based and market based.  Accounting-based variables of 
performance measure are return on equity (ROE) and return on total assets (ROA).  
Price to earnings ratio (P/E), market to book value (MBV), and stock returns are the 
market-based variables of performance.  Total risk and market risk are considered to 
be risk proxies in our cross sectional analyses.  
In order to investigate the impact of ownership structure on a firm’s 
performance and risk-taking behavior, we use Dunning’s (1993) paradigm.  Dunning 
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suggests that firms should hold ownership structure based on specific advantages as 
well as disadvantages.  The ownership structure based advantages are stated as “ … 
privileged possession of intangible assets …”, the exploitation of which creates firm 
value.  Dunning (1993) discriminates between asset advantages and transaction 
costs, minimizing advantages of those that “…. arise from the ability of the firm to 
coordinate multiple and geographically dispersed value-added activities and to 
capture the gains of risk diversification …”.  We focus on cross-sectional differences 
in ownership structures to better understand the impact of agency conflicts on 
corporate performance and risk-taking behavior. 
For empirical testing, we examine the following research questions in this 
study.   
a. What are the distinct characteristics of the ownership structure of Turkish 
listed firms? 
b. What are the differences between the characteristics of the ownership 
structures of Turkish listed firms and those of other countries? 
c. Does the ownership structure have any significant impact on the 
performance of Turkish listed firms? 
d. Does the ownership structure have any significant impact on the risk taking 
behavior of Turkish listed firms? 
To construct the data sample we started with all non-financial Turkish firms 
listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) between 1992 and 1998.  We consider 
survivorship bias as defined by Banz et al. (1986) while constructing our data 
sample.  For the survivorship bias, we did not exclude the firms delisted between the 
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years of 1992 and 1998.  Most (73 percent) of these companies are ranked among the 
largest 500 manufacturing companies compiled by Istanbul Chamber of Commerce.  
Transportation and service corporations in our sample are clearly comparable in size 
with the largest 500.  Hence, it would not be wrong to label our sample as the largest 
companies in Turkey with public ownership.  This creates an inevitable inherent bias 
in our sample.   
2.3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
When the ownership structure characteristics of Turkish listed firms are 
examined, the findings indicate that most of the Turkish firms have concentrated 
ownership structure, and families have significant involvement in the corporate 
governance systems of the firms.  Cross ownership and pyramidal structures are not 
unusual, especially in the conglomerate affiliates.  On the other hand, we have 
witnessed decreasing involvement of the government and a slightly increasing 
foreign partnership in the ownership structures of Turkish firms.  
In 32 percent of the sample, average percentage of total shares held by outside 
dispersed shareholders is less than one percent.  On the other hand, when we 
examine the concentration levels of the Turkish listed firms, we found that the 
average share of the largest owner is 43 percent and the mean value of the 
cumulative shares held by the largest three shareholders is 62 percent.  Most Turkish 
firms in our sample have a complex network of ownership.  When a firm is owned by 
both the parent company and its affiliates, we define this ownership structure type as 
pyramidal ownership structure.  By using this pyramidal ownership structure, we 
calculated cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) by considering both 
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direct ownership and indirect ownership via the shares of the parent company.  These 
figures provide sufficient evidence that most of the Turkish firms have a 
concentrated ownership structure and only a small percentage of shares are held by 
dispersed and unorganized investors. 
In terms of ownership mix, the Turkish corporations in our sample group are 
mostly family-owned firms attached to a group of companies generally owned by the 
same family or a group of families.  The group usually includes a bank, which does 
not have significant equity ownership in member firms.  Very large groups are well-
diversified conglomerates sometimes with pyramidal structures.  Others are usually 
vertically integrated companies in the same line of business.  Although professional 
managers run these companies, family members are actively involved in strategic as 
well as daily decisions.  Joint ventures with foreign firms are not uncommon.  Some 
of the very largest companies are government owned monopolies.  The close ties 
between managers and the largest controlling shareholder group –mainly family 
members with an average of 74 percent in Turkish Market– substantially reduce 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts common to American firms.  The 
dominance of families is not surprising, since government and families have become 
the locomotives of development since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. 
We have also identified 30 percent of companies in our sample as member 
firms in one of the distinct conglomerates.  Obviously, there have to be some 
advantages of the conglomerate form of ownership.  It is clear that conglomerates 
enable their owners to diversify when there are no other possible diversification 
alternatives in the underdeveloped capital markets.  Also, member firms in a 
conglomerate generally pool their funds for more efficient allocation within the 
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group.  To the extent that the financial system lacks operational efficiency due to 
high transaction costs and taxes, local optimization of resource allocation within a 
group would make sense. 
In the light of the results of the cross sectional analyses, we conclude in favor 
of the existence of the significant impact of ownership structure on both corporate 
performance and risk taking behavior of Turkish listed firms.  Specifically, as the 
concentration in ownership increases, we experience lower accounting-based 
performance, and higher market-based performance.  This is consistent with the 
findings reported in other emerging markets such as China (Xu and Wang, (1997)) 
and Czech Republic (Claessens, (1997)).  
When the effect of the ownership mix is considered, we observe the dominant 
effect of family ownership, and government ownership in the Turkish market.  While 
firms with foreign ownership display better accounting performance, government-
owned firms tend to have higher market performance.  In contrast, family-owned 
firms seem to show lower accounting and market performance.   
Concerning the risk-taking behavior of our sample of companies, our results 
reveal that highly concentrated firms have higher risks as suggested by a larger 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns.  Government-owned firms and widely 
held firms with dispersed ownership in our sample display higher market risk, 
although they are larger on the average.  Family-owned firms, on the other hand, 
have a lower market risk.  
The overall findings in this chapter are consistent with the empirical findings in 
the literature in general.  While we observe concentration of ownership as a 
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significant determinant of corporate governance mechanisms, identity of controlling 
owners also seem to have a vital role in the performance-ownership relationship.  
Hence we conclude that ownership structure has a significant impact on both 
performance and risk-taking behavior of Turkish listed firms. 
2.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The study is organized as follows: Chapter I discusses the background and 
research questions.  Related literature on corporate governance and ownership 
structure are summarized in Chapter II.   
Chapter III addresses the description of ownership structure of Turkish listed 
firms between 1992 and 1998.  We provide some insights into the corporate 
governance schemes in Turkey and describe our sample of companies in terms of 
their ownership characteristics by comparing findings with those of other countries.  
Industry, size, and country based comparisons of Turkish firms’ ownership structure 
characteristics are also explored in this chapter.   
Chapter IV presents the cross-sectional analyses to explore the consequences 
of the ownership structure in the Turkish listed firms.  The impact of ownership 
structure on performance and risk-taking behavior of Turkish firms is elaborated 
upon in this chapter.   
Chapter V includes the conclusions of the research and recommendations for 
the further studies.  
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CHAPTER – II 
CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter establishes theoretical framework for the research theme of the 
relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking and performance.  This 
issue attracts considerable amount of interests from various interest groups.  Main 
reason of the attraction comes from the transformation processes of corporations.  In 
the 20th century, corporations have experienced profound changes, when their way of 
doing business is considered.  In the light of those changes, new concepts are 
discussed in the literature beginning from the book titled “The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property” by Berle and Means (1932).  We will try to uncover those 
concepts, which are mainly related to our research topic. 
 In this chapter we will begin examining the transformation process of a 
corporation and eventually end up with the evidence found in the literature related to 
the relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking and performance.  With 
this approach, we intend to cover all related studies conducted so far and establish a 
theoretical framework for the research. 
 This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the transformation 
process of a modern corporation and its definition.  Definitions of the terms and 
related topics of corporate governance are summarized in the Section 2.  Section 3 
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addresses agency theory and its implications.  While Section 4 discusses corporate 
control issues, corporate risk is discussed in the Section 5.  Finally, in the Section 6, 
we examine the evidence found in the literature related to the relationship between 
ownership structure and risk-taking and performance. 
2.2 MODERN CORPORATION 
When we look at the history, we witness significant changes in corporations 
and their structures.  Beginning in the 17th century, we witness entrepreneurial 
capitalism, in which firms are owned and controlled by owner-managers.  In the 19th 
century, professional managers took control, but firms were owned by non-
managers.  In the information age of 20th century, firms were controlled by 
professionals but they were mostly owned –especially in Europe– by financial 
institutions. 
The major change in corporations occurred in the 19th century. Berle and 
Means (1932) first define this change as the “separation of ownership and control.”  
The separation of ownership and control of firms has generated an enormous amount 
of literature since the publication of Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.  When we examine the neoclassical theory, we encounter a firm 
definition in the context of production-function setup.  As Holl (1975) states, in the 
neoclassical theory, the owner (risk bearer) and the manager (risk taker) is the same 
person.  In Alchian and Demsetz (1972) treatment of the classical capitalist firm, 
turns critically on the existence of technological nonseparabilities.  The vertical 
integration assumption of Grossman and Hart (1982) claims that the firm managers 
of different stages are also the owners.   
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) examine the consequences of diluting a one-
hundred-percent equity position in an entrepreneurial firm.  Their main interest is on 
the “diffuse ownership” of the modern corporation.  In the light of changes in 
corporations, Jensen (1986) defines Modern Corporations as large, complex, and 
diffusely owned entities.  Finally, Williamson (1988) views the Modern Corporation 
as a series of separately financed investment projects.  Because of the differences in 
the view of academics, we encounter different definitions of firms.  We combine 
those definitions in a single one, as “firm is a large, complex, diffusely owned entity, 
with its defined and separately financed investment projects.” 
Berle and Means (1932 and 1991) examine diversification of ownership from 
the perspective of the modern corporation and explain the phenomenon with the 
agency theory.  They state that the interests of the directors and managers might 
diverge from those of the owners of the firm.  Therefore, we observe a shift in the 
power and control rights at the expense of shareholders.  Managers are supposedly 
responsible for considering shareholders’ best interests with the highest priority; 
however, this might not always be the case.  Demsetz et al. (1985) summarize their 
concerns as “… in a world in which self-interest plays a significant role in economic 
behavior, it is foolish to believe that owners of valuable resources systematically 
relinquish control to managers who are not guided to serve their interest.”  
2.2.1 Goal Discrepancy 
Separation of ownership and management causes a decline in the influential 
power of shareholders on management.  Pike et al. (1986) claim that, managers’ 
increasing concerns for their own welfare rather than that of their shareholders’ leads 
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them to adopt low-risk-survival strategies and satisfactory decision behavior.  This 
conflict is also studied by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  All of the arguments support 
the Berle and Means’ (1991) hypothesis of “diffuse ownership structures adversely 
affect corporate performance.” 
The literature indicates that the functions and responsibilities of both the risk 
taker and the risk bearer are distinct from each other and there is a high possibility of 
goal and interest conflicts among them.  This hypothesis claims that, these goal and 
interest conflicts end up with different performance levels, by keeping other factors 
constant.  Holl (1975) argues that, performance of owner controlled firms differ 
significantly from managerially controlled firms.  It is not uncommon to observe 
different outcomes when firms have adverse goals and interest priorities. 
Managers are expected to concentrate their efforts on maximizing 
shareholders equity.  However, when we consider the Pike et al.’s (1986) study as 
summarized in Table 1, we witness inconsistencies between the goals of managers 
and owners.  Downs et al. (1999), state the long-term value of the nondiversifiable, 
firm-specific human capital of managers may be maximized by ensuring the survival 
of the firm rather than seeking to maximize the value of the firm.  Thus, managers 
may tend to act in a risk-averse manner even if this is not in the best interests of 
shareholders.   
Table 1 The importance of goals (Pike et al. (1986)) 
Objectives of a firm Importance % 
Maximize Percentage return on assets 58.0 
Maximize earnings per share 43.8 
Target share of market 18.3 
Maximize share price 17.9 
Target earnings per share growth rate 12.3 
Other 1.0 
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Prentice et al. (1993) explain the source of the goal conflicts between 
managers and shareholders with the following justifications. 
• Managers are risk averse, because they have more to lose from failure, 
and unlike shareholders they cannot diversify their risk across a range of 
investments, 
• Managers will reach decisions that are acceptable to organizational group, 
• Managers will tend to pursue growth policies. 
 
As can be seen by the listed justifications, managers and owners have, as 
expected, different incentive structures caused by their different goals and risk types 
and levels.  Both managers and owners will try to take required actions to maximize 
their welfare by optimizing their goals and constraining their risk levels.  As a 
consequence of the trade off between these conflicting efforts, we observe different 
levels of performance outcomes. 
2.2.2 Quasi-Public Corporation 
Corporations can be classified into several categories based on their main 
characteristics.  The main classification categories are public and private 
corporations.  Berle and Means (1991) define the quasi-public corporation (not 
private) as the one in which ownership and control of a corporation is separated 
through expanded ownership.  Since the corporation is owned by a large group of 
people, even if they do not even know each other, the corporation becomes quasi-
public.  For example, consider a corporation in which the largest shareholder owns 
only 7 percent of the corporation.  The main characteristics of a quasi-public 
corporation are: 
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• tremendous size, 
• reliance on the public market for capital. 
 
Separation of ownership from management may cause a power shift from 
owners to delegated managers.  This notion needs to be questioned carefully.  This 
question may even be more meaningful for different types of corporations.  With this 
respect, we intend to focus on different classes of corporations with different 
ownership structures. 
Berle and Means (1991) define the new aspect of the corporation as a means, 
where the wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge 
aggregates and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified 
direction.  Within this evolving corporation context, there exists an attraction, which 
draws wealth together into aggregates of constantly increasing size, at the same time 
throwing control into the hands of fewer and fewer people.  The trend of increasing 
concentration, increasing dispersion of stock ownership, and increasing separation of 
ownership and control, is apparent and no limit is as yet in sight.  As property has 
been gathered under the corporate system, and as control has been increasingly 
concentrated, the power of this control has steadily widened.  American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company (AT&T), perhaps the most advanced development of the 
corporate system in the world, with assets of almost five billion dollars, 454,000 
employees, and 567,694 stockholders.  This company may indeed be called an 
economic empire bounded by no geographical limits, but held together by centralized 
control.  It can be seen in the AT&T ownership structure, that the largest shareholder 
is reported to own less than one percent of the company’s stock.  In these types of 
organizations, you do not need to own more than 50 percent of the equity in order to 
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gain the control of the organization.  In case of the Standard Oil Company of 
Indiana, a minority interest of 14.5 percent has proved sufficient for the control of 
the corporation (Berle and Means (1991)). 
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.3.1  Introduction 
OECD defines corporate governance in a broader sense, as a system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled.  Berle and Means (1991) call 
governance as an integrating term of guiding and controlling systems in an 
organization.  On the other hand, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) describe corporate 
governance in terms of the financial aspects as the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.  
Corporate governance is defined by Wong, (1989) as a process by which 
incorporated companies are governed. Corporate governance is taken in this study as 
an integrating term of directing and controlling system in an organization and it 
entails strategic and long-term focus.  In the literature governance may be used as a 
synonym for management, however, there is a difference between the two terms, 
“management“and “governance.”  According to Tricker (1984) management is 
concerned with the running of a business operation efficiently and effectively, but 
governance is concerned with the higher level activities of giving overall direction to 
the company, supervising the executive actions of management, and satisfying the 
demands of accountability.  
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Kimberly and Zajac (1988) examine governance relationships and conclude 
that performance depends on the articulation and implementation of appropriate 
strategies, on the symbolic and substantive contributions of executive leadership, and 
on the informed and competent exercise of corporate governance.  Their taxonomy 
report as summarized in Figure 1 shows interest relationships between them.  Figure 
1 indicates that governance has an effect on performance in two ways; a direct 
impact and indirect influence via leadership. 
 
Twenty nine different countries including Turkey have agreed upon and signed 
a memorandum of understanding to promote an improved corporate governance 
environment and accepted OECD principles of corporate governance as a point of 
reference.  The principles mainly cover five basic aspects of corporate governance.  
These are:  
• The rights of shareholders  
• The equitable treatment of shareholders 
• The role of stakeholders  
• Disclosure and transparency 
Figure 1 Governance Relationships (Kimberly and Zajac (1988)) 
     Leadership 
   Performance 
    Governance Corporate 
Strategy 
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• The responsibilities of the board.  
 
Reflections of “good” governance are studied by Felton et al. (1996) and they 
conclude that, 
• a company with good governance will perform better over time, leading 
to higher stock prices,  
• good governance will reduce risk,  
• the recent increase in attention to governance is a fad.  As this group sees 
it, the stock of a well-governed company may be worth more simply 
because governance is such a hot topic these days. 
2.3.2. Corporate Governance Perspectives 
Separation of ownership and management increased the importance of the 
“good governance.”  With this respect, Keasey et al. (1997) classify corporate 
governance issues with the following four different perspectives.   
2.3.1.1 The Principal-Agent Model (Finance Model) 
This model claims that the managerial labor market, capital markets, and 
corporate control solve the puzzle of interest conflicts between shareholders and 
managers as explained by Hart (1995).  On the other hand, Keasey et al. (1997) 
clarify the model by claiming that profit-maximizing behavior of firms is a sufficient 
condition for Paretian social welfare maximization.  This model plays an important 
role in the study, for that reason, it will later be discussed in detail.  
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2.3.1.2 The Myopic Market Model 
The myopic market model argues that the market is fundamentally flawed by 
an excessive concern with short-term performance.  This model contends that 
shareholder welfare is not synonymous with share price maximization; because 
markets tend to systematically undervalue long-term expenditures such as research 
and development and capital investments. 
2.3.1.3 The Abuse of Executive Power 
The status quo leaves excess power in the hands of senior management and 
thus might be damaging to shareholders at the points where interest conflicts arise.  
In order to decrease the abuse of executive power, some safety measures need to be 
taken; such as a time limitation for chief executive officers, independent nomination 
of non-executive directors, etc.  
2.3.1.4 The Stakeholder Model 
The stakeholder model asserts that objective function of the firm should be 
defined in a wider sense by including not only the well-being of shareholders but 
also other stakeholders such as customers, employees, suppliers, etc.  When we 
consider corporate governance in a broader sense, we witness the deep involvement 
of stakeholders to protect their best interests, sometimes at the expense of other 
stakeholders.  This fact is at the core of the unending conflicts between the involved 
stakeholders.   
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2.3.2 Stakeholders 
Corporate governance provides a general direction to the management, and is 
influenced by different inside or outside interest groups.  All of these interest groups 
will be called as stakeholders.  These are: 
• Shareholders 
• Large shareholders 
• Minority shareholders 
• Board of Directors 
• Managers 
• Government  
• Creditors 
• Employees 
• Unions 
• Customers 
• Suppliers  
 
Executives and directors take the responsibilities of management.  On the 
other hand, the board of directors and general meetings of shareholders, as a supreme 
power, play major roles in the corporate governance world. 
The board of directors and board of trustees are by definition responsible for 
the overall conduct of the corporation.  Their legal and fiduciary responsibilities at 
least imply some interests in corporate strategy and executive leadership.  As 
Kimberly et al. (1988) state, the CEO serves at the pleasure of the board; it is the 
board’s responsibility to hire, evaluate, and fire the CEO. 
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Shareholders as a whole are defined as the supreme power source in a 
corporation, since they have the voting rights to determine the board of directors, 
who will control and give guidance to management.  Thus, shareholders are at the 
center of corporate governance.  They select the board of directors as their 
representatives who presumably protect their best interests.  However, the power of 
shareholders is limited to their proportionate level of shares.  The one-share-one-vote 
system gives certain privileges to those large shareholders.  We need to examine the 
question of whether the interests of large shareholders are more important than those 
of small shareholders. 
On the other hand, the managers of a firm rent their human capital to the firm 
and the rental rates for their human capital are determined by the managerial labor 
market, based on the success or failure of the firm.  Shareholders have the option of 
reducing the risk by diversifying their investments.  However, managers do not have 
that many diversification opportunities.  For that reason, they tend to be more risk-
averse compared to shareholders. 
The government is another key player in the corporate governance 
environment.  The main responsibility of a government is to arrange a corporate 
governance environment via rules and regulations.  Protection of minority 
shareholder rights and elimination of managerial power abuse are some 
responsibilities of the governments.  In addition to the regulatory role of the 
governments, sometimes we see it on owner lists of the corporations.  When the 
performance of those government owned or controlled firms are questioned, 
Megginson et al. (1994) provide us evidence that government-controlled or owned 
firms are less efficient than privately owned firms.  The lower performances of the 
 
 
22
government-owned firms are mainly caused by the existing differences between 
economic necessities and political expectations. 
In the limited liability world, the firm is the debtor, not the shareholders.  On 
the other hand, the creditors of the corporation have a claim to its assets before the 
shareholders.  These limited liability conditions motivate creditors to take some 
safety measures in order to make sure that they will receive their loans back.  With 
this perspective, creditors play an important role as a control mechanism to discipline 
managers. 
2.3.3 Governance Structures 
Williamson (1988) claims that there are similarities between corporate 
finance and vertical integration.  Corporate finance decisions to use debt or equity to 
support individual investment projects are closely akin to the vertical integration 
decision to make or buy individual components or subassemblies.  He argues that 
rather than regarding debt and equity as financial instruments, they should be 
regarded as governance structures.  He proposes “dequity” as a new governance 
structure that combines the best properties of debt and equity.  Governance 
properties of equity are: 
• bearing a residual-claimant status to the firm in both earnings and asset-
liquidation respects, 
• contracting for the duration of the life of the firm, 
• creating a board of directors. 
 
When equity and debt is considered, we observe that debt has added controls 
and better assurance properties compared to equity.  This makes equity much more 
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forgiving than debt.    For that reason, governance structures associated with equity 
are much more disturbing and are akin to administration.  However, governance 
structures associated with debt are very market-like.  On the other hand, debt is a 
comparatively simple governance structure, because of its lower setup costs.  
Another governance attribute of debt is the influence of bankers on management in 
order to insure the survivability of the firm. 
Williamson (1988) defines the puzzle of “selective intervention” as the 
discriminating use of debt and equity.  Debt is a governance structure that works out 
of rules and is well suited to projects where the assets are highly redeployable.  
Equity, on the other hand, is a governance structure that allows discretion and is used 
for projects where assets are less redeployable.  Asset redeployability is the one of 
the main determinants of project risk, since the redeployability level determines the 
flexibility of the investment.  For example, consider a defense-related investment: 
Defense related investment projects are not usually flexible enough to transform 
production to commercial products.  After the decrease in American defense budget 
in real terms, the American defense industry firms felt threatened.  Large defense 
industry firms such as Martin Marietta and Lockheed chose to merge in order to be 
more powerful and competitive in a shrinking market.  Some of them focused on 
increasing their share of commercial products.  The main incentive for these efforts 
is to decrease and differentiate business risk.  Williamson (1988) suggests dequity to 
solve this puzzle as a new financial instrument or governance structure.  Dequity 
includes all of the constraining features of debt to which benefits are ascribed.  
When, however, these constraints get in the way of value maximizing activities, the 
board of directors can suspend the constraints, thereby permitting the corporation to 
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implement value-maximizing plan.  The constraints are thus the norm form which 
selective relief is permitted. 
2.3.4 Financial System Governance 
Keasey et al. (1997) proposes four types of financial governance systems 
with two dimensions of financial institution involvement and governance orientation.  
The first dimension of a financial institution refers to the role of the financial 
institution like banks, pension funds, etc. in corporate governance.  It can be either 
low involvement as in American firms, or high involvement as in Japanese firms.  
The other dimension explains the governance orientation; individualistic versus 
collective perspectives.  Individual orientation indicates that individuals act 
independently in governing firms, as opposed to the coordination of governance 
activities as in collective orientation.  As a result, we end up with four types of 
governance systems as summarized in Figure 2. 
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2.4 AGENCY THEORY 
The agency theory examines the relationship between a principal (a person 
interested in delegating responsibility for a set of decision problems) and an agent (a 
person acting on behalf of the principal for which he is paid a fee).  This agency 
relationship is one of the oldest and most common codified modes of social 
interactions (Ross, (1973)).  The problem with the agency system is the possibility of 
conflict of interest between the owners and management of a firm.  Agency problems 
are not unique to corporations and prevail whenever there is a separation of 
ownership and control.  Eisenhardt (1989) summarizes agency theory basics as 
reported in Table 2.  
 
Typical American Firms    Collective Strategy Firms with low  
institutional involvement  
(Cooperatives, Employee owned  
firms) 
 
 
1     2 
 
3     4 
Japanese Independent   Japanese Keiretsu 
Firms     Firms 
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Figure 2   Types of Financial Governance Systems in America and Japan 
(Keasey et. al. (1997)) 
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Table 2 Agency Theory Overview (Eisenhardt, (1989)) 
Key Idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of 
Analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human  
Assumptions 
Self-interest  
Bounded rationality  
Risk aversion 
Organizational  
Assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion  
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Informational 
Assumptions Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting 
Problems 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem  
Domain 
Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression, management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing)  
 
Agency theory provides a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective 
on the problems of cooperative effort.  The domain of the agency theory, as defined 
by Eisenhardt (1989), is a relationship that mirrors the basic agency structure of a 
principal and an agent that both are engaged in cooperative behavior, but have 
different goals and differing attitudes toward risk.  The trend towards 
professionalism in corporate management forces owners to delegate their authority, 
with an assumption that the agents will make the “right” decisions in behalf of their 
best interests.  In order to feel comfortable, owners are eager to implement proper 
governance mechanisms.  However, there is sufficient evidence in the literature that 
there is a gap between the wealth created by the professional managers and the 
wealth that would have been created if owners were in charge.  This gap is the 
leading incentive for study in this area and it is hypothesized that this gap is the main 
driver of different performance and risk levels of corporations with different 
ownership structures.  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that an agency problem occurs when 
cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor.  The root of the 
problem prevails when agents do not follow and protect the interests of those who 
delegate (owners).  Eisenhardt (1989) states that agency problem arises when; (1) the 
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (2) it is difficult or expensive 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
Even though agency theory mainly focuses on the interest conflicts between 
principal and agent, we encounter different versions of the conflict in the literature.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify two types of conflict: (1) conflicts between 
shareholders and managers and (2) conflicts between debt holders and equity 
holders.  On the other hand, Gomes (1989) argues, by referring to recent empirical 
evidence in many countries, that the agency problem is not the traditional agency 
problem between management and shareholders, but rather the agency problem 
between controlling and minority shareholders. 
2.4.1 Agency Costs or Ex-post Costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that a principal can limit divergences from 
his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit the deviant activities of the agent.  Sometimes the 
principal will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he 
will not take actions that would harm the principal.  This ensures that the principal 
will be compensated if the agent does not take such actions.  It is generally 
impossible for the principal or the agent, at zero cost, to ensure that agent will make 
optimal decisions, from the principal’s point of view.  As a result, there will be some 
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divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions, which might have 
been made by the principal, so as to maximize his welfare.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) call the dollar equivalent of this reduction as welfare residual loss.  The 
agency costs are the sum of the three following factors.  
• The monitoring expenditures, 
• The bonding expenditures, 
• The residual loss. 
 
Transaction-Cost Economics (TCE) is mainly concerned with the governance 
of contractual relations and it was first introduced in the literature by Ronald Coase 
(1937).  The classic transaction-cost problem is Coase Problem (Vertical 
Integration), which tries to describe when firms produce for their own needs 
(integrate backward, forward, or laterally) and when they procure from the market.  
Coase argued that transaction-cost differences between markets and hierarchies were 
principally responsible for the decision to use markets for some transactions and 
hierarchical forms of organization for others.  On the other hand, Berle and Means’s 
problem (the separation of ownership and control) explains agency theory.  When 
TCE traces its origin to vertical integration, Agency Theory (AT) was originally 
concerned with corporate control.  Both theories work out of a managerial discretion 
setup.  TCE regards the firm as a governance structure and AT considers it as a 
nexus of contracts.  Comparison of Agency Theory (AT) and Transaction-Cost 
Economics (TCE) are summarized in Table 3 by Eisenhardt, (1989). 
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Table 3   Comparison of Agency Theory (AT) and Transaction-Cost  
Economics (TCE). 
 AT TCE 
Unit of analysis Individual Transaction 
Focal dimension         ? Asset specificity 
Focal cost concern Residual loss Maladaptation 
Contractual focus Ex-ante alignment Ex-post governance 
 
Williamson (1988) states in his article that TCE emphasizes ex-post costs.  
These costs include: 
• the maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment 
• the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex-post 
misalignments 
• the setup and running costs associated with the governance structure 
• the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments. 
 
Maladaptation costs occur only in an intertemporal, incomplete contracting 
context.  Williamson (1988) asserts that reducing these costs through judicious 
choice of governance structure (market, hierarchy, or a hybrid), rather than merely 
realigning incentives and pricing them out, is the distinctive TCE orientation. 
Ang et al. (2000) examine agency cost and ownership structure relationships 
in their study.  They consider the impact of managerial (insider) ownership on 
agency cost.  Against their null hypothesis that agency costs are independent of the 
ownership and control structure, they conclude that agency cost is; 
• significantly higher when an outsider rather that an insider manages the 
firm, 
• inversely related to the manager’s ownership share,  
• increasing with the number of non-manager shareholders, 
• to a lesser extent, and lower with greater monitoring by banks. 
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2.4.2 Positivist School of Thought 
As Eisenhardt (1989) summarizes, the positivist school identifies various 
contract alternatives, and tries to determine which contract is the most efficient under 
varying levels of outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, information asymmetry, and 
other related factors.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) explore the ownership structures 
of the corporations, including how equity ownership by managers aligns managers’ 
interests with those of owners.  Fama (1980) discusses the role of efficient capital 
and labor markets as information mechanisms that are used to control the self-
serving behavior of top executives.  Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the role of the 
board of directors as an information system that the stockholders within large 
corporations could use to monitor the opportunism of top executives.  The entire 
positivist stream tried to describe the possible governance mechanisms that might 
solve the agency problem.  Jensen (1983) classifies the governance mechanisms, 
suggested by positivist school of thought, that solve the agency problem into two 
broad propositions.  These are: 
• When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the 
agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
• When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is 
more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
2.4.3 Principal-Agent School of Thought 
Complement to the positivist school of thought, the principal-agent school of 
thought has emerged.  Principal-agent literature has focused on determining the 
optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the principal and the agent.  The 
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simple model assumes goal conflict between a principal and an agent who is more 
risk averse than the principal.   
Agency theory is used to analyze the strategic relationship between the CEO 
and his business unit managers.  Kimberly et al. (1988) offer an alternative 
framework with two dimensions: information asymmetry and lack of goal 
congruence.  Information asymmetry refers to the extent to which the agent, by 
virtue of his knowledge of the local environment and the principal’s inability to 
easily monitor the agent’s activity.  This position typically creates an informational 
advantage in favor of agents.  Goal congruence refers to the extent to which the agent 
acting in his own interest is likely to seek outcomes, which are different from those 
desired by the principal.  
2.5 CORPORATE CONTROL 
Corporate control is one of the major functions of corporate governance.  
When we examine the key players responsible for monitoring the governance of 
firms, we encounter owners, managers, public authorities, and financial institutions.  
Owners – institutional investors, banks, other firms, individuals, and families – have 
the ultimate power of deciding on board members, selecting the managers, approval 
of corporate strategy etc.  However, owners use their ultimate power by delegating to 
board of directors.  On the other hand, managers who are guided and controlled by 
the board of directors are responsible for corporate performance.  They have the right 
to formulate corporate strategy, select and implement projects.  In addition to 
owners, public authorities and financial institutions rigorously monitor the activities 
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of managers.  Given this intense and multi-echelon control environment, managers 
do not have any other choice but behave in a risk-averse manner. 
Each firm desires to have “adequate” control on their operations.  Claessens 
(1997) claims that firms with a more concentrated ownership have presumably better 
corporate governance at a higher price and therefore better corporate control.  It 
seems that ownership structure may be a significant factor in explaining (relative) 
share prices.  Claessens (1997) reports that the higher the equity shares of the 
strategic owners and the lower the dispersion of ownership, the higher the price.  
Does it mean better corporate governance? 
Control is not only dependent on the fraction of shares but also the distribution 
of the shares between other owners.  This can be restated as dependence on corporate 
ownership structure.  For example, it is possible that a very small fraction of shares 
e.g., 10 percent could have effective control in a case where shares are widely 
distributed among the firm’s remaining shareholders. 
Bethel et al. (1998) find evidence supporting the theory that the market for 
corporate control plays an important role in limiting agency costs in American 
corporations.  The market for corporate control moderates the degree to which 
managers can pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense.  All of those 
arguments provide us with evidence that corporate control is the core of corporate 
governance functions. 
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2.5.1 Corporate Classification  
Corporations can be classified based on the kinds of the controls they 
implement.  The categorization of corporations as summarized in Figure 3 is taken 
from Cubbin and Leech (1983). 
 
The main classification depends on whether managers have the right to control 
the firm or not.  If it is a managerially controlled firm, then either the owner is the 
manager or non-owners run the firm.  In either case, we are talking about public and 
non-public ownership.  In the owner manager case, we witness family ownership, 
multinational franchising, and partnerships.  If it is a non-owner managed public 
firm, then the shares of largest shareholder is less than 5 percent, and firm is 
Control Type 
Management Control Non-Management Control 
Owner 
Managed 
Non-Owner 
Managed 
Owner 
Control 
Non-Owner 
Control 
Public 
Ownership 
Non-Public
Ownership 
Public 
Ownership 
Non-Public
Ownership 
Public 
Ownership 
Non-Public 
Ownership 
Dominant Minority 
Ownership 
Majority 
Ownership 
Dominant Minority
Ownership 
Majority 
Ownership 
Figure 3   Type of Corporations (Cubbin and Leech (1983)) 
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diffusely owned.  In the other cases of non-public ownership, the government, 
cooperatives, and foundations have full control of the power.   
In the non-management controlled firms, either owners or non-owners control 
the firm.  In owner controlled public and non-public firms, we witness either a 
dominant minority ownership or majority ownership.  In any case, there might be 
family ownership, foundation ownership, cross ownership, or institutional 
ownership.   
2.5.2 Role of the Board 
Shivdasani (1993) examines the characteristics of the boards of directors and 
the ownership structure of firms that receive hostile takeover bids.  He concludes that 
both characteristics of the board of directors and the ownership structure are 
significant determinants of the likelihood that a firm is a target for hostile takeover 
attempts.  The author claims that there are three factors that can contribute to the 
imperfect control of managerial actions.  These are: 
• The board of directors, 
• The structure of equity ownership, 
• The characteristics of the management team. 
 
The board of directors is a key internal corporate governance mechanism.  
This is the process by which management is monitored by outside directors.  
However, Shivdasani (1993) states that board become ineffective when agency costs 
are high.  Ownership structure is another important internal governance mechanism.  
Significantly, large shareholders can monitor managerial actions in three ways as 
claimed by the author.  These are: 
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• Informal negotiations, 
• Acquisition of the firm, 
• Facilitating third-party takeovers. 
 
However, unorganized atomistic shareholders do not have sufficient power 
to control and influence management.  The final factor is the management 
characteristics.  Shivdasani (1993) emphasizes that increased ownership by managers 
gives them incentives to maximize shareholder wealth because of the goal 
congruence principle. 
2.5.3 Role of Shareholders 
Actually, shareholders are not left powerless in corporate governance; they 
have the ultimate power but are relatively slow in response to management 
preservation.  Shareholders can be classified based on their expectations and their 
stake in the firm.  Investor equity holders might not have any incentive to interfere 
with corporate policies.  On the other hand, large shareholders are highly motivated 
to influence, and sometimes manipulate, corporate policies, because of their stakes in 
the firm.  Shareholder-initiated proxy proposals on corporate governance issues 
became popular in the late 1980s.  These proposals are categorized by Karpoff et al., 
(1996) into the following groups.   
a. External Corporate Control Market Issues:  Proposals to put to shareholder 
vote or repeal a poison pill, put to shareholder vote or terminate a standstill 
agreement, opt out of a state antitakeover law, eliminate a fair price provision or 
reduce a fair price super-majority level, ban greenmail, repeal or require shareholder 
approval for antitakeover devices, reduce the vote required for shareholder action by 
 
 
36
written consent, lower a super-majority level required for merger agreements, or 
require a shareholder vote on a targeted share placement. 
b. Internal Corporate Control Issues: Proposals to require confidential voting, 
require cumulative voting, eliminate a classified board, provide shareholders equal 
access to proxy materials, restore shareholders' right to call meetings or propose 
charter amendments, or require one-share-one-vote rules. 
c. Compensation Related Issues: Proposals to place limits on executive pay or 
requirements that directors own company stocks, proposal events involving 
compensation of senior officers and directors. 
d. Other Miscellaneous Issues: Proposals calling for shareholder ratification of 
auditors, change in shareholder meeting times or locations, establishing a 
shareholder advisory or monitoring committee, and limits on outside directors’ 
terms. 
2.5.4 Role of Large-Block Shareholders and Institutions 
Large shareholders play a significant role in the corporate governance 
process.  Because they have a quite amount of stake on the firm and they may not 
easily diversify their risk, they are the first who will be affected from the changes in 
corporate policies and corporate performance.  For that reason, they are highly 
motivated to control and guide managerial activities.  Sometimes they may tend to 
manipulate corporate strategy and policies for their own benefits.  Most of the time, 
we encounter those large shareholders represented in the board of directors. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) investigate various ways in which managers that 
own enough stock to dominate board of directors could expropriate or consume 
corporate wealth.  Large-block shareholder could pay himself an excessive salary, 
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negotiate ‘sweetheart’ deals with other companies they control, invest in negative 
NPV projects, or simply withdraw corporate funds.  Jensen and Meckling (1976), on 
the other hand, explain how the interests of managers and shareholders become 
increasingly aligned as the percentage ownership interest increases.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) develop a model in which a large-block shareholder monitors but does 
not participate in a firm’s management. 
Holderness et al. (1988) conclude that majority shareholders are usually 
directly involved in firm management.  However, it is questionable whether large-
block ownership in general is motivated primarily as a means to expropriate or 
consume corporate wealth.  Authors suggest that benefits associated with managerial 
large-block holdings often motivate concentrated ownership.   
Maug (1998) investigates the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces 
large shareholders’ incentives to monitor and concludes that liquid stock markets are 
beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.  Large 
shareholders face a free-rider problem since they bear the costs of monitoring alone, 
whereas all the small shareholders benefit from the monitoring efforts.  Maug (1988) 
explains that large shareholders tend to have significant bias towards intervention in 
managerial activities as derived by the motivations of the lock-in-effect and liquidity 
effect.  Since large shareholders have significant stake on returns, they feel more 
incentives to intervene corporate affairs (lock-in-effect).  If a larger fraction of the 
total shares is owned by a few shareholders, then fewer shares are held by other 
shareholders.  Because of that, market becomes less liquid for that type of shares 
(liquidity effect). 
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Institutions are other significant key players in the corporate control market.  
Based on their expectations and interests they tend to apply different levels of 
management control mechanisms.  Pound (1988) explains three reasons for the 
institutions’ incentives to intervene in corporate governance.  These are: 
• The efficient monitoring hypothesis:  Institutional shareholders are more 
informed and able to monitor management at lower cost than small 
shareholders. 
• The strategic alignment hypothesis:  Institutional shareholders and board 
may make mutually advantageous co-operations.    
• The conflict of interest hypothesis:  Institutional shareholders may have 
business relationships with the firm, which make them less willing to 
control management discretion. 
 
Empirical analysis of the relationship between institutional shareholders and 
performance provided conflicting findings.  Keasey et al. (1997) explain this 
inconsistency in findings as complex web of interrelationships existing between the 
various ownership interests. 
2.5.5 Control Tools or Methods 
Before mentioning about the control tools and methods, we need to define the 
source of the control.  Stakeholders gain their property right from their positions and 
belongings.  This notion is stated by Cooter et al. (1988) as the legal conception of 
property is that of bundle of rights over resources that the owner is free to exercise 
and whose exercise is protected from interference from others.  Control rights of 
different stakeholders, which are critical for the purpose of corporate governance are: 
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Equity holders: 
• Voting rights (to select board of directors, to fire and hire managers etc.) 
• Right to acquire information about the firm, 
• Right to delay bankruptcy proceedings, 
• Right to sue managers for breach of duty, 
• Right to sell or liquidate the firm. 
 
Debt holders: 
• Right to start bankruptcy proceedings, 
• Right to acquire information about the firm, 
• Priority covenants, 
• Covenants requiring the firm to keep a specified leverage level, 
• Transfer of debt, 
• Right to receive rents and amortization in accordance with the terms of 
debt contract. 
 
Berle and Means (1991) study the concept of control for corporations.  In 
their definition, board of directors perform critical corporate control role.  When they 
examine the board selection process, they define the following selection methods:  
• complete ownership of the common stock 
• majority control 
• legal devices 
• minority control 
• management control 
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Each of the selection methods has its advantages and disadvantages.  If the 
board is selected by the way of majority control, then we may easily argue that board 
will prioritize the interest of majority group at the expense of small shareholders.  
However, in minority control selection method, it is highly likely that we may 
encounter power games and compromises. 
They also stressed that the interests of those in “control” differ from the 
profit-maximizing desires of the other owners, and as these interests move further 
apart, the control will ultimately lie in the hands of management.   
Keasey et al. (1997) examine corporate monitoring and control mechanisms.  
In behalf of shareholders, board of directors has to monitor and control management 
in order to align the interests of all sides.  They list monitoring and control 
mechanisms as: 
• the market for corporate control (hostile takeover bids) 
• the managerial labor market 
• shareholder activism 
• debt bonding 
• incentive mechanisms 
• changes in the board composition 
2.5.6 Governance Defensive Tactics   
If interests of target shareholders and managers deviate significantly during 
the corporate control contest, managers might exploit several defensive tactics as 
suggested by Keasey et al. (1997).  These are: 
a. Dual-class Recapitalization: Shares with limited voting rights are 
exchanged for common equity shares leading to an increase its voting power of 
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insiders.  This allows managers to increase their voting power without increasing 
their equity shares. 
b. Elimination of Cumulative Voting: Cumulative voting entitles a 
shareholder to cast all votes for a single director instead of distributing among the 
other candidates.  By elimination of cumulative voting, managers impede changes in 
corporate control 
c. Anti-takeover Amendments: It is also known as shark repellents and 
categorized into three groups.  These are supermajority voting provisions, staggered 
board of directors, fair price amendments. 
d. Targeted Share Repurchases and Standstill Agreements: Targeted share 
repurchases and standstill agreements (greenmail) occur when a target firm buys 
back a block of shares from a potential bidder. 
e. Litigation: Charges against bidding firms can be used to frustrate takeover 
bids.  It creates pressure on bidding firms and increases the takeover period. 
f. Poison Pills: Poison pills grant special rights and privileges to target 
shareholders in the event of possible control change.  There are five variants of the 
poison pill: preferred stock rights, flip-over plan, flip-in plans, back-end rights plans, 
and voting plans. 
g. Golden Parachute: Golden parachute are provisions in an employment 
contract which, pays a specified amount of monetary compensation to senior 
executives in the event of displacement following a corporate control contest. 
h. Defensive Corporate Restructuring: Corporate restructuring may be used 
as a defensive response to hostile takeovers.  As Scholes and Wolfson (1990) states 
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leveraged cash-outs may be used to consolidate ownership in parties who are 
perceived to be affiliated to the existing management. 
2.6 CORPORATE RISK  
2.6.1 Risk Measurement 
The owners of the firm have a put option on the firm’s assets with a strike 
price equal to the value of the firm’s liabilities.  Option pricing comparative statistics 
demonstrates that the value of the put option is greater for more risky firms.  (Downs 
et al., 1999)  Many economic provisions that involve problems of risk sharing and 
incentives may be described in terms of the principal and agent relationship.   
Risk is the key factor in virtually all investment decisions with return.  For 
that reason, identification, measurement, and diversification of risk as much as 
possible are central theme in decision-making process.  Different forms of risk can 
be defined but the followings are suggested by Pike et al., (1986) as essential while 
making investment decisions:  
a. Business Risk: The variability in operating earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT).  It mainly depends on its operating leverage, which is the proportion of fixed 
costs to variable costs.   
b. Financial Risk: This is driven by use of debt.  Financial leverage increases 
by taking more debt, and causing to incur more fixed interest expenses and 
increasing volatility in earnings. 
c. Project Risk: This is caused by the variability in expected cash flows from 
investment projects.  The greater the instability and uncertainty of markets, and the 
less the redeployability of assets, the greater the project risk. 
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d. Portfolio Risk:  This is variability in shareholders’ returns.  Portfolio risk 
can be controlled to some extent by considering different combinations of investment 
tools. 
Pike et al. (1986) apply Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to capital 
budgeting decisions.  They claim that firms should view investment projects as a 
portfolio of projects.  For that reason individual project Betas as market sensitivity 
indexes are required to be estimated.  It is assumed that rational investor should 
prefer maximum return for a given risk level, and vice versa.  Authors define 
corporate Beta as the weighted average Beta of all projects if company is financed 
completely by equity.  The market value of an investment project can be found by 
estimating the discounted expected cash flows throughout its life.  However, it 
should be noted that, risk and returns of investment projects are independent from 
each other.  Because of this risk independence, each project’s risk must be assessed 
separately.   
2.6.2 Risk and Governance 
Stulz (1996) claims that by reducing risks that are outside the control of 
managers, modern risk management also can make firm performance a less noisy 
measure of managers’ quality and hence make ownership more useful for solving the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders.  This study provides evidence 
to establish a bridge between the risk management and corporate governance 
process.   
Saunders et al. (1990) study the relationship between risk taking attitudes of 
banking firms and their corporate governance structures.  This is an interesting 
implication, although it is applied to a specific industrial sector and corporate 
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governance structure measurement system is somehow different from the one 
defined in this study.  Their main focus is on the difference in risk taking attitudes 
between managerially controlled banks and stockholder-controlled banks. 
 
 
Risk of the bank is defined in the model by incorporating the variables of 
bank ownership structure, financial leverage, operating leverage, and size.  They 
claim that their model is different from Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) model that 
considers risk as exogenous and ownership structure as endogenous factor.  
However, their model considers risk as an endogenous decision of the bank 
especially in the short term.  It is judged that risk is being influenced by corporate 
governance mechanisms.  Their model utilizes Lev’s (1974) conclusion that highly 
leveraged firms tend to exhibit greater stock return variance.  The same insight is 
applied to operating leverage concept.  Authors used cross-section time series 
regression for 38 bank holding companies over the 8-year period in an empirical 
study and find some support for both hypotheses.  They find the following three 
variables as significant and positive at 1 percent level: 
• total return risk, 
• unsystematic risk with short term rates, 
• unsystematic risk with long-term rates. 
 
(banks whose managers hold 
relatively small proportion of 
equity)  
(banks whose managers hold 
relatively large proportion of 
equity) 
“managerially controlled”         “stockholder controlled” 
Figure 4   Governance Structure and Risk 
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Galai and Masulis (1976) note that, limited liability stockholders; prefer 
increasing risk by increasing leverage.  However, as Kane (1985) and Benston et al. 
(1986) state, the risk taking behavior of bank managers depend on the degree to 
which their best interests or preferences are tied to those value-maximizing 
stockholders. 
2.7 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
2.7.1 Definitions and Measurement 
Ownership structure definition of Xu and Wang (1997) is used in this study.  
They define ownership structure with the two folds of ownership concentration and 
ownership mix.  In the literature, most of the academicians use ownership 
concentration as a proxy for ownership structure.   
2.7.1.1 Ownership Concentration 
Corporate ownership concentration is measured with different variables in the 
literature.  Share distribution among the shareholders provides a measurement 
system for ownership concentration and it has several forms as stated in the 
literature.  These are; 
• Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by the largest 
shareholder.  Owned by, 
• Financial Institutions, 
• Nonfinancial corporations, 
• Family members, 
• Individuals, 
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• Other Agents, 
• Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by the top three 
shareholders, 
• Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by the top five 
shareholders, 
• Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by the top ten 
shareholders, 
• Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by the top fifteen 
shareholders, 
• Cumulative percentage ownership of other atomistic shareholders, 
• Herfindahl Index, 
 
Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by the top shareholders is 
an indicator of the level of dispersion and degree of large shareholders in the mix.  
This measure also provides evidence whether shareholders are organized or diffusely 
owned by atomistic shareholders.  If the percentage of outstanding common shares 
owned by the “n” large shareholders is relatively high, it can be concluded that this 
corporation is governed by a countable number of large shareholders, and they have 
high stake on the corporation.  These large shareholders with management will show 
different attitudes toward investment decisions and policies, than those diffusely 
owned corporations.   
Percentage ownership of other agents gives an insight about the distribution 
of minority shares.  If this value is relatively high, then it can be a sign of the 
presence of diffuse ownership. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Claessens (1997) measure the degree of 
ownership concentration with Herfindahl index.  Herfindahl Index is defined as a 
sum of squared percentage of ownership shares controlled by each shareholder.  For 
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that reason, this index can take a value between the ranges of mean-equity-share-held 
and one.  If a firm is owned by a single owner, than its Herfindahl index becomes 
one.  On the other hand if ownership is exactly equally distributed among all 
shareholders, Herfindahl index will be the mean equity share held. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
2.7.1.2 Ownership Mix 
Ownership concentration may not itself cover all characteristics of ownership 
structure.  While ownership structure is only concerned with the share distribution 
characteristics among the shareholders, ownership mix captures the identity of 
shareholders.  Ownership mix variables may be defined with some of the following 
variables.  
• Foreign ownership: Foreign owners that have a stake on the company and 
carry shares of the firm might be involved to corporate affairs. 
• Government ownership: The governance characteristics of government-
controlled firms differ compared to private ones. 
• Affiliation to a conglomerate:  Conglomerates have a tendency to affect 
their affiliates.   
• Family control: Family controlled firms have distinctive differences in 
governance processes compared to others.  
• Cross ownership:  If a firm is owned by other firms and at the same time 
firm owns the shares of the owner firms, it gets very complicated to find 
an answer to the question of “who really owns that firm.”  
• Dispersed ownership: If a firm is owned by small atomistic shareholders 
and it is difficult to determine dominantly controlling a single person or a 
group, then it can be defined as a dispersed firm.   
1 H index Mean equity share 
High  
Dispersion 
Low 
Dispersion 
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• Bank ownership: Bank owned firm might have differences in its nature 
compared to others.   
• Global Firm: Firms operating in the global arena might have differences 
in their governance systems. 
• High-Tech Firm: Firms using highly sophisticated and at the edge of 
technical machinery and equipments might have different systems. 
• Managerial ownership: We witness the effects of managerial ownership 
in the literature.  For that reason managerially owned firms need to be 
categorized. 
• Manager in the board:  In some firms management is represented in the 
board and CEO is a member of the board.  This might change the nature 
of control mechanisms. 
2.7.2 Ownership Structure Factors  
Ownership structure is one of the most important determinants of the 
corporate governance environment.  When we question the factors affecting 
ownership structure, we find answers in the literature.  Demtsetz and Lehn (1985) 
state three general forces affecting ownership structure.  These are:  
• Value maximizing size of the firm,  
• Profit potential from exercising more effective control,  
• Systematic regulation that imposes constraints on the scope and impact of 
shareholder decisions. 
 
In addition to those stated above, Prowse (1992) claims additional factors 
affecting ownership structure of a firm.  His list includes the following factors in 
addition to Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  
• Risk Aversion 
• Cost of Capital   
• Leverage  
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• Instability of the firm’s environment (measured by profit volatility)   
• Managerial behavior 
2.7.3 Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 
Corporate performance measurement has attracted the attention of significant 
amount of academicians.  Different performance measurement systems are suggested 
in the literature and performance is often measured from the owner’s point of view.  
The frequently used measures are return on assets, return on equity, economic profit, 
Tobin’s Q, and adjusted market returns.  These measures can be classified into two 
main subgroups: (1) market based and (2) accounting based measures.  While market 
based measures are concerned with expectations regarding the entire future of the 
firm, accounting based measures merely rely on historical data.   
Besides measurement systems, a group of academicians focused on 
investigating relationship between ownership structure and performance.  These 
studies can be classified in a number of ways.  Major classifications are summarized 
below. 
2.7.3.1 Incentive Alignment Argument 
The main sources of the agency dilemma are delegation of authority and 
information asymmetry.  Since owners feel themselves obliged to use professionals 
in the managerial positions, they need to be sure that their property rights and 
ownership interests are going to be protected by those agents.  However, most of the 
times they are not perfectly informed on their firms’ operations and investments.  In 
order to solve or at least minimize agency conflicts, owners investigate incentive 
mechanisms, which help to align the goals of both principals and agents.  Perfect 
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incentive case is full ownership or complete residual payment.  Since, this does not 
always seem feasible; agency cost will not be a coincidence in the corporate life.  
When we examine the literature we find evidence provided by Holderness et al. 
(1999) that managerial ownership of publicly traded firms is on average higher today 
than earlier in the century.  Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities 
associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors 
explaining the increase in managerial ownership. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that more equity ownership by the 
manager may increase corporate performance because it means better alignment of 
the monetary incentives between the manager and other equity owners.  This 
argument is supported also by Stulz (1988) from a takeover perspective.   
Hart and Holmström (1997) consider four cases between principals and agents.  
It is assumed that all role players are perfectly rational and pursue utility 
maximization and managers are much more risk averse than shareholders.  They 
suggest that if there is a significant and positive correlation between the manager 
effort and the profit of the firm, and then it is a good idea to make the salary of the 
manager an increasing function of the firm’s profit.  As a result, higher efforts of 
managers will create higher profits and higher salaries.  This scheme will be efficient 
if the manager’s loss in utility from increased effort is less than the gain in utility 
from increased salary and if the shareholder’s gains in profits are higher than the loss 
from increased salary payments. 
2.7.3.2 Takeover Premium Argument 
Corporate control contest is not uncommon in the corporate life.  Proxy fights 
against replacing managers, or takeover battles in order to gain ownership and at the 
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same time, control of the firm are just a few examples.  Managers play a key role in 
the takeover battles.  Since manager has perfect information on all aspects of the 
target firm, his attitude towards takeover may affect the outcome of the battle.  Stulz 
(1988) examines this phenomenon and concludes that more equity ownership by the 
manager may increase corporate performance, because managers are more capable of 
opposing a takeover threat from the market for corporate control, and as a result the 
raiders in this market will have to pay higher takeover premiums. 
2.7.3.3 Managerial Entrenchment Argument 
Increased managerial ownership to align the goals of both agents and 
principals might create its own problems.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
explain that more equity ownership by the manager may decrease corporate 
performance because managers with large ownership stakes may be so powerful that 
they do not have to consider other stakeholders’ interest.  Managers might also be so 
wealthy that they no longer intend to maximize profit but get more utility from 
maximizing market share or technological leadership etc. 
Managers are under the influence of owners, financial institutions, public 
authorities, managerial labor market, and other stakeholders.  Their main self-interest 
lies in the protection and improvement of their current positions.  For that reason, 
they will tend to be reluctant to invest risky projects even though those projects are 
preferable to the owners.  Therefore, managers entrench themselves against the 
incidences of risking their positions.   
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) conduct an event-study on US listed firms that 
announced adoption of antitakeover charter amendments to check for simultaneous 
effect of type of amendment and percentages of institutional ownership by including 
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interaction terms.  They conclude that managers can entrench themselves using anti-
takeover provisions instead of stock ownership.  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
decreases significantly with the adoption of antitakeover amendments.  CAR 
increases for increasing institutional ownership, concentration of institutional 
ownership, and ownership by 5 percent block holders.  However, no evidence of a 
difference in CAR for different levels of insider ownership is found by the authors. 
2.7.3.4 Cost of Capital Argument 
Increased concentration is expected to increase corporate performance in the 
worlds of rationales.  However, ownership concentration has advantages as well as 
disadvantages and at some point, disadvantages may overcome the benefits. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that increased ownership concentration (any 
kind of owner) decreases corporate performance because it raises the firm's cost of 
capital as a result of decreased market liquidity or decreased diversification 
opportunities on behalf of the investor.  
On the other hand, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) investigate ownership 
concentration and performance relation by using data of large US firms, for the time 
period of 1976-80.  They conduct OLS regression and find that performance by 
accounting return is insignificantly decreasing with ownership by 5 or 20 largest 
shareholders or the Herfindahl index.  Authors conclude that ownership by 5 or 20 
largest shareholders (or Herfindahl or ownership by family and individuals or 
institutional investors) increases significantly by standard error of market return.  
Loderer and Martin (1997) examine the relationship between ownership 
structure and performance.  They measure performance with Tobin’s Q as defined by 
market value of equity plus book value of long and short term debt to book value of 
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assets; and six-day's cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  In two separate OLS 
regressions with market value of equity, performance variables of Tobin’s Q and 
CAR are significantly increasing with the insider ownership.  Regression analysis 
reveals that, inside ownership increases significantly with CAR, and CAR decreases 
significantly with inside ownership.  Further, inside ownership decreases 
significantly with Tobin’s Q, and Tobin’s Q decreases insignificantly with inside 
ownership. 
2.7.3.5 Monitor and Influence Argument 
There is an information asymmetry between the principals and agents.  If 
owners are dispersed, unorganized, and atomistic, they may hesitate to gather 
sufficient amount of information because of the information cost involved.  Cost of 
gathering information will far exceed the benefit from that specific information 
piece.  However, large shareholders and institutes have significant amount of stake 
on corporate performance, for that reason they will tend to incur information costs.  
This argument is also supported by Shliefer and Vishny (1986, and 1997) stating that 
large owners or block owners may be more capable of monitoring and controlling the 
management thereby perhaps contributing to corporate performance.   
Barclay and Holderness (1991) also conduct an event study to examine the 
relationship between performance and large equity shareholders.  They find that 
there is significant and positive relationship between performance and announcement 
of outsider’s acquisition of a large equity position, but only persistent if takeover or 
other corporate restructuring follows. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), study large US firms in order to detect any 
relationships between ownership structure and performance.  They measure 
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performance with Tobin’s Q which is defined as sum of market value of stock, 
preferred stock and debt to book value of assets and conclude that Tobin's Q 
decreases significantly with board outsiders, leverage, and corporate control activity.  
Performance increases significantly with insider ownership.  Shareholdings by block 
holders and institutional investors increase significantly by corporate control activity.  
Institutional ownership decreases significantly with block holder ownership and vice 
versa.  Leverage increases significantly with insider ownership and outside board 
membership but not vice versa.  Years of CEO employment decreases significantly 
with institutional and block holder ownership, but not vice versa. 
These arguments provide evidence that agency conflict is not necessarily 
between managers and owners but it may also reveal itself between large and 
minority shareholders.  Justification for that argument lies in the conflicting interests 
and expectations of the two groups.  Block shareholders have a significant stake on 
corporate performance and they do not prefer risking that.  For that reason, large 
shareholders generally occupy a place on the board of directors and they will tend to 
influence the firm’s decision process in favor of their own interests.   
Small shareholders can diversify their investments and can easily buy and sell 
their possessions.  This flexibility of small shareholders decreases their risk and at 
the same time, their incentive to monitor and influence corporate policies.  
Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) conduct an event study on the effect of monitor 
actions by small shareholders.  They find evidence that united small shareholder 
activism enhances shareholder value. 
When managers of large firms hold significant equity stakes, the question of 
these managers' remuneration becomes less important since the majority of their 
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income would come from their equity stakes, Mehran (1995).  For that reason, a 
decrease in the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is expected.  
2.7.3.6 Nonlinearity Argument 
Stultz (1988) presents a formal model that predicts a roof shaped relation 
between managerial ownership and performance.  The model is integrating the 
takeover premium argument and the entrenchment argument into a single theory. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine roof shaped relation by using NYSE 
or AMEX data.  They use two performance measures of Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets (ROA).  Tobin’s Q is defined by market value of stock, preferred stock and 
debt to replacement value of assets.  Ownership structure is measured by insider 
stock ownership of managers and directors, institutional ownership, and share of 
block holders.  They find that both measures of profitability is significantly 
increasing with ownership by managers and directors, and this relation is roof-
shaped with a performance peek for 69 percent  ownership in 1976 and 41 percent  in 
1986.  Hubbard and Palia (1995) also find similar evidence of a roof-shaped relation 
between performance and ownership structure.  According to McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) performance increases significantly with institutional ownership, but 
no measure of block holder ownership seems to have any effect.  By using new data 
sample, McConnell and Servaes, (1995) conduct another study and reproduced the 
similar results of their 1990 study.  The only difference in the findings is that Tobin’s 
Q now is significantly increasing with block holder ownership.  For all sample 
periods the relation between Tobin’s Q and all ownership variables is insignificant 
for high-growth firms and significantly positive and roof-shaped for low-growth 
firms.  
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Keasey, Short and Watson (1994) examine UK firms and test for roof-shaped 
relation by squaring board ownership and use piecewise linear regression.  They 
discovered that performance is significantly increasing with board ownership and 
this relation is significantly roof-shaped.  This is also confirmed using piecewise 
linear regression.  Performance also increases if directors are represented in other 
firm’s boards. 
Cho (1998) conducts OLS regression with the large US firms in 1991 to test 
for non-monotonic relation by piecewise linear regression and fix the breakpoints by 
a grid search technique that maximizes significance and two stage least squares 
regression to estimate three equations with ownership, performance, and investment 
as the dependent variables.  He concludes from two separate OLS regressions that 
Tobin’s Q and capital expenditure is significantly increasing for inside ownership in 
the (0 percent - 7 percent) range and significantly decreasing in the (7 percent - 38 
percent) range.  He argues that inside ownership determines investment, which in 
turn determines performance, which in turn determines inside ownership. 
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) explore the relationship between 
ownership and performance by measuring performance with Tobin’s Q as defined by 
the ratio of market value of stock, and book value of debt to book value of assets.  
They find that profitability is significantly increasing for management ownership in 
the (0 percent - 5 percent) range and significantly decreasing in the (5 percent - 25 
percent) range in the 1935 sample and for the 1995 sample.  Tobin's Q is 
significantly increasing for management ownership in the (0 percent - 5 percent) 
range by controlling size.  Hermalin and Weisback (1991) find that performance 
 
 
57
increases significantly with CEO ownership in the (0 percent - 1 percent) range and 
decreases significantly in the (1 percent - 5 percent) range. 
2.8 SUMMARY 
The theoretical debate focuses on agency relationship.  Separation of ownership 
and management gives rise to a conflict of interest between owners and managers as 
their agents.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) explore the costs of agency relationship on 
the corporation.  They claim that there exist governance mechanisms by which this 
conflict can be resolved to a certain extent.  This assertion indicates that, governance 
scheme is likely to affect a firm’s performance.  Fama (1980) argues that a well 
functioning managerial labor market will impose the necessary discipline on 
managers.  Likewise, markets for corporate control, if they function properly, are 
expected to serve as an incentive for managers to act in the best interest of owners 
(e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Martin and McConnell, 1991).  Grossman and Hart 
(1982), on the other hand, point out that if ownership is widely dispersed, no 
individual shareholder will have the incentive to monitor managers since each will 
regard the potential benefit from a takeover to be too small to justify the cost of 
monitoring.  Shliefer and Vishny (1986) points out the benefits of ownership 
concentration in enhancing the functioning of takeover market.   
Large equity ownership may impose potential costs on the company too.  Lack of 
diversification on the part of a large shareholder will expose him to unnecessarily 
high risks.  As he controls the strategic decisions of the firm, he may pass up some 
profitable projects on the basis of total risk, rather than merely evaluating the 
projects in terms of their systematic risk.  Large equity ownership may have some 
direct costs on other stakeholders in the firm, most notably, the minority 
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shareholders and employees.  Large shareholders can divert funds for their own 
personal benefits in the form of special (hidden) dividends and preferential deals 
with their other businesses.  On the other hand, Shliefer and Vishny (1986) argue 
that large shareholders have the capability of monitoring and controlling the 
managerial activities.  Thereby, they are liable to contribute to corporate 
performance.  The overall impact of large shareholders seems to be ambiguous.  
Actually, there are both theoretical and empirical studies suggesting a quadratic 
shaped relationship between level of ownership and firm performance (e.g. Stulz, 
1988; McConnel and Servaes, 1990).  At lower levels of ownership concentration, 
companies benefit from resolution of the agency problem, however, as the share of 
large owner increases potential costs take over, surpassing the benefits. 
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CHAPTER – III 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last quarter of the 20th century has been referred to as decade of significant 
developments in Turkish corporate life, with a considerable degree of positive and 
promising economic changes.  As a part of the overall liberalization process, 
beginning in the 1980s in the financial markets, capital markets are organized by a 
new regulatory framework, setting the stage for effective and healthy functioning of 
the markets.  Since there have been large restructurings in Turkey in the past two 
decades, we have witnessed consequences of the steps taken. 
In the past two decades, as a result of radical restructurings in the economic 
conditions of Turkey, as well as financial markets, we have observed an emergence 
of the privatization of corporate ownership.  Corporate owners began discovering the 
benefits of raising equity through public offerings.  Debt financing during that time 
frame had a very high cost because of high inflation and risk premiums.  On the 
other hand, small investors recognized the stock market as a promising investment 
tool resulting in considerable gains.  As a consequence of an increased equity selling 
efforts, and an increased number of small investors that invested in stock markets, 
we observed significant changes in the ownership structure of Turkish firms.   
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This increasing trend is also supported by regulations.  The recent legislation 
on minority rights that was enacted in December 1999, the Law No. 4487, brought in 
a set of amendments to the Capital Market Law.  According to the Turkish 
Commercial Law, minority shareholders are granted rights to protect themselves 
against larger shareholders.  Turkish Commercial Law defined minority shareholders 
as shareholders representing minimum of 10 percent of the capital stock.  With the 
new provision, minority rights are now granted to the shareholders with 5 percent of 
the paid in capital.  The legal framework of the capital markets in Turkey is based on 
the Capital Market Law (CML) enacted in 1981, amended in 1992 and 1999.  
Although the existence of the Stock Exchange dates back to the foundation of the 
Republic, its present state of functioning is based on the regulations enacted after 
1983.  After the launching of the relevant regulation in 1985, the exchange began 
operating under the name of Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1986.  (ISE Brochure, 1999) 
In addition to legal and financial arrangements, the transfer from indirect to 
direct private share ownership of formerly government-owned enterprises gained 
significant momentum during this period.  Privatization programs turn out to be one 
of the required steps for the membership to the European Union. 
Because of new regulations, the increased interest of small investors, and ongoing 
privatization programs, the total volume of issues of new stocks increased 
substantially between 1986 and 2000.  The number of corporations that realized 
initial public offerings (IPOs) which had been increasing in the past years mainly 
depends on general economic conditions.  37 corporations made initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and collected 2.7 billion US dollars in 2000.  However, in 1999, 
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only 10 corporations made initial public offerings and collected 86 million US 
dollars. 
Although the Istanbul Stock Exchange was affected by the national crisis in 
1994 and global crisis in 1998, it is a growing emerging stock market.  The total 
trading volume increased to 178,997 million US dollars in 2000 from 13 million US 
dollars in 1986.  The number of companies whose shares are traded increased to 316 
in 2000 from 80 in 1986.  The total market capitalization reached to 70 billion US 
dollars in 2000.  The numbers of firms listed on the ISE and trading volume of the 
ISE from 1986 to 2000 are presented in Figure 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The literature on ownership structure provides us with significant evidence on 
the international differences in country ownership structures as documented by 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997), Charkham (1994), Porter (1992), Prowse (1995), Roe 
(1991, 1994), and Walter (1993).  Turkey is classified as an emerging market 
because of its developing and promising nature.  Emerging markets are differentiated 
from developed markets by their heterogeneous nature and inherent dynamics.  They 
are markets characterized by high volatility and high average returns.  It has been 
shown that they are not integrated into the developed markets of the world as 
Figure 5 Number of Firms Listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
No of Firms 80 82 79 76 110 134 145 160 176 193 213 244 262 256 315
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 
 
62
evidenced by very low correlation with the rest of the world and among themselves 
(Bekaert et al., 1998).  Most of the studies in the literature on ownership structure 
focus on developed mature markets.  In this chapter, we intend to determine the main 
ownership structural characteristics of Turkish firms and compare the findings with 
those of other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 presents a visual comparison of the ISE with the world stock 
exchanges.  The various stock exchanges are compared on the basis of: the number 
of companies listed, market capitalization, and trading values, for 2000.  The table 
clearly shows that the ISE is a small, developing exchange with promising trading 
values.  
Turkey has a liberal foreign exchange regime, with a convertible currency.  
There are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investors trading in the Turkish 
securities markets.  Decree No. 32, passed in August 1989, removes all restrictions 
on overseas institutional and individual investment in securities listed on the ISE.  
Hence, the Turkish stock and bond markets are open to foreign investors, without 
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any restrictions on the taking back of capital and profits.  Decree No. 32 also allows 
Turkish citizens to buy foreign securities.  (ISE Brochure, 1999)  These laws attract 
direct and indirect foreign investors to the ISE.  In this chapter, we will mainly focus 
on those who have direct investments in Turkish firms to establish long-term 
partnerships. 
Table 4  Comparison of World Stock Exchanges in 2000  (US$ Million) 
Exchange No of Firms Listed 
Market Capitalization 
(Million USD) 
Total Share Trading 
(Million USD) 
Amex  649 82,717.40 945,390.70 
Canadian Venture  2598 9,413.57 10,882.33 
Mexico 177 125,203.85 45,768.38 
Nasdaq 4734 3,597,085.87 19,798,799.25 
NYSE 2862 11,534,612.90 11,060,046.00 
Toronto  1421 770,116.26 636,535.29 
Athens 310 107,499.18 94,162.67 
Copenhagen 235 111,818.51 102,636.12 
Deutsche Börse 989 1,270,243.17 2,119,784.71 
Euronext Amsterdam 392 640,456.30 678,763.67 
Euronext Paris 966 1,446,634.12 1,064,866.03 
Helsinki 158 293,634.74 208,326.09 
ISE 316 69,658.92 178,997.59 
Italy 297 768,363.36 1,019,625.27 
Johannesburg   606 131,321.00 77,446.07 
Lisbon 110 60,680.50 54,896.64 
London  2374 2,612,230.21 4,558,662.93 
Stockholm 311 328,339.04 485,288.34 
Tel-Aviv  665 65,337.46 28,538.48 
Warsaw 225 31,428.61 19,305.44 
Australian 1406 372,794.35 226,484.89 
Hong Kong 790 623,397.74 376,664.05 
Jakarta 286 26,812.50 15,109.27 
Tokyo 2096 3,193,934.44 2,315,501.78 
Korea 702 148,361.20 556,246.30 
Taiwan 531 247,596.88 986,271.71 
 
The increasing diversity of corporate control, and the emergence of more 
varied types of ownership structure, motivates us to reflect on recent developments 
in corporate governance and their implications for our understanding economics of 
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the processes involved.  In order to describe the ownership structure picture of the 
Turkish non-financial firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange, we will use ISE’s 
yearbooks between 1992 and 1998 as well as its electronic database.  Banks, leasing 
companies, investment companies, holding companies, and insurance firms are 
excluded from the data set.  Investment companies are closed-end mutual funds that 
invest in a portfolio of securities and Holding companies invest only in member 
firms of a conglomerate.  Ownership structure data is mainly gathered from the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange yearbooks (ISE, 1990-1999). 
Our sample consists of non-financial corporations listed on Istanbul Stock 
Exchange from 1992 to 1998.  Most (73 percent) of these companies are ranked 
among the largest 500 manufacturing companies in Turkey, based on the list 
compiled by Istanbul Chamber of Commerce.  Transportation and service 
corporations in our sample are clearly comparable in size with the largest 500.  
Hence, it would not be wrong to label our sample as the largest companies in Turkey 
with public ownership 
We define ownership structure along two dimensions: ownership concentration 
and ownership mix.  Ownership concentration refers to the distribution of the shares 
owned by a certain number of individuals, institutions, or families.  Ownership mix, 
on the other hand, is related to the presence of certain institutions or groups, such as 
government or foreign partners, among the shareholders.  These two categories 
incorporate both the influence power of the shareholders, as well as, the identity of 
owners and their unique incentive mechanisms and preferences.   
 
 
65
3.2 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Ownership concentration intends to measure the influence power of the 
shareholders on management.  Ownership concentration variables are defined as the 
distribution of shares among the shareholders.  In this study, we measure ownership 
concentration with the following four variables.  These measures are:   
• Percentage share of the largest shareholder (LSH1) 
• Total shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3) 
• Cumulative percentage of shares held by other diffused shareholders 
(OTHER) 
• Cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH)  
 By examining the concentration measures, we intend to determine the 
ownership concentration characteristics of the Turkish firms.  Each ownership 
concentration measure will be defined and examined in detail in the further sections. 
3.2.2 Largest Shareholder (LSH1) 
The ownership concentration measure, LSH1, reflects the percentage of the 
shares held by the largest single shareholder.  This measure provides an insight 
regarding the concentration level of a firm.  When we examine the descriptive 
statistics of the percentage share of the largest shareholder (LSH1) as presented in 
Table 5, we observe considerably large values in the central tendency measures.  
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Mean of the percentage share of the largest shareholder (LSH1) in our sample is 43 
percent and median of the variable is 40 percent.  These values provide evidence in 
favor of the concentrated nature of Turkish firms.  The percentage of the sample 
firms whose largest shareholder owns more than 30 percent of the shares is 
approximately 70 percent.  This implies that large shareholders are dominant in the 
governance systems of the Turkish firms.  In Chapter IV we will look closely at the 
impact of large shareholders dominance in a firm’s governance and try to identify the 
possible conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. 
Table 5 Summary Statistics of Percentage 
Share of the Largest Shareholder  
  LSH1 
Mean  43.46
Std. Error of Mean  0.64
Median  40.07
Std. Deviation  21.16
Skewness  0.57
Kurtosis  -0.03
Minimum  0.52
Maximum  99.30
Percentiles 
10% 19.43 60% 46.24 
20% 26.00 70% 51.00 
30% 30.96 75% 54.42 
40% 35.00 80% 60.00 
50% 40.07 90% 74.91 
 
When we examine the yearly descriptive statistics of percentage share of the 
largest owner (LSH1) as documented in Table 6, we do not observe any significant 
deviations from the mean.  Even though there is a slightly decreasing trend in the 
mean of the yearly LSH1 values, between 1992 and 1998, it does not seem to be 
statistically significant. 
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Table 6 Yearly Descriptive Statistics of LSH1 
LSH1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean 45.47 44.14 42.49 42.47 42.20 43.73 44.30
Change in Mean  -3% -4% -0.1% -1% 4% 1%
Median 40.00 39.41 37.70 40.00 40.05 41.35 42.04
Change in Median  -1% -4% 6% 0.1% 3% 2%
Std. Deviation 22.36 21.98 21.31 21.06 20.68 20.98 20.77
Skewness 0.92 0.83 0.83 0.54 0.50 0.33 0.29
Kurtosis 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.00 -0.03 -0.17 -0.19
Minimum 12.60 4.11 1.61 0.52 1.11 1.00 1.00
Maximum 99.24 99.30 98.20 98.20 98.17 98.17 98.17
 
We have created two main categories for the percentage share of the largest 
shareholder (LSH1), with a cut point of 50 percent, to examine the diverse 
characteristics of ownership concentration.  With this approach, it is intended to 
uncover the concentrated nature of the listed Turkish firms.  When we examine the 
yearly percentages in each category presented in Table 7, we do not observe any 
significant change.  On average, in 66 percent of our sample firms, largest 
shareholder owns more than 50 percent of his firm. 
Table 7 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of LSH1 Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
LSH1<50 30.76 30.23 30.12 29.73 29.80 31.07 31.09 30.42 
  -2% -0.4% -1% 0.2% 4% 0.1% 
LSH1>50 68.43 67.63 66.70 64.75 64.24 65.67 64.84 65.78 
  -1% -1% -3% -1% 2% -1% 
 
The main characteristics of the percentage share of the largest shareholder 
(LSH1) variable are examined by conducting independent sample t tests.  The results 
of the t tests are presented in Table 8.   
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Table 8 Mean Comparison of Percentage Share of the Largest Shareholder 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each class.  K 
stands for 1,000 $. 
 LSH1<50
%
LSH1>50% t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA)  93,801 K        144,852 -3.62*
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.25 7.66 -0.65
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.39 14.79 -0.82
Price to Earnings (P/E) 23.01 21.35 0.77
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.39 5.38 0.02
S/T liability to L/T Liability 77.43 79.96 -1.96*
Gross Profit Margin 33.68 34.93 -0.68
Net Profit Margin 10.61 8.76 1.17
Growth in Gross Sales 100.91 296.77 -1.36
Net Profit Growth Rate 270.14 301.64 -0.16
Total Asset Growth Rate 105.29 100.38 0.71
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 132.71 192.83 -0.95
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.32 0.29 2.87*
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.10 0.07 3.65*
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.40 0.34 3.31*
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.04 2.06*
S/T Liability to TA 0.41 0.45 -3.60*
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.15 0.18 -2.76*
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.12 1.90*
R&D to TA 0.01 0.01 0.60
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.05 0.06 -1.01
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.08 0.04
 
Size is an important characteristic of the sample firms as reflected in the 
LSH1 categories.  Concentrated firms are mainly large firms.  Firms whose LSH1 is 
more than 50 percent, are significantly larger than those of less concentrated firms.  
Besides size, we also compare the means of the ratios listed in Table 8 to reveal 
characteristics of the sample firms.  When the leverage characteristics are examined 
we find ample evidence.  Short term liability to long term liability, short term 
liability to total assets and long term liability to total assets ratios are significant.  
Those ratios indicate that firms with LSH1 more than 50 percent have higher short 
term liabilities but lower long term liabilities.  When the debt preferences of those 
firms with a sole powerful owner are examined, we witness the dominancy of the 
short-term debt selections.  On the other hand, concentrated firms have significantly 
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lower investment ratios (Total Fixed Assets to Total Assets, Machinery, Plant and 
Equipment to Total Assets and Investment in Process to Total Assets). 
In sum, concentrated firms with LSH1 more than 50 percent are large in size 
and mostly short-term oriented in their debt preferences with relatively lower 
investment attitudes. 
3.2.3 Cumulative Shares of the Largest Three Shareholders (LSH3) 
Cumulative percentage of shares held by the largest ‘n’ number of shareholders 
is commonly used as an ownership concentration measure in the literature.  
However, based on the market characteristics, different authors include different ‘n’ 
number of largest shareholders.  For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Prowse 
(1992) used the percentage of shares held by the largest ten shareholders as a proxy 
for the concentration of ownership control and power. 
We select cumulative percentage of shares held by the largest three 
shareholders. We believe that it better captures the dimensions of ownership 
concentration compared to the others, when the Turkish market characteristics are 
taken into consideration.  When we examine the median percentage share of the 
largest shareholder (LSH1) on the ISE, it is approximately 40 percent and this figure 
increases to 64 percent when the largest three shareholders’ (LSH3) median shares 
are taken into account.  On the other hand, the median share of the other diffused 
shareholders is 29 percent.  On average, shares of the largest three shareholders and 
other diffused shareholders add up to 93 percent.  This is a noteworthy amount, 
which enables us to explore the consequences of the ownership structure of Turkish 
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firms listed on the ISE.  By using the largest three-shareholder measure, we only 
exclude 7 percent of the shareholders from the analyses.   
Table 9 Summary Statistics of cumulative 
percentage shares of the largest three 
shareholders (LSH3) 
  LSH3 
Mean  62.128
Std. Error of Mean  0.581
Median  64.000
Std. Deviation  19.071
Skewness  -0.724
Kurtosis  0.799
Minimum  0.820
Maximum  99.300
Percentiles 
10% 36.80 60% 67.45 
20% 50.50 70% 72.20 
30% 55.14 75% 75.00 
40% 59.29 80% 78.09 
50% 64.00 90% 84.65 
 
When we examine the distribution of the cumulative shares of the largest 
three shareholders (LSH3), we witness the concentrated nature of Turkish firms.  
Mean value of LSH3 is 62 percent which does not leave any doubt about the 
concentrated nature of our sample.  When we explore the changes in the mean values 
of LSH3 between 1992 and 1998, we do not observe any significant deviations in 
year-to-year values.   
In those concentrated firms, only the three largest shareholders are enough to 
decide on critical issues.  If the largest three shareholders belong to the same family, 
than it becomes more threatening to the powerless, minority shareholders.  It may not 
be surprising to witness possible conflicts between minority and majority 
shareholders in that type of firms. 
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Table 10 Yearly Descriptive Statistics of cumulative percentage shares of the 
largest three shareholders (LSH3) 
LSH3 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean 65.47 63.78 61.84 61.02 60.29 61.95 62.20
Change in Mean  -3% -3% -1% -1% 3% 0.1%
Median 65.40 64.11 62.13 61.70 61.67 64.91 65.03
Change in Median  -2% -3% -1% 0.1% 5% 0.1%
Std. Deviation 19.91 18.06 18.15 18.74 18.81 19.87 19.50
Skewness -0.317 -0.537 -0.459 -0.718 -0.748 -0.975 -0.993
Kurtosis -0.479 0.723 0.733 0.846 0.941 1.122 1.165
Minimum 14.00 4.11 4.27 0.82 1.11 1.0 1.0
Maximum 99.24 99.30 98.20 98.20 98.23 98.17 98.17
 
In order to examine various size and financial characteristics, we create two 
groups for classification based on LSH3 variable.  In the first group, we divide the 
overall firms into two subgroups.  Those firms whose cumulative shares belonging to 
the largest three shareholders (LSH3) are more than 50 percent constitute the first 
group while others make up the second group, referred to as widely held firms.  On 
average 18.5 percent of the sample firms can be categorized as widely held firms, 
81.5 percent of them are concentrated firms.  Yearly changes as listed on Table 11 do 
not show significant variations, indicating that there has been only a minor change in 
the ownership structure of the sample firms.  In 82 percent of the sample firms, only 
three shareholders are enough to decide on the future of firms.  If this is the case, 
then it would not be surprising to observe the effects of large shareholders on the 
corporate governance system.  
Table 11 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of LSH3 
Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
LSH3<50 19.05 14.88 18.38 20.13 20.57 19.59 16.49 18.5 
  -21.9% 24% 10% 2% -4.8% -16%  
LSH3>50 80.95 85.12 81.62 79.87 79.43 80.41 83.51 81.5 
  5% -4% -2% -1% 1.2% 4% 
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In the second group, we define three subgroups.  On average, we ignore 7 
percent of the sample firms as described above.  For that reason, we accept 7 percent 
of our sample firms as our error zone and create a new subgroup between 
concentrated and widely held firms.  With this approach, we intend to capture the 
internal dynamics of each class.  We again do not observe any significant deviations 
in the ownership concentrations of the sample firms.  However, the concentrated 
nature of ownership structures is robust in the two groups of classification.  82 
percent of the sample firms have the largest three shareholders whose shares are 
more than 50 percent.  This figure drops to 66 percent when we consider those 
largest three shareholders whose shares are more than 57 percent, but still it is a 
considerable amount to support the previous findings.  
Table 12 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of LSH3 Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 
LSH3<43% 15.24 11.57 13.24 14.29 14.86 13.92 12.89 13.7
  -24% 14% 8% 4% -6% -7%
43%<LSH3<57% 19.05 19.01 22.79 20.78 22.86 17.53 18.56 20.0
  -0.2% 20% -9% 10% -23% 6%
LSH3>57% 65.71 69.42 63.97 64.94 62.29 68.57 68.56 66.3
  6% -8% 2% -4% 10% -0.02% 
 
The Independent-Samples t-test is conducted to compare the means of two 
groups of cases.  Ideally, for this test, the subjects are randomly assigned to two 
groups, so that any difference in response is due to the treatment and not to other 
factors.  T-tests were conducted for both groups by comparing the characteristics of 
the concentrated and widely held firms in the sample.  The results of the t-tests are 
reported in Tables 13 and 14.  The results provide insightful evidence on the 
different characteristics of the concentrated and widely held firms.   
When the size variable is considered, we can assert that concentrated firms 
are large in size.  Debt structure characteristics are also examined and it is found that 
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concentrated firms prefer to use more short-term debt.  On the other hand, significant 
long-term bank loans to total assets ratio shows that concentrated firms use lower 
long term bank loans than widely held firms. 
 
Table 13 Mean Comparison of Percentage Shares of the Largest Three 
Shareholders 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each class.  K 
 LSH3<50% LSH3>50% t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 60,023.72 K 124,602.19 K -3.69*
Return on Assets (ROA) 8.82 7.08 2.20*
Return on Equity (ROE) 14.26 13.83 0.20
Price to Earnings (P/E) 20.23 22.91 -1.01
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.11 5.45 -0.60
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.20 78.39 -0.12
Gross Profit Margin 32.68 34.48 -0.80
Net Profit Margin 14.29 8.93 2.74*
Growth in Gross Sales 109.68 187.54 -0.44
Net Profit Growth Rate 241.62 291.02 -0.21
Total Asset Growth Rate 116.28 100.52 1.84**
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 121.68 162.50 -0.52
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.33 0.31 1.43
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.11 0.09 2.04*
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.40 0.38 0.98
Investment in Process to TA 0.06 0.04 1.53
S/T Liability to TA 0.38 0.43 -3.87*
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.17 0.16 0.69
L/T Liability to TA 0.11 0.13 -1.73
R&D to TA 0.00 0.01 -1.41
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.04 0.06 -1.79**
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.08 -0.07
 
The investment attitude of the firms can be captured with the ratios of total 
fixed assets to total assets, machinery, plant, and equipment to total assets, 
marketing, selling, and distribution expenses to total assets and research, investment 
in process to total assets and development expenses to total assets.  Among those, 
only marketing, selling, and distribution expenses to total assets ratio is significantly 
higher in the concentrated firms.   
When the profitability levels of the concentrated firms are examined, we 
witness significantly lower return on assets (ROA) and net profit margin ratios.  This 
fact suggests that profitability of the concentrated firms is not as good as those 
widely held firms. 
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Table 14 Mean Comparison of Percentage Shares of the Largest Three 
Shareholder 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each class.  K 
stands for 1 000 $ LSH3<43% LSH3>57% t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 65,973.40 K 122,983.04 K -2.95*
Return on Assets (ROA) 10.04 7.11 3.11*
Return on Equity (ROE) 16.99 13.35 1.45
Price to Earnings (P/E) 20.19 22.94 -0.86
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.11 5.09 0.03
S/T liability to L/T Liability 76.96 78.71 -0.95
Gross Profit Margin 32.87 34.51 -0.59
Net Profit Margin 14.16 7.86 3.50*
Growth in Gross Sales 102.58 208.73 -0.46
Net Profit Growth Rate 136.17 272.32 -0.48
Total Asset Growth Rate 114.22 99.06 1.45
Shareholders Equity Growth 116.09 173.68 -0.57
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.34 0.31 2.26*
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.11 0.09 2.07*
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.39 0.37 0.82
Investment in Process to TA 0.06 0.04 2.01*
S/T Liability to TA 0.36 0.44 -4.87*
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.14 0.16 -1.30
L/T Liability to TA 0.12 0.13 -1.11
R&D to TA 0.00 0.01 -1.65
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.03 0.06 -1.92**
L/T Investments to TA 0.09 0.07 0.80
 
The t-test results of the LSH3 with three categories as listed in Table 14 
support the findings of the one with two categories in Table 13.  In addition to those 
significant variables, investment in process to total assets ratio is also significant.  
This ratio contradicts the finding that concentrated firms have higher investment 
attitudes. 
3.2.4 Percentage Shares of Diffused Shareholders (OTHER) 
Diffused and anonymous minority shareholders that are less organized and 
powerless than large shareholders are measured with the variable of OTHER.  In the 
one-share-one-vote system, shareholders whose shares are less than 1 percent are 
taken into consideration with this measure.  When the firms in our sample are 
examined, the mean of the percentage of diffused shareholders is found to be 32 
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percent (median value is 29 percent) as reported in Table 15.  The results of the 
central tendency measures indicate that diffused owners are mostly powerless in the 
governance system of our sample firms.  Firms controlled by diffused owners who 
own more than 50 percent of the shares make up only 12 percent of the sample firms.  
We can claim, in general, that the large shareholders mainly control 88 percent of the 
sample firms.  Those diffused shareholders whose total shares reach up to 70 percent 
control only 4.25 percent of the sample firms.   
Table 15 Summary Statistics of Percentage 
Shares of Diffused Shareholders (OTHER) 
  OTHER 
Mean  31.86
Std. Error of Mean  0.56
Median  28.84
Std. Deviation  18.52
Skewness  1.13
Kurtosis  1.694
Minimum  0.700
Maximum  99.150
Percentiles 
10% 14.00 60% 33.60 
20% 16.18 70% 38.71 
30% 20.00 75% 41.95 
40% 24.46 80% 45.02 
50% 28.84 90% 52.95 
When the changes in the central tendency measures of OTHER as listed in 
Table 16, are examined, we do not witness any significant changes.  This trend 
implies that the power of the small, diffused shareholders does not vary through the 
selected time frame, and it seems that ownership structure remains stable.   
Table 16 Yearly Descriptive Statistics of OTHER 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean 30.626 29.952 31.198 32.102 33.238 32.818 31.809
Change in Mean  -2% 4% 3% 4% -1% -3%
Median 27.000 28.140 29.000 29.110 30.840 28.570 27.975
Change in Median  4% 3% 0.1% 6% -7% -2%
Std. Deviation 19.666 18.050 17.973 18.038 18.183 19.318 18.508
Skewness 0.630 0.957 0.914 1.152 1.244 1.366 1.397
Kurtosis -0.164 1.305 1.339 2.054 2.265 2.080 2.334
Minimum 0.760 0.700 1.800 1.800 1.770 1.830 1.830
Maximum 86.000 95.890 95.730 99.150 98.890 99.000 99.000
 
 
 
76
We have also created two types of categories to explore the main 
characteristics of the concentrated and widely held firms.  In the first category, we 
define the cut off point as 50 percent, and divide the sample firms into two groups.  
In the second category, we divide the sample firms into three groups with the cut off 
points of 43 percent and 57 percent.  Yearly changes of the two categories are 
presented in Table 17 and 18.  When we consider the case in which OTHER is more 
than 50 percent, only 12 percent of our sample firms fall in this category.  This level 
drops to 8 percent when the firms whose OTHER is more than 57 percent are taken 
into account.  Clearly more than 75 percent of our sample firms have concentrated 
ownership structures.   
Table 17 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of two OTHER Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
OTHER<50% 86.67 89.26 88.24 87.66 87.43 86.60 89.18 87.9
  2.99% -1.14% -0.65% -0.27% -0.95% 2.98%
OTHER>50% 13.33 10.74 11.76 12.34 12.57 13.40 10.82 12.1
  -19.42% 9.50% 4.87% 1.89% 6.61% -19.23%  
 
Table 18 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of three OTHER Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG
 OTHER <43% 71.43 79.34 75.74 76.62 74.86 76.29 78.87 76.4
  11.07% -4.54% 1.17% -2.31% 1.91% 3.38%
43%< OTHER <57% 17.14 14.05 17.65 16.88 17.71 14.43 12.89 15.7
  -18.04% 25.61% -4.33% 4.92% -18.52% -10.71%
 OTHER>57% 11.43 6.61 6.62 6.49 7.43 9.28 8.25 8.0
  -42% 0.2% -2% 14% 25% -11%
 
 T-tests were conducted in order to detect differences in the main 
characteristics of the level of diffused ownership (OTHER) in our sample firms.  For 
that reason, two types of classifications are designed as explained in the previous 
section.  T-test results of both classes are similar, providing similar evidence for the 
characteristics of the diffused ownership as documented in Table 19 and 20.   
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Firms with diffused ownership are relatively smaller firms when compared to 
concentrated firms.  This finding is consistent with the previous ownership 
concentration variables.  Concentration of the sample firms may be explained with 
the historical trend in the Turkish corporate life.  When we examine the firms listed 
on Istanbul Stock Exchange, we face an inherent bias in favor of large firms.  
Government and families are the dominant owner groups in the corporate history.  
With the ongoing privatization programs, the involvement of government is 
decreasing while the families are defending their positions.  For that reason, it is not 
surprising to witness diffused ownership in smaller firms.  These firms are generally 
new business enterprises, which gather the contribution of variety of investors.  Most 
of the time, families do not tolerate losing the control of their firms, and we do not 
witness any takeover battles in that type of firms.  However, we sometimes face 
proxy fights in some widely held firms where there are no dominant ownership 
groups that hold more than 50 percent of the shares.   
When the capital structures of the widely held firms are examined, we 
witness higher leverage levels than in concentrated firms.  Their debt levels (short-
term liability to total assets and long-term liability to total assets) are significantly 
higher in the widely held firms.  On the other hand, widely held firms tend to have 
higher ROA and net profit margin ratios, indicating higher profitability levels.   
 Investment ratios reveal contradictory results.  When marketing, selling and 
distribution expenses to total assets is higher in widely held firms, total fixed assets 
to total assets ratio shows opposite relationship.  By considering the findings, in sum, 
we can assert that widely held firms are smaller in size and have higher leverage, and 
lower profitability ratios. 
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Table 19 Mean Comparison of Percentage Shares of Diffused Shareholders 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each class.  K 
stands for 1,000 $. 
 OTHER<50% OTHER >50% t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 119,459.94 K 63,221.73 K 2.69*
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.15 9.22 -2.20*
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.93 13.72 0.08
Price to Earnings (P/E) 22.60 20.97 0.51
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.51 4.53 1.47
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.09 80.29 -1.15
Gross Profit Margin 34.33 32.72 0.60
Net Profit Margin 9.36 14.15 -2.04*
Growth in Gross Sales 181.92 107.75 0.35
Net Profit Growth Rate 282.09 279.03 0.01
Total Asset Growth Rate 103.82 101.06 0.27
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 161.96 103.39 0.63
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.31 0.33 -1.43
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.10 -0.57
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.38 0.40 -0.95
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.06 -1.42
S/T Liability to TA 0.43 0.37 3.33*
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.16 0.15 0.53
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.10 2.96*
R&D to TA 0.01 0.00 1.24
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.06 0.03 2.20*
L/T Investments to TA 0.09 0.08 0.35
 
Table 20 Mean Comparison of Percentage Shares of Diffused Shareholders 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each class.  K 
stands for 1,000 $. 
 OTHER<43% OTHER>57 t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 116,816.05 K 58,719.63 K 2.42* 
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.01 9.97 -2.54* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.28 16.68 -1.11 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 22.59 22.11 0.12 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.36 3.99 1.80** 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.46 79.50 -0.44 
Gross Profit Margin 34.85 31.44 0.97 
Net Profit Margin 8.44 12.22 -1.68 
Growth in Gross Sales 193.73 101.99 0.31 
Net Profit Growth Rate 295.00 72.49 0.59 
Total Asset Growth Rate 100.26 93.10 0.93 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 165.09 101.19 0.50 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.31 0.36 -2.87* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.08 0.47 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.38 0.40 -0.81 
Investment in Process to TA 0.04 0.06 -1.45 
S/T Liability to TA 0.44 0.35 3.95* 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.16 0.15 0.95 
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.09 3.45* 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.00 1.36 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.06 0.03 1.99* 
L/T Investments to TA 0.07 0.08 -0.56 
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3.2.5 Cash Flow Right(s) of the Ultimate Controlling Owner(s) (CASH)  
When we need to classify corporations based on their control uniqueness, 
ownership concentration will give us insight.  In order to make this classification 
much clearer we need to determine the voting power of the controlling shareholder 
and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate owner(s).  The largest shareholder stakes will 
help us to define the voting power of the controlling stakeholder(s).  In the one-
share-one-vote system, it is generally accepted that those who own more than 50 
percent of the shares have the right to control the firm and are dominant in the 
decision-making process.  Furthermore, we also need to measure the cash flow 
right(s) of the ultimate owner(s) as defined by Yurtoglu (2000).  Most of the Turkish 
firms have complex network of ownership.  In the presence of a pyramidal 
ownership structure, we calculate cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling 
owner(s) by considering both direct ownership and indirect ownership via the shares 
of the parent company.   
In order to explain the pyramidal and complex network of ownership 
structures, consider the case of Koç Holding, a holding company, and Arçelik, a 
manufacturer of consumer durables, owned by Koç family.  The controlling family 
owns and controls the majority stake of 65.52 percent of Koç Holding, and 10.55 
percent of the shares of Arçelik.  Given that Koç Holding Co. holds 38.25 percent of 
shares in Arçelik, cash flow rights of the controlling family in that company is 35.61 
percent [(0.6552 x 0.3825) + 0.1055].   
The summary statistics of the cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling 
owner(s) variable are calculated and the results are presented in Table 21.  The mean 
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of the cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) of the sample firms is 
61 percent.  This figure is very close to the mean of the cumulative shares of the 
largest three shareholders (LSH3).  This finding indicates that on average cash flow 
rights and voting rights of the sample firms are comparable.  In the overall 
evaluation, the mean value of 61 percent is significant to conclude in favor of the 
concentrated nature of the Turkish firms.  In support of this claim, 75 percent of the 
sample firms have a cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) of more 
than 50 percent.  When the yearly descriptive statistics of cash flow right(s) of the 
ultimate controlling owner(s) are examined, we do not encounter any significant 
changes between 1992 and 1998. 
Table 21 Summary Statistics of Cash Flow 
Right(s) of the Ultimate Controlling Owner(s) 
  CASH 
Mean  61.179
Std. Error of Mean  0.577
Median  61.79
Std. Deviation  18.947
Skewness  -0.45
Kurtosis  0.297
Minimum  1.00
Maximum  99.80
Percentiles 
10% 37.50 60% 66.89 
20% 48.02 70% 72.57 
30% 51.96 75% 75.00 
40% 55.78 80% 78.59 
50% 61.79 90% 84.80 
 
 Table 22 Yearly Descriptive Statistics of Cash Flow Right(s) of 
the Ultimate Controlling Owner(s)  
CASH  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean 61.016 62.567 60.087 61.560 62.024 60.354 60.933
Change in Mean  3% -4% 2% 1% -3% 1%
Median 58.530 60.710 58.790 63.270 63.095 62.735 63.190
Change in Median  4% -3% 8% -0.1% -1% 1%
Std. Deviation 20.205 18.717 18.630 18.579 17.799 19.776 19.246
Skewness 0.018 -0.227 -0.325 -0.430 -0.566 -0.666 -0.635
Kurtosis -0.704 -0.062 0.353 0.297 0.985 0.498 0.478
Minimum 14.00 4.11 5.19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Maximum 99.24 99.30 98.20 99.80 99.80 99.80 99.80
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 We again created two categories with different cut off points.  In the first 
category, we defined the cut off point as 50 percent and establish two groups.  In the 
second category, cut off points were determined as 43 percent and 57 percent by 
taking into consideration the 7 percent error of data gathering process.  Yearly 
changes in each category are documented respectively in Tables 23 and 24.   
Firms with cash flow rights more than 50 percent, make up 78 percent of our 
sample firms in the first category where the cut point is 50 percent.  This value drops 
to 58 percent in the second category where the cut off points are 43 and 57 percent.  
T-tests were performed to reveal the differences between concentrated and 
diffused cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s).  T-test results of both 
groups of the cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH) are 
presented in Tables 25 and 26. 
 
Table 23 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of two CASH 
Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
CASH<50 23.81 21.49 25.74 20.78 17.24 22.68 23.20 22.00 
  -9.8% 19.8% -19.3% -17% 31.6% 2.3%  
CASH>50 76.19 78.51 74.26 79.22 82.76 77.32 76.80 78.00 
  3.1% -5.4% 6.7% 4.5% -6.6% -0.7%  
 
 
Table 24 Yearly Changes in the Percentages of three CASH 
Categories. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG
CASH<43% 21.90 11.57 13.97 12.99 11.49 15.46 14.95 14.4
  -47% 21% -7% -11% 35% -3%
43%<CASH<57% 26.67 30.58 32.35 29.22 28.16 25.28 25.26 27.9
  15% 6% -10% -4% -10% -0.08%
CASH>57% 51.43 57.85 53.68 57.79 60.34 59.28 59.79 57.7
  12% -7% 8% 4% -2% 1%
 
  
When the t-test results were examined, we encounter mixed findings for the 
size variable.  Size is significant in the two category model but not in the three 
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category model.  On the other hand, results of the capital structure variables are 
consistent with those of LSH3 and OTHER.  Firms with concentrated cash flow 
right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) have higher debt levels as measured by 
short-term liability to total assets, long-term liability to total assets and short-term 
bank loans to total assets ratio.  Considering the profitability levels, firms with 
concentrated cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) have 
significantly higher gross profit margin, but lower ROA.   
 
Table 25 Mean Comparison of the two CASH categories. 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each 
class
 CASH<50% CASH >50% t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 90,134.64 119,078.89 -2,57* 
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.61 7.36 0.35 
Return on Equity (ROE) 12.89 14.25 -0.68 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 22.22 22.46 -0.09 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.28 5.40 -0.22 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.20 78.39 -0.13 
Gross Profit Margin 31.05 35.00 -1.84** 
Net Profit Margin 11.84 9.44 1.29 
Growth in Gross Sales 100.92 192.84 -0.54 
Net Profit Growth Rate 181.51 311.81 -0.58 
Total Asset Growth Rate 107.38 102.56 0.59 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 107.33 167.82 -0.82 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.35 0.30 3.94* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.09 -0.17 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.43 0.37 3.36* 
Investment in Process to TA 0.06 0.04 1.67 
S/T Liability to TA 0.37 0.44 -4.89* 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.13 0.17 -2.50* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.11 0.13 -1.93** 
R&D to TA 0.00 0.01 -1.24 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.04 0.05 -1.48 
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.09 -0.17 
 
 
 
Firms with higher CASH values have lower investment ratios of total fixed 
assets to total assets and machinery, plant, and equipment to total assets.  This shows 
the lower investment attitude of those firms.  Firms with concentrated cash flow 
rights have higher leverage, and lower investment attitudes. 
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Table 26 Mean Comparison of the three CASH categories. 
Figures in the body of table are t-statistics and variable mean values of each 
class CASH<43% CASH>57% t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 97,899.25 120,295.24 -1,56 
Return on Assets (ROA) 8.80 6.94 2.01* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 14.99 13.16 0.73 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 24.21 22.71 0.44 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.87 5.05 1.35 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 76.72 78.17 -0.76 
Gross Profit Margin 30.91 35.50 -1.57 
Net Profit Margin 10.31 7.84 1.29 
Growth in Gross Sales 96.74 225.94 -0.52 
Net Profit Growth Rate 49.20 364.74 -0.98 
Total Asset Growth Rate 109.52 102.30 0.65 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 111.60 186.36 -0.69 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.34 0.31 2.22* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.09 0.01 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.41 0.37 1.75** 
Investment in Process to TA 0.06 0.04 2.31* 
S/T Liability to TA 0.37 0.44 -4.16* 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.13 0.17 -2.55* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.12 0.13 -1.72** 
R&D to TA 0.00 0.01 -1.09 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.04 0.05 -1.24 
L/T Investments to TA 0.09 0.06 1.62 
 
3.3 OWNERSHIP MIX 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Ownership mix measures are intended to capture the other illustrative aspects 
of the ownership structure phenomenon that cannot be explained only by the 
ownership concentration variables.  In addition to the influencing power of 
shareholders, the identity of the owners needs to be considered for the categorization 
of ownership structure.  Noticeably, each ownership identity class will have common 
goals and interests.  These common goals and interests will generate similar 
incentive mechanisms, which will guide them to act in predetermined ways.   
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Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) state that maximization of the economic profits 
can only be defined as the main goal when markets are complete.  However, even 
owners, based on their interests and incentives may sacrifice profit maximization 
goal for different preferences such as risk avoidance, time profile of expected cash 
flow etc.   
We have attempted to differentiate owner identity groups based on their 
commonalities and define them as ownership mix variables.  These owner identity 
measures are: 
• Conglomerate affiliation (CONG) 
• Family ownership (FAM) 
• Group ownership (CFAM) 
• Foreign ownership (FRGN) 
• Government ownership (GOV) 
• Cross ownership (CROSS)  
• Dispersed ownership (DISP)   
 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) conclude in their study that each ownership 
category has different objectives with implications for corporate strategy and 
performance.  Before examining the consequences of the ownership structures, we 
need to map the ownership structure characteristics of the firms in our sample with 
respect to identity characteristics.  In the following sections we will examine the 
characteristics of each ownership mix group in our sample firms. 
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3.3.2 Conglomerate Affiliation (CONG)  
The conglomerate affiliation (CONG) variable defines whether a firm is a 
member of a conglomerate or not.  A conglomerate creates an integral link between 
its affiliates.  This link provides some advantages, like knowledge curve and 
knowledge transfer, and efficient use of critical inputs.  However, disadvantages 
include loss of flexibility.  Kester (1992) reports that the cost of the advantages of 
conglomerates is loss of flexibility, and the risk of deficient mutual monitoring.  This 
unique ownership structure creates its own incentives and dynamics which are 
expected be reflected in its unique decision-making process.  Conglomerate affiliates 
are likely to be in the backward or forward integration chain of the other member 
firms.  Each conglomerate has an incentive to embody a bank in order to finance 
their own affiliations.  These equity and debt financing options within the 
conglomerate are expected to be reflected in corporate behavior.  Conglomerate 
affiliates tend to internalize their transactions with the providers of critical input, 
which makes sense under conditions of high asset specificity and transaction 
frequency. (Williamson, 1985)  All of those justifications lead us to include the 
conglomerate affiliation variable into our analyses. 
Ownership structure can be defined as a pyramid if it has an ultimate 
controlling owner, and there is at least one company between it and the ultimate 
owner in the chain of voting rights.  When we examine the ownership structure of 
conglomerate affiliates in our sample firms, we observe a pyramidal ownership 
structure.  Most of the conglomerates in Turkey use the pyramidal structure in order 
to keep control of their affiliates.   
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Conglomerate affiliates seem to have decreased between 1992 and 1998 as 
documented in Table 27.  This decrease is caused by either a real decrease of the 
involvement of the conglomerates or new firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange 
between 1992 and 1998 are not conglomerate affiliates.  Conglomerate affiliates 
decreased from 33 percent to 27 percent in a seven-year period with a decline rate of 
18 percent.  On the other hand, non-conglomerate affiliates rose to 73 percent from 
67 percent during the analysis period. 
Table 27 Yearly Percentages of Conglomerate Affiliation (CONG) 
CONG (1): conglomerate affiliates and CONG (0): the other firms. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
CONG(0) 66.67 68.60 69.85 69.48 70.86 72.68 72.71 70.5
∆CONG(0)  3% 2% -1% 2% 3% 0.1% 
CONG(1) 33.33 31.40 30.15 30.52 29.14 27.32 27.34 29.5
∆CONG(1)   -6% -4% 1% -5% -6% 0.1% 
 T-tests were conducted to discover the main characteristics of conglomerates 
and results are reported in Table 28.  The results of the t-tests do not reveal detailed 
insights regarding the nature of the conglomerate affiliates.  The t-tests do reveal, 
however, that price to earnings and market to book value ratios are significantly 
higher for the conglomerate affiliates.  Stock prices of conglomerate firms are higher 
than those of other firms even though they have similar earnings patterns.  
Furthermore, market to book values of the conglomerate affiliates is significantly 
higher than those of non-conglomerate firms at a given level of book value.  This fact 
shows that market performance of the firms is better than their profitability ratios.  
On the other hand, higher marketing, selling, and distribution expenses to total assets 
ratio in conglomerate affiliates is an indication of higher investment levels.  Those 
conglomerate affiliates seem to use less short-term bank loans in their debt 
structures. 
 
 
87
Table 28 Mean Comparison of Conglomerate Affiliation (CONG) 
CONG (1): conglomerate affiliates and CONG (0): the others.  K stands 
for 1,000 $. 
 CONG(0) CONG(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 112,157.20 113,768.7 -0.11 
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.33 7.56 -0.34 
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.12 15.77 -1.46 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 19.86 28.21 -3.72* 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 4.83 6.59 -3.71* 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.65 77.69 0.71 
Gross Profit Margin 34.49 33.34 0.61 
Net Profit Margin 10.51 8.64 1.13 
Growth in Gross Sales 203.46 105.53 0.65 
Net Profit Growth Rate 198.56 465.30 -1.34 
Total Asset Growth Rate 104.11 102.11 0.28 
Shareholders Equity Growth 174.41 111.55 0.96 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.31 0.30 0.77 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.10 -1.14 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.38 0.38 -0.31 
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.04 0.74 
S/T Liability to TA 0.43 0.41 1.56 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.17 0.13 3.99* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.12 0.13 -1.01 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.01 -0.80 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.04 0.07 -2.76* 
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.09 -0.69 
3.3.3 Family Ownership (FAM)  
The family ownership (FAM) variable captures the attributes of a firm that is 
controlled by a family or a group of families.  There is a small distinction between 
conglomerate affiliation and family ownership.  Even though a family or a group of 
families control almost all of the conglomerates in Turkey, we can classify them in 
terms of their economic power and business diversification levels.  This difference is 
mainly caused by the varying economic power and size of those two groups.  Family 
ownership (FAM) is mostly associated with a double role for the family as owners 
and managers of a firm.  Since families tend to have intense firm specific 
investments in human capital, they will tend to be reluctant to relinquish control.  
While we observe strong support of the conglomerate for its affiliates, we do not 
expect to see that much support in family-owned firms.  The dual role of family 
members may lead them to have different goals and interests and, as a result, 
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different incentive mechanisms emerge.  Moreover, family members have a higher 
stake on the firm based on their total commitments and historical links with it.  All of 
those characteristics of the family ownership are expected to be reflected in 
corporate performance.   
Family ownership has an increasing trend between 1992 and 1998.  The 
percentage of firms with family ownership rose to 49 percent in 1998 from 36 
percent in 1992.  The main reason for this increasing trend is the new firms joining 
the ISE are mainly family-owned firms.  Families seem to have discovered that 
selling equity for financing their projects, rather than using high cost debt, is more 
profitable.  
The t-test results, as reported in Table 30, reveal the characteristics of family 
ownership.  Family-owned firms are smaller firms compared to the others with the 
statistically significant t-statistics (significance level of 0.05).  Most of the 
conglomerate affiliates are mainly controlled by a family or a group of families, but 
those firms are relatively large in size and conglomerates have relatively lower 
business risk associated with the diversified business firms within the same 
conglomerate.  Conversely, family-controlled firms are not big enough to 
institutionalize and do not attain financial resources as easily as conglomerate 
affiliates.  This fact is reflected on the lower performance measures of ROA, P/E and 
MBV of family-owned firms.   
Table 29 Yearly Percentages of Family Ownership (FAM) 
FAM (1): family-owned firms and FAM (0): the other firms. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
FAM(0) 63.81 59.50 56.62 55.84 54.29 51.55 51.03 55.2
∆FAM(0)  -7% -5% -1% -3% -5% -1%
FAM(1) 36.19 40.50 43.38 44.16 45.71 48.45 48.97 44.8
∆FAM(1)   12% 7% 2% 4% 6% 1%
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Marketing, selling and distribution expenses to total assets and long-term 
investments to total assets are significantly lower in the family-owned firms.  This 
fact suggests that family-owned firms follow lower level of investment policies 
compared to other firms.  Families may be reluctant on investing new projects 
because of their risk-averse attitude. 
When the debt policies of the family-owned firms in our sample are 
examined, we witness the tendency of using short-term debt.  Family-owned firms 
have higher short-term liabilities to total assets and short-term bank loans.   
Profitability levels are inferior in the family-owned firms.  Those firms have 
lower ROA ratios.  This finding is consistent with the poor performance measures of 
the family-owned firms. 
Table 30 Mean Comparison of Family Ownership 
FAM (1): conglomerate affiliates and FAM (0): the others.  K stands for 1000 
$. 
 FAM(0) FAM(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 158,618.74 K 55,886.76 K 7.66* 
Return on Assets (ROA) 8.08 6.54 2.50* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 15.03 12.49 1.53 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 24.83 19.36 2.62* 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.93 4.62 2.91* 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 77.08 80.06 -2.38* 
Gross Profit Margin 35.25 32.63 1.47 
Net Profit Margin 9.98 9.87 0.07 
Growth in Gross Sales 222.44 104.44 0.84 
Net Profit Growth Rate 263.31 306.93 -0.23 
Total Asset Growth Rate 101.55 106.13 -0.67 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 104.77 223.34 -1.93** 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.32 0.30 1.36 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.09 -0.88 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.39 0.36 1.71 
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.05 -0.09 
S/T Liability to TA 0.40 0.45 -4.59* 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.12 0.20 -7.67* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.12 1.24 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.00 1.18 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.06 0.04 2.55* 
L/T Investments to TA 0.10 0.07 2.28* 
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3.3.4 Group Ownership (CFAM) 
Even though there is a distinction between family ownership and 
conglomerate affiliation, inclusion of both sides in a new group, which has similar 
type of incentives, may help us to capture different aspects of the characteristics.  
CFAM variable is defined by inclusion of both CONG and FAM firms into a new 
pool.  With the classification of group ownership (CFAM), we intend to differentiate 
firms operating under the control of a family or a group of families without 
considering size, diversification, and institutionalization level of a firm.  The 
cumulative percentages of firms with group ownership are 74.5 percent on average.  
This figure shows a slightly increasing trend from 1992 to 1998.  This increasing 
trend is largely derived from the increasing initial public offerings (IPO) preferences 
of the family-owned firms. 
Table 31 Yearly Percentages of Group Ownership 
CFAM (1): conglomerate affiliates and family-owned firms and CFAM (0): the other firms.
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
CFAM(0) 30.48 28.10 26.47 25.32 24.57 23.71 23.20 25.50
∆CFAM(0)  -8% -6% -4% -3% -4% -2% 
CFAM(1) 69.52 71.90 73.53 74.68 75.43 76.29 76.80 74.50
∆CFAM(1)   3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
 
 When the t-test results of the group ownership, as presented in Table 32, are 
examined, we witness similar findings to family ownership (FAM).  This fact shows 
dominance of the family-owned firms in this categorization.   
Firms with group ownership (CFAM) are also small firms when compared 
with the other firms.  Even though, conglomerate affiliates (CONG) are categorized 
as large firms, family-owned (FAM) firms are relatively smaller.    
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Table 32 Mean Comparison of Group Ownership 
CFAM (1): conglomerate affiliates and family-owned firms and CFAM (0): the 
others.  K stands for 1,000 $. 
 CFAM(0) CFAM(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 211,667.46 K 78,758.11 K 8.75* 
Return on Assets (ROA) 8.72 6.94 2.54* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 14.22 13.80 0.22 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 20.87 22.91 -0.84 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.14 5.48 -0.67 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 76.30 79.09 -1.97** 
Gross Profit Margin 37.53 32.91 2.32* 
Net Profit Margin 11.55 9.35 1.27 
Growth in Gross Sales 361.04 104.81 1.63 
Net Profit Growth Rate 26.05 373.76 -1.66 
Total Asset Growth Rate 101.23 104.29 -0.40 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 96.81 175.70 -1.14 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.33 0.30 2.44* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.08 0.10 -2.04* 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.40 0.37 1.58 
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.05 0.74 
S/T Liability to TA 0.39 0.43 -3.59* 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.12 0.17 -4.64* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.12 0.46 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.01 0.12 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.05 0.05 0.01 
L/T Investments to TA 0.10 0.08 1.52 
 
Firms under this categorization are experiencing higher short-term liability, 
short-term bank loans and long-term bank loans.  In the overall evaluation of the test 
results, we can claim that CFAM is not revealing us insightful information to 
describe ownership structure characteristics. 
3.3.5 Foreign Ownership (FRGN) 
The foreign ownership (FRGN) variable measures the stake of foreign 
ownership within the company.  We try to differentiate between foreign owners and 
foreign investors by considering the magnitude of their investments.  It is believed 
that the higher the magnitude of their investments, the more incentives these 
investors are likely to have to participate in corporate governance.  For that reason, 
foreign investors that own more than 10 percent of all shares are taken into account 
and considered as foreign partners.  The cutoff point of 10 percent is used because 
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(1) it provides a significant threshold of votes; and (2) CMB the mandates disclosure 
of 10 percent of ownership stakes.  
Foreign investors have an increasing interest in the Istanbul Stock Exchange.  
When we examine the realized net foreign direct investments by years, as presented 
in Figure 7, we observe an increasing trend until 1991 and after then relatively stable 
nature.  Foreign investment values were 125 million US dollars in 1992, and reached 
its maximum level of 783 million US dollars in 1991.  
The percentage of the firms with foreign partners is, on average, 17 percent.  
We observe a relatively stable trend in the increasing percentages of the firms with 
foreign partners.  Foreign owner percentages are sensitive to changes in general and 
country specific macro economic conditions.  On the other hand, foreign partners are 
long-term perspective investors unlike foreign portfolio investors who are generally 
first to leave the sinking ship.  The percentage of the foreign owners in Turkish firms 
is relative low compared to other European countries.  For example, as reported by 
Pederson and Thomsen (1997), the percentage of complete foreign ownership 
(foreigners own more than 50% of equity) is 61 percent in Belgium, 45 percent in 
Spain, and 38 percent in Austria; where as, in Turkey complete foreign ownership is 
only 4 percent. 
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Table 33 Yearly Percentages of Foreign Ownership 
FRGN (1): firms with foreign owners and FRGN (0): the other firms. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
FRGN(0) 82.86 84.30 82.35 82.47 83.43 81.96 81.44 82.60
∆FRGN(0)  2% -2% 0.1% 1% -2% -1% 
FRGN(1) 17.14 15.70 17.65 17.53 16.57 18.04 18.56 17.40
∆FRGN(1)   -8% 12% -1% -5% 9% 3% 
 
Independent sample t-tests were conducted by including all control variables 
to detect significant differences between firms with foreign partners and the other 
firms.  The results of the t-tests are reported in Table 34.  Firms with foreign 
ownership are larger in size.   
Accounting-based performance measures of return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) as well as the market-based performance measure of market 
to book value (MBV) ratios are higher in the firms with foreign ownership (FRGN).   
Those firms with foreign ownership (FRGN) tend to use less long-term bank 
loans and have lower long-term liabilities.  This may be caused by the general macro 
economic conditions of Turkey and high inflation experienced between 1992 and 
1998.   
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Table 34 Mean Comparison of Foreign Ownership 
FRGN (1): firms with foreign owners and FRGN (0): the others.  K stands for 1,000 
$.
 FRGN(0) FRGN(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 108,707.80 K 131,230.90 K -1.81** 
Return on Assets (ROA) 6.79 10.28 -4.34* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 12.88 18.70 -2.69* 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 22.34 22.70 -0.13 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.13 6.56 -2.45* 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.04 79.89 -1.12 
Gross Profit Margin 34.56 32.03 1.07 
Net Profit Margin 9.72 10.99 -0.63 
Growth in Gross Sales 188.77 93.17 0.51 
Net Profit Growth Rate 314.14 119.05 0.79 
Total Asset Growth Rate 105.71 92.31 1.49 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 163.43 111.59 0.63 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.32 0.28 2.93* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.10 0.06 3.12* 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.38 0.37 0.42 
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.03 3.05* 
S/T Liability to TA 0.42 0.43 -0.23 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.16 0.15 1.28 
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.11 2.24* 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.01 -1.10 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.04 0.09 -3.87* 
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.13 -2.34* 
Investment attitudes of firms with foreign ownership can be categorized as 
low since total fixed assets to total assets and investment in process to total assets 
ratios are significantly lower than the other firms. 
3.3.6 Government Ownership (GOV)  
The government ownership (GOV) variable intends to capture the 
characteristics of government-controlled firms.  Government ownership defines 
whether a firm is controlled by government agencies or not.  We do not include 
private firms in which government agencies own a small percentage of shares (less 
than 50%) and therefore are not among the controlling shareholders.  
Government-owned or controlled firms are mainly under the influence of 
politicians.  Economic realities may not coincide with the political expectations and 
interests.  This claim is supported with the findings of Shepherd (1989).  
Government authorities that are under the influence of politicians may disregard 
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economic necessities at the expense of public and other owners.  As it is commonly 
believed, government control has its own dynamics and preferences, which might 
differ drastically from the privately owned firms.  Megginson et al. (1994) asserts 
that government-owned firms are less efficient than privately owned firms.  These 
differences are expected to shed some light on corporate behavior. 
When we examine the yearly mean values of government ownership (GOV) 
percentages are examined we observe a consistently decreasing trend.  Although 
government ownership (GOV) percentage was 10 percent in 1992, this value had 
dropped to 6 percent in 1998.  The ongoing privatization programs in Turkey can 
explain this decreasing trend.   
Table 35 Yearly Percentages of Government Ownership 
GOV (1): government-owned firms and GOV (0): the other firms. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
GOV(0) 89.52 91.74 92.65 92.86 92.57 93.81 93.81 92.7 
∆GOV(0)  2% 1% 0.2% -0.3% 1% 0%  
GOV(1) 10.48 8.26 7.35 7.14 7.43 6.19 6.19 7.3 
∆GOV(1)   -21% -11% -3% 4% -17% 0%  
 
 When the independent sample t-test results, as presented in Table 36, are 
examined, we observe rich findings of government versus non-government firm 
characteristics.  As expected, government-owned firms are large in size, as reflected 
in the size variable book value of equity (TA).  Most of those firms are among the 
largest business enterprises listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange.  
When the debt structures of government-owned firms are examined, we find 
that government-owned firms tend to have more long-term liabilities to total assets 
and less short-term bank loans to total assets.  Less short-term liability to long-term 
liability ratio also supports that. 
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Table 36 Mean Comparison of Government Ownership 
GOV (1): government-owned firms and GOV (0): the others.  K stands for 1,000 
$
 GOV(0) GOV(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 79,680.13 K 529,746.11 K -4.57* 
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.69 3.71 3.40* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 14.77 3.03 3.74* 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 22.23 25.00 -0.64 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.33 6.04 -0.87 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 79.16 68.84 4.51* 
Gross Profit Margin 34.72 27.31 2.28* 
Net Profit Margin 10.40 4.50 2.08* 
Growth in Gross Sales 178.99 103.12 0.30 
Net Profit Growth Rate 326.22 -223.95 1.63 
Total Asset Growth Rate 104.85 87.95 1.38 
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 160.89 85.77 0.67 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.31 0.39 -3.79* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.10 -0.92 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.38 0.44 -1.86** 
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.07 -1.97** 
S/T Liability to TA 0.42 0.40 1.16 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.17 0.07 4.16* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.12 0.18 -4.14* 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.00 0.56 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.05 0.02 2.16* 
L/T Investments to TA 0.09 0.05 1.64 
 
Government-owned firms have comparatively lower ROA, ROE, gross and net 
profit margins.  This is an indication of lower performance of the government-owned 
or controlled firms but we need to examine it in detail. 
Machinery, plant and equipment to total assets, investment in progress to total 
assets, and total fixed assets to total assets of government-owned firms are 
significantly higher compared to other firms.  However, marketing, selling and 
distribution expenses to total assets ratio is lower.  All of these variables are 
indicators of the investment attitude of a firm.  By considering the higher values of 
those listed variables, we can claim that government-owned firms have relatively 
better investment attitudes when compared to other firms.   
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3.3.7 Cross Ownership (CROSS) 
The cross ownership (CROSS) variable is used in order to determine the firms 
with complex ownership networks.  It is not uncommon to encounter the name of 
another firm in the list of owners of a public corporation.  This ownership 
relationship becomes more confusing when the owned firm owns some percentage of 
the shares of his owner firm.  We say that there is cross-shareholding by sample firm 
A in its control chain if A owns any shares in its controlling shareholder or in the 
companies along that chain of control.  For example, firm A is owned by firm B and, 
at the same time, firm B carries some percentage shares of firm A.  It gets very 
complicated when more than three firms are involved in this sort of ownership 
structure.  It becomes difficult to find an answer to the question, “Who really owns 
that firm?”   
 Cross ownership is not so common in our sample firms.  Only 28 percent of 
our sample firms have cross ownership (CROSS) with a decreasing trend.  Although 
cross ownership (CROSS) in our sample was 35 percent in 1992, it dropped to 25 
percent in 1998.  Mostly, conglomerate firms have a cross ownership structure.  
Conglomerate governance systems use cross ownership to transfer financial 
resources from one affiliate to another via block equity transfers.  By way of internal 
fund transfers, conglomerate governance systems meet the fund requirements within 
the conglomerate by keeping control of the firms within the conglomerate.  77 
percent of the firms with cross ownership (CROSS) are affiliates of a distinct 
conglomerate.  On the other hand, none of those firms are government-owned and 
only 3 percent is dispersedly owned.  87 percent of the firms with cross ownership 
(CROSS) have LSH3 values more than 50 percent.  These findings lead us to 
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conclude that concentrated firms use cross ownership (CROSS) as a governance 
system to control their affiliates and at the same time transfer equity between their 
affiliates.   
 Table 37 Yearly Percentages of Cross Ownership 
CROSS (1): firms with cross ownership and CROSS (0): the other 
firms. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
CROSS(0) 64.76 69.42 70.59 72.08 74.86 74.74 75.26 72.4 
∆CROSS(0)  7% 2% 2% 4% -0.2% 1%  
CROSS(1) 35.24 30.58 29.41 27.92 25.14 25.26 24.74 27.6 
∆CROSS(1)  -13% -4% -5% -10% 0.5% -2% 
 
Table 38 Mean Comparison of Cross Ownership 
CROSS (1): firms with cross ownership and CROSS (0): the others.  K stands for 1,000 
$ CROSS(0) CROSS(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 118,385.10 K 97,554.60 K 1.85**
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.57 6.94 0.92
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.74 14.36 -0.33
Price to Earnings (P/E) 20.30 27.77 -3.24*
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.16 5.93 -1.57
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.22 78.69 -0.34
Gross Profit Margin 34.13 34.17 -0.02
Net Profit Margin 10.53 8.47 1.22
Growth in Gross Sales 201.15 105.65 0.63
Net Profit Growth Rate 202.82 469.74 -1.32
Total Asset Growth Rate 104.88 100.17 0.64
Shareholders Equity Growth Rate 171.13 115.93 0.83
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.31 0.32 -1.30
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.10 -2.15*
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.37 0.41 -2.39*
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.05 -0.50
S/T Liability to TA 0.43 0.41 1.29
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.17 0.14 2.17*
L/T Liability to TA 0.12 0.14 -2.05*
R&D to TA 0.01 0.01 -1.58
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.05 0.06 -1.39
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.08 0.06
 
When we examine the differences of the main characteristics of the firms 
with cross ownership (CROSS), we do not uncover insightful results.  Firms with 
cross ownership (CROSS) have significantly higher price to earnings (PE) ratio.  
This fact indicates that market optimistically appraises the potential of those firms 
and rewards them with relatively higher stock prices.  Firms with cross ownership 
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seem to have more long-term liability, long-term bank loans and less short-term bank 
loans.  When the investment attitudes of those firms are examined we can suspect 
higher investment attitudes, since these firms have higher machinery, plant and 
equipment to total assets ratio. 
3.3.8 Dispersed Ownership (DISP) 
The dispersed ownership (DISP) variable categorizes firms which are owned 
by dispersed, atomistic shareholders.  In this case, neither a single person nor group 
has the privilege to control the firm.  Diffused ownership yields significant power 
into the hands of managers, whose interests may not coincide with the interests of 
other stakeholders.  Pension fund firms constitute an example for this type of a 
categorization.  Firms operating in this type of category have some disadvantage.  It 
may not be easy for this type of a firm to find cheap financing alternatives without 
losing control when compared to a conglomerate affiliate.  Besides, this type of a 
firm does not have the privilege of transferring expertise from other firms like 
conglomerate affiliates.  It is also challenging for those firms with cross ownership 
(CROSS) to create vertical integration.  However, those firms are much more 
flexible and responsive to changing conditions.   
When we examine the yearly percentages of the dispersed firms, we do not 
observe a dramatic change through time.  Even though there are slight ups and 
downs, the maximum change does not exceed 1.37 percent. 
Independent sample t-tests were conducted to reveal the main characteristics 
of firms with dispersed ownership (DISP).  Widely held firms are significantly 
smaller in size.  When the performance measures are examined, we find that 
dispersed firms tend to have higher accounting-based performance as measured with 
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the return on assets ratio (ROA), but a lower market-based performance as measured 
with the market to book value (MBV).  On the other hand, the gross and net profit 
margins of dispersed firms are significantly higher when compared to other firms.  
Firms in this category have significantly lower leverage levels as measured by the 
debt to total assets ratios listed in Table 40.  Investment attitudes of these firms can 
be defined as poor, since long-term investments to total assets and total fixed assets 
to total assets are significantly low. 
Table 39 Yearly Percentages of Dispersed Ownership 
DISP (1): dispersed firms and DISP (0): the other firms. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AVG 
DISP(0) 87.62 87.60 88.97 88.31 88.57 88.14 87.63 88.1
∆DISP(0)  -0.02% 2% -1% 0.1% -0.5% -1% 
DISP(1) 12.38 12.40 11.03 11.69 11.43 11.86 12.37 11.9
∆DISP(1)  0.1% -11% 6% -2% 3.7% 4% 
 
Table 40 Mean Comparison of Dispersed Ownership  
DISP (1): dispersed firms and DISP (0): the others.  K stands for 1,000 $. 
 DISP(0) DISP(1) t-stats 
Book Value of Equity (TA) 117,474.45 K 76,655.20 K 4.00* 
Return on Assets (ROA) 7.03 10.11 -3.26* 
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.57 16.41 -1.12 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 22.90 18.88 1.26 
Market to Book Value (MBV) 5.62 3.64 2.90* 
S/T liability to L/T Liability 78.20 79.54 -0.69 
Gross Profit Margin 32.65 45.44 -4.73* 
Net Profit Margin 9.08 16.45 -3.10* 
Growth in Gross Sales 103.96 687.72 -2.73* 
Net Profit Growth Rate 297.97 159.82 0.48 
Total Asset Growth Rate 101.69 116.91 -1.46 
Shareholders Equity Growth 163.17 92.14 0.75 
Total Fixed Assets to TA 0.31 0.35 -2.50* 
L/T Bank Debt to TA 0.09 0.07 2.22* 
Mach. Plant & Equip. to TA 0.38 0.41 -1.08 
Investment in Process to TA 0.05 0.05 -0.82 
S/T Liability to TA 0.43 0.34 5.08* 
S/T Bank Debt to TA 0.17 0.12 2.71* 
L/T Liability to TA 0.13 0.10 2.42* 
R&D to TA 0.01 0.00 1.34 
Mrkt. Sell. & Dist. Exp. to TA 0.05 0.04 0.81 
L/T Investments to TA 0.08 0.11 -1.92** 
 
 
 
101
3.4 SIZE EFFECT 
Since, ownership structure appears to be related with firm size, this 
relationship is further elaborated in our analyses while examining the consequences 
of ownership structure.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that ownership concentration 
and firm size, measured by the market value of equity are inversely related.  Prowse 
(1992) defines size of the firms as a determinant of ownership concentration.  He 
justifies his claim with cost of capital and risk arguments.  The larger the firm, the 
greater will be the cost of acquiring a fraction of ownership.  Moreover, the risk-
aversion of large shareholders causes an increase in their ownership stakes at lower, 
risk-compensating prices.  We define size with the book value of equity in our 
sample firms in order to control the effects of leverage.   
 
Table 41 Descriptive Statistics of Book Value as Size Proxy (in 1000 $.) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Mean 138,251 149,442 109,200 117,964 118,850 85,113 95,888 
Std. Err.  Mean 25,901 28,058 20,515 19,561 16,222 11,087 12,590 
Median 53,585 68,219 46,225 54,889 55,836 43,604 50,487 
Std. Deviation 265,407 308,641 239,251 242,752 214,607 154,430 175,371 
Skewness 3.94 4.56 4.93 5.19 4.97 5.11 5.49 
Std. Error of 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Kurtosis 16.99 23.46 25.96 29.59 29.03 30.98 37.97 
Std.Err.Kurtosis 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.35 
Minimum 2,272 2,259 1,739 2,938 3,437 2,217 2,667 
Percentiles     10 8,783 9,685 8,088 11,937 12,465 9,192 10,792 
20 14,815 17,970 16,500 18,675 21,033 15,146 16,342 
30 26,166 31,754 25,954 26,509 31,274 21,617 25,335 
40 40,624 46,204 34,508 43,370 44,887 30,306 34,261 
50 53,585 68,219 46,225 54,889 55,836 43,604 50,487 
60 74,714 85,784 61,390 71,138 83,119 54,289 59,049 
70 94,560 114,489 80638 93,725 102,704 71,102 77,733 
80 180,571 154,152 108,519 133,761 143,144 101,961 114,320 
90 253,196 255,670 188,838 221,202 248,527 182,642 214,989 
 
When the descriptive statistics of book value of equity is examined, we observe 
significant yearly changes.  These changes are mainly caused by the high inflation 
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experienced between 1992 and 1998.  On the other hand, we have statistical evidence 
that there is a significant deviation from the normal distribution.  
In order to detect differences in the ownership structure variables we 
conducted independent sample t-tests with respect to size categories.  We have 
divided the pooled data into three equal groups, after sorting with respect to size 
proxy of market value.  We only consider the two extreme groups and eliminate the 
group between those two.  With this approach, we can detect the size effect on 
ownership structure better.  Results of the t-tests are reported in Table 42. 
Table 42 Mean Comparison of Size 
 Small Firms 
Large 
Firms t-stats 
Percentage Share of the Largest Shareholder (LSH1)  41.266 45.664 -3.43*
Cumulative Shares of the Largest Three Shareholders (LSH3)  59.252 65.009 -5.01*
Percentage Shares of Diffused Shareholders (OTHER)  34.821 28.901 5.32*
Cash Flow Right(s) of the Ultimate Owner(s) (CASH)  59.925 62.044 -1.84**
Conglomerate Affiliation (CONG)  24.6% 34.3% -3.51*
Family Ownership (FAM)  50.6% 39.0% 3.85*
Group Ownership (CFAM) 75.7% 73.3% 0.92
Foreign Ownership (FRGN)  9.8% 25.0% -6.73*
Cross Ownership (CROSS)  25.2% 30.1% -1.79
Government Ownership (GOV)  5.7% 8.9% -1.99*
Dispersed Ownership (DISP)  13.1% 10.6% 1.31
 
The means of the ownership structure variables are compared and t statistics 
provide us evidence to interpret the results.  When the ownership concentration 
variables are examined all variables but cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling 
owner(s) (CASH) are significantly different in the two size categories.  Large firms 
have higher ownership concentration as reflected in percentage share of the largest 
shareholder (LSH1) and cumulative percentage shares of the largest three 
shareholders (LSH3).  This finding is supported with the inverse relation of the 
percentage share of diffused shareholders (OTHER).  Large firms have relatively low 
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OTHER values.  It would not be misleading to conclude that large Turkish firms are 
mostly concentrated.  This finding is inconsistent with the finding of Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985).   
In addition to ownership concentration measures, we also examined the 
ownership mix variables in order to capture the big picture on ownership structure.  
All ownership mix variables except cross ownership (CROSS) and dispersed 
ownership (DISP) are significantly different in the two size groups.  The percentage 
of the firms with conglomerate affiliation (CONG), foreign ownership (FRGN), and 
government ownership (GOV) are significantly higher in large firms when compared 
to smaller firms.  On the other hand, the percentage of family ownership (FAM) and 
group ownership (CFAM) are higher in small firms.  By considering these results, 
we can assert that, on average, conglomerate affiliates, firms with foreign partners 
and government-controlled firms are large firms.  Conversely, family-owned firms 
are relatively smaller firms. 
By considering both the ownership concentration and the ownership mix 
results, we can conclude that size is significantly and positively related to ownership 
structure variables.  For that reason, we will use size variable as a control variable in 
the statistical analyses. 
3.5 INDUSTRY EFFECT 
The literature on ownership structure documents that it differs across 
industries.  The existence of industry effects are confirmed by Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Zeckouser and Pound (1990).  Commonalities within the industrial firms 
lead them to have similar preferences and dynamics as well as governance systems.  
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With this respect, we examined the ownership structure differences of our sample 
firms in 13 distinct sectors.  Industrial sectors are determined by the classification of 
Istanbul Stock Exchange.  Note that, we have already excluded banks, insurance 
companies, leasing and factoring companies, holdings, and investment companies 
from our sample.  Industrial sectors for our sample are listed in Table 43.   
Table 43 Sectors in Istanbul Stock Exchange and Number of Firms 
Code  Industrial Sectors  
No. of  
Firms % 
1  The Fabricated Metal Products and Machinery Equipment 177 16% 
2  Basic Metal Industries 72 7% 
3  Non Metallic Mineral Products Sector 173 16% 
4  Chemicals Petroleum, Rubber, and Plastic Products 145 13% 
5  Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 70 6% 
6  Wood Products 14 1% 
7  Textile Apparel and Leather 171 16% 
8  Food, Beverage, and Tobacco 132 12% 
9  Transportation 16 1% 
10  Hotels and Restaurant 38 4% 
11  Retail Trade 34 3% 
12  Wholesale 17 2% 
13  Electricity, Gas, and Water 20 2% 
3.5.1 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is defined with the four variables.  These are 
percentage share of the largest shareholder (LSH1), cumulative percentage shares of 
the largest three shareholders (LSH3), percentage shares of diffused shareholders 
(OTHER), and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH).  Our 
sample firms are categorized with respect to the selected sectors and ownership 
concentration variables of each sector are graphed in Figure 8.     
When we examine the sectors’ ownership concentration measures, we 
observe significant differences among them.  Based on the findings of Figure 8, the 
transportation sector (sector 9) has the highest percentage share of the largest 
shareholder (LSH1), cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders 
(LSH3), and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH) and the 
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lowest percentage share of diffused shareholders (OTHER).  We can conclude that 
firms in the transportation sector are the most concentrated ones in our sample firms 
between 1992 and 1998.  The sectors of chemicals, petroleum, rubber, and plastic 
products (sector 4) and fabricated metal products and machinery equipment (sector 
1) follow the transportation sector.  Those two sectors are the second in the 
concentration listing.  On the other hand, the wholesale sector (sector 12) has the 
highest percentage share of diffused shareholders (OTHER) among the other sectors 
and lowest cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3) 
and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH). 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Ownership Concentration Measures by Sectors 
Sector Codes are 1:The Fabricated Metal Products and Machinery Equipment; 2:Basic Metal 
Industries; 3:Non Metallic Mineral Products Sector; 4:Chemicals Petroleum, Rubber, and 
Plastic Products; 5:Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing; 6:Wood Products; 
7:Textile Apparel and Leather; 8:Food, Beverage, and Tobacco; 9:Transportation 
10:Hotels and Restaurant; 11:Retail Trade; 12:Wholesale; 13:Electricity, Gas, and Water 
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LSH3 68.15 55.44 57.92 70.05 59.01 49.23 58.78 62.5 82.94 61.75 63.34 49.47 50.85
OTHER 26.62 41.56 34.57 26.71 36.41 35.78 32.67 30.95 14.76 33.97 34.23 41.66 35.05
CASH 63.1 52.04 57.82 66.88 55.42 56.25 62.88 63.32 84.96 56.3 62.49 47.73 48.92
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In the overall evaluation, LSH3 and CASH variables are in harmony but 
LSH1 variable show significant deviations from LSH3 and CASH concentration 
measures.  On the other hand, OTHER variable is also synchronized with those two 
concentration measures. 
Table 44 Mean of the Selected Ownership Concentration Variables of the Sectors. 
LSH3: Cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders, OTHER: 
Cumulative percentage shares of diffused shareholders, LOST: Percentage of shares 
uncovered in the analyses. 
SECTOR LSH3 OTHER SUM LOST 
Fab. Metal Prod. 68.15 26.62 94.77 5.23
Basic Metal Ind. 55.44 41.56 97.00 3.00
Mineral Prod. 57.92 34.57 92.49 7.51
Chem.Oil and Plastic 70.05 26.71 96.76 3.24
Paper Prod. 59.01 36.41 95.42 4.58
Wood Prod. 49.23 35.78 85.01 14.99
Textile 58.78 32.67 91.45 8.55
Food 62.50 30.95 93.45 6.55
Transportation 82.94 14.76 97.70 2.30
Hotels 61.75 33.97 95.72 4.28
Retail Trade 63.34 34.23 97.57 2.43
Wholesale 49.47 41.66 91.13 8.87
Utilities 50.85 35.05 85.90 14.10
Avg. 60.73 32.69 93.41 6.59
 
In the Table 44, we document selected ownership concentration variables to 
detect deficiencies in the data definition process.  We selected cumulative percentage 
shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3) and percentage share of diffused 
shareholders (OTHER) as our main ownership concentration variables.  LSH3 is an 
indicator of concentration and OTHER the diffuseness of ownership.  In theory, the 
summation of those two variables should add up to 100 percent, but it is not in 
practice.  For example, in our data definition we could not uncover 6.59 percent of 
the shareholders.  However, this deviation takes its highest levels in the sectors of 
wood products (sector 6) and electricity, gas, and water (sector 13), with the values 
of 15 percent and 14 percent respectively.  This means that largest three shareholders 
are not so powerful in those sectors.  This fact is also supported with the lowest 
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LSH1 values of 25 percent and 28 percent in the wood products (sector 6) and 
electricity, gas, and water (sector 13) respectively. 
3.5.2 Ownership Mix 
Ownership structure is defined by both ownership concentration and 
ownership mix variables.  In order to detect the structural differences of ownership in 
thirteen selected sectors of the ISE, we will also examine ownership mix variables 
for each sector.   
The percentage of conglomerate affiliates (CONG) is highest in the wholesale 
industry (sector 12).  82 percent of the sample firms operating in the wholesale sector 
are conglomerate affiliates.  This significant value shows that most of the wholesale 
sector firms are controlled by conglomerates.  Following the wholesale sector, the 
sector of electricity, gas, and water (sector 13) has the second highest conglomerate 
affiliates with a percentage of 70 percent.  On the other hand, conglomerates do not 
have any affiliates operating in the transportation sector (sector 9).  The second least 
presence of the conglomerate affiliates is in the textile, apparel and leather sector 
(sector 7).  It seems that distinct conglomerates do not prefer to invest in textile 
industry and leave them to other investor groups.   
 When the percentages of family ownership (FAM) in sectors are examined, 
we find that sector of textile, apparel and leather (sector 7) has the highest 
percentages of family ownership (FAM).  Investments in the textile industry are 
small, when compared to the other sectors.  For that reason, it will be easier for a 
family or a group of families to invest in this sector.  The second largest sector of the 
family involvement is the sector of hotels and restaurant (sector 10) with a 
percentage of 63 percent.  We did not, however, discover any firm with family 
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ownership (FAM) in the wholesale sector, which is mainly controlled by the distinct 
conglomerates.   
Table 45 Ownership Mix Variables for Sectors. 
 
Sectors CONG FAM CFAM FRGN CROSS GOV DISP 
Fab. Metal Prod. 32.20 46.89 79.10 31.64 28.81 4.52 38.89
Basic Metal Ind 19.44 29.17 48.61 18.06 19.44 12.50 31.79
Mineral Prod. 16.18 27.75 43.93 20.23 18.50 13.29 4.83
Chem.Oil and Plastic 31.72 37.93 69.66 27.59 24.14 19.31 10.00
Paper Prod. 51.43 38.57 90.00 14.29 27.14 0.00 0.00
Wood Prod. 50.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 12.28
Textile 10.53 77.78 88.30 0.00 20.47 0.00 3.79
Food 43.18 44.70 90.15 15.15 47.73 1.52 0.00
Transp. 0.00 18.75 18.75 37.50 0.00 43.75 0.00
Hotels 36.84 63.16 100.00 2.63 36.84 0.00 5.88
Retail Trade 38.24 50.00 88.24 0.00 0.00 5.88 17.65
Wholesale 82.35 0.00 82.35 41.18 82.35 0.00 0.00
Utilities 70.00 30.00 100.00 0.00 70.00 0.00 0.00
 
 Group ownership (CFAM) is defined as the merging of two ownership 
identity groups of conglomerate affiliation (CONG) and family ownership (FAM).  
When the CFAM percentages are examined three sectors are fully occupied by the 
conglomerate affiliates and family-owned firms.  These sectors are wood products 
(sector 6), hotels and restaurants (sector 10), and electricity, gas, and water (sector 
13).  The transportation sector has the lowest group ownership (CFAM) with a value 
of 19 percent.   
It seems that foreign investors mostly prefer firms operating in the wholesale 
sector.  Note that conglomerates are also dominant in this sector.  On the contrary, as 
second choice, foreign investors prefer transportation sector.  Interestingly, there is 
no single conglomerate affiliate operating in this sector.  It seems reasonable, 
however, to invest in the transportation sector, since this sector entails intense 
international aspects like air transportation.  On the other hand, we do not observe 
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any foreign partners in the sectors of wood products (sector 6), textile, apparel and 
leather (sector 7), retail trade (sector 11) and electricity, gas, and water (sector 13).   
Cross ownership (CROSS) structure is mainly used for controlling 
conglomerate affiliates as a governance mechanism.  With this respect, cross 
ownership (CROSS) has a significant correlation (0.854) with the conglomerate 
affiliation (CONG) listing.  This claim is also supported with the similar ranking of 
the two sectors.  The wholesale sector (sector 12) has the highest cross ownership 
(CROSS) and the sector of electricity, gas, and water (sector 13) the second highest 
as in the conglomerate affiliation (CONG).  On the other hand, the sectors of 
transportation (sector 9) and retail trade (sector 11) have no firms with cross 
ownership (CROSS).  
Government ownership (GOV) has the highest level in the transportation 
sector with a percentage of 44 percent.  When we examine the results presented in 
Table 45, we witness supportive findings in favor of the ongoing privatization 
programs.  The government is not operating six out of thirteen sectors.  These sectors 
are textile, apparel and leather (sector 7), paper and paper products, printing and 
publishing (sector 5), wood products (sector 6), hotels and restaurants (sector 10), 
wholesale (sector 12) and electricity, gas, and water (sector 13). 
Dispersed ownership (DISP) is not very common among the firms listed on 
Istanbul Stock Exchange.  For example, the largest sector of dispersed ownership 
(DISP) is the fabricated metal products and machinery equipment (sector 1) with the 
mean value of 39 percent.  We do not encounter dispersed ownership (DISP) in five 
of the thirteen sectors.  These sectors are paper and paper products, printing and 
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publishing (sector 5), food, beverage, and tobacco (sector 8), transportation (sector 
9), wholesale (sector 12) and electricity, gas, and water (sector 13). 
3.6 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
When we examine the literature on ownership structure we find considerable 
international differences as documented by Pedersen and Thomsen (1997), 
Charkham (1994), Porter (1992), Prowse (1995), Roe (1991, 1994), and Walter 
(1993).  The literature suggests that ownership structure is highly dependent on 
regulation, macro economic conditions, corporate history and culture, dominance of 
prevailing institutions, maturity level of financial system, and politics.  In addition to 
those criteria, Pederson and Thomsen (1997) also claim that a large and liquid stock 
market is in principle consistent with significant ownership concentration, since 
presumably the costs of capital would be lower in such markets.   
Pederson and Thomsen (1997) hypothesize and explain the differences in 
ownership structure with a historical and geographical difference perspective.  
Safarian (1966), for example, examines foreign multinationals in Canada, including a 
study of the ownership shares of foreign (mainly U.S.) parent companies.  Vernon 
(1971), on the other hand, discusses the ambiguous attempts by host nations to 
control foreign multinationals.  Turner (1971, pp. 172-89) reports how European 
governments reacted to the rise of U.S. foreign direct investment.  Capitalization and 
industrialization levels, as well as the privatization and nationalization processes of 
the countries mainly cause the differences in their ownership structure patterns. 
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Table 46 Ownership Structure of European Countries vs. Turkey. 
(DISP)  Dispersed Ownership: No single owner owns more than 20% of the company's 
shares.  (DMNT)  Dominant Ownership: One owner (person, family, company) owns a 
sizeable (voting) share (20% < share < 50%) of the company.  (FAM)  Family Ownership: 
One person or a family owns a (voting) majority of the company.  They include in this 
category foundation (trust) ownership because it reflects the will of a personal founder and 
often gives the family (heirs) some degree of control.  (GOV) Government Ownership: The 
(local or national) government owns a (voting) majority of the company.  (FRGN) Foreign 
Ownership: A foreign multinational (MNE) owns a (voting) majority of the company.  
(COOP)  Cooperatives: The company is registered as a cooperative or (in a few cases) 
majority owned by a group of cooperatives. (Pedersen and Thomsen (1997)) 
 DISP DMNT FAM FRGN COOP GOV 
Austria 0% 7% 25% 38% 10% 20%
Belgium 4% 20% 6% 61% 3% 6%
Denmark 10% 9% 30% 23% 17% 11%
Finland 12% 25% 23% 11% 10% 19%
France 16% 28% 15% 16% 3% 22%
Germany 9% 30% 26% 22% 3% 10%
Great Britain 61% 11% 6% 18% 1% 3%
Italy 0% 22% 20% 29% 0% 29%
Netherlands 23% 16% 7% 34% 13% 7%
Norway 6% 14% 29% 19% 19% 13%
Spain 6% 22% 8% 45% 5% 14%
Sweden 4% 31% 18% 14% 12% 21%
European Average 13% 20% 18% 28% 8% 15%
Turkey 19% 58% 45% 17% NA 7%
 
Ownership categories of the hundred largest companies in twelve European 
nations are reported by Pedersen and Thomsen (1997).  The comparison of the 
ownership structure characteristics of Turkey with those of European countries are 
reported in Table 46. 
When we examine the percentages of ownership structure variables presented 
in Table 46, we can make comparisons.  Great Britain can be characterized as the 
first domain of personal capitalism in the Europe.  The percentage of the firms where 
no single owner owns more than 20 percent of the company's shares is 61 percent.  
This dispersion rate of shares is very high among the European countries. The 
dispersion rate in Turkey is only 19 percent.  Thus, Turkey is much more 
concentrated than Great Britain, but less concentrated than Germany, Belgium, 
Spain, Norway, and Sweden.  Another concentration measure, dominant ownership, 
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is defined by Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) as one owner (person, family, company) 
owning a sizeable (voting) share (20% < share < 50%) of the company.  Turkey is 
the leader in the Europe in this category.  Sweden and Germany follow Turkey with 
mean percentage of 30 percent firms with a single powerful shareholder.   
Family Ownership is as defined whether one person or a family owns a 
(voting) majority of the company or not.  Family has some degree of control in this 
type of firms.  European average of family ownership (FAM) is 18 percent but this 
value is 45 percent in Turkey.  This finding leads us to declare the dominance of 
families in the governance systems of the Turkish firms.  Denmark and Norway 
follow Turkey with the mean percentages of 30 percent and 29 percent respectively.  
Great Britain, Belgium, and Netherlands have the lowest family involvement in their 
firms’ governance systems.   
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) define foreign ownership as a foreign 
multinational owning a (voting) majority of the company.  Even though we define 
foreign ownership (FRGN) as foreign partnership which controls at least 10 percent 
of the shares, our average is at the lower bounds in the Europe.  When we define 
foreign ownership (FRGN) as the full control by foreigners, this percentage drops to 
3 percent.  On the other hand, foreigners in Belgium control 61 percent of the firms.  
Spain follows Belgium with a percentage share of 45 percent. 
Government ownership is defined as the (local or national) government 
owning a (voting) majority of the company.  In Europe, 15 percent of the firms are 
controlled by governments or their agencies.  In our sample, the government controls 
only 7 percent of the firms.  However, this value increases to 29 percent in Italy, 22 
percent in France, and 21 percent in Sweden. 
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The ownership structure of European firms are examined and compared with 
Turkish firms.  Dominant ownership identity groups are summarized in Table 47.  
We can define Turkish firms with their high ownership concentration levels and 
heavy involvement of family ownership (FAM) in their governance systems. 
Table 47 Ownership Structures in Europe 
Country Dominant Characteristic(s) 
Great Britain Dispersed ownership (DISP)  
Netherlands Dispersed ownership (DISP)  
Belgium Foreign ownership (FRGN)  
Spain Foreign ownership (FRGN) 
France Government ownership (GOV)  Conglomerate affiliation (CONG)  
Italy Government ownership (GOV)  
Denmark Family ownership (FAM)  Cooperatives 
Austria Government ownership (GOV)  Foreign ownership (FRGN)  
Germany Dominance of Banks and  Family ownership (FAM)  
Norway Government ownership (GOV)  
Finland Government ownership (GOV)  
Sweden Dominance of Banks and  Conglomerate affiliation (CONG)  
 
 
When we examine the studies of rich countries with developed stock markets, 
we witness more significant concentration of ownership in Germany (Franks and 
Mayer (1994), Gorton and Schmid (1996)), Japan (Prowse (1992), Berglof and 
Perotti (1994)), Italy (Barca (1995)), and the seven OECD countries (European 
Corporate Governance Network (1997)). In developing economies, ownership is also 
heavily concentrated (La Porta et al. (1998)).  Findings suggest that, in many 
countries, large corporations have large shareholders, and these shareholders are 
active in corporate governance (e.g., Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Yafeh and Yosha 
(1996)).  This is contrast to the Berle and Means idea that managers are 
unaccountable. 
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La Porta et al. (1999) examine the identities of the ultimate owners of the 
capital and of the voting rights of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies in their 
study.  In their empirical work, they find that the Berle and Means corporation is 
quite rare for some definitions of control.  The German model of bank control 
through equity is not common either.  Instead, controlling shareholders, usually 
government or families are dominant in most large companies.  These stakeholders 
have significant control rights in firms in excess of their cash flow rights, largely 
through the use of pyramids, but they also participate in management.  The results 
suggest that the incentives and opportunities of controlling shareholders originate 
corporate policies, which benefit and expropriate the minority shareholders. 
La Porta et al. (1999) document that in countries with poor protection of 
minorities, concentration of ownership is common. In such countries, controlling 
shareholders would do everything to keep control because losing control 
involuntarily may be costly in terms of surrendering the private benefits of control. 
 
 
Table 48 Ownership Structure Around the World 
Table values are gathered from the study of La Porta et al. (1999).  Authors 
focus on only large and medium firms of 27 countries.  A company is classified 
as widely held if the there is no controlling shareholder;  family controlled if 
controlling shareholders are belong to a family; government controlled if the 
(domestic or foreign) state is the controlling shareholder. 
 Widely Held Family 
Controlled 
Government 
Controlled 
Large Firms (World) 36% 30% 18%
Medium Firms (World) 24% 45% 15%
Large Firms (Turkey) 12% 69% 11%
Medium Firms (Turkey) 11% 79% 6%
 
 La Porta et al. (1999) focused on the data of medium and large firms in 27 
countries and their results are presented in Table 48.  36 percent of world firms as 
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stated by La Porta et al. (1999) are widely held and only 12 percent of our large 
sample firms can be defined in the same way.  Even though the percentage of widely 
held firms in medium firms declines by 12 percent, in the Turkish sample, this value 
drops only 1 percent.  However, we observe a similar pattern in the family ownership 
(FAM).  When the world family ownership (FAM) level is 30 percent in large firms, 
this jumps to 45 percent in medium sized firms.  In Turkish firms, we observe that 
family ownership (FAM) percentages are 69 percent and 79 percent for large and 
medium firms respectively.  The government ownership (GOV) average worldwide 
is 18 percent in large firms and 15 percent in medium firms.  On the other hand, 
government ownership (GOV) percentages are 11 percent and 6 percent respectively 
in Turkey.  This fact indicates that most of the government owned firms are large.  
Indeed, the magnitude of government ownership (GOV) among the largest 
companies would be even higher if we could include non-ISE firms that are under 
this category, and do not trade publicly.   
La Porta et al. (1999) conclude with a surprise that by far the dominant form 
of controlling ownership in the world is not that by banks and other corporations, but 
rather by families. 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
While a number of studies have identified striking international differences in 
ownership structures, the purpose of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of 
the ownership structures of Turkish firms and compare findings with those of other 
countries.  For that reason, data of non-financial Turkish firms between 1992 and 
1998 were gathered and examined. 
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The Istanbul Stock Exchange is the only stock exchange in Turkey and its 
changing nature is described.  In the last two decades Turkey has been experiencing 
significant improvements, and these changes are reflected in the ownership structures 
of Turkish firms.   
To describe the ownership structure of Turkish firms, we focused on ownership 
structure variables, which are categorized into two main groups; ownership 
concentration and ownership mix variables.  Ownership concentration variables of 
LSH1, LSH3, OTHER and CASH measure the dispersion of shares among the 
shareholders.  In addition to those ownership concentration variables, the following 
ownership mix variables are defined as: conglomerate affiliation (CONG), family 
ownership (FAM), government ownership (GOV), foreign ownership (FRGN), cross 
ownership (CROSS), and dispersed ownership (DISP).    
When we interpret the findings of ownership concentration variables, the 
ownership structure of Turkish firms can easily be defined as “highly concentrated” 
with the mean values of ownership concentration as graphed in Figure 9.  The mean 
of LSH1 (43 percent) and the mean of LSH3 (62 percent) reveal the concentrated 
nature of the sample firms.  This finding is also supported, and consistent with the 
findings of Ugurlu (1998) and Yurtoglu (2000).  The average percentage of diffused 
and small investors is only 32 percent.  When we compare the dispersed ownership 
(defined as no single owner owning more than 20 percent of the company's shares) of 
Turkey with those of other countries, we witness significant differences.  While the 
dispersed ownership average is 19 percent in Turkey, this value is 61 percent in 
Great Britain, 23 percent in Netherlands, and 4 percent in Belgium and Sweden.  As 
it can be understood from the comparison of the concentration (dispersion) levels, 
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there are significant variations in the ownership concentration values from country to 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  In addition to ownership concentration measures, we also examined the 
ownership mix variables in order to detect the differences in the identity of 
controlling owner(s).  Owner identities reflect the unique characteristics on the 
preferences and incentive mechanisms of the ultimate controlling owner(s).  
According to these findings, as summarized in Figure 10, family ownership (FAM) is 
dominant in Turkish firms.  If we consider that most of the conglomerates are 
controlled by families, then we can assess the impact of family ownership (FAM) on 
the corporate world much better.  This finding is not surprising, since government 
and families become the locomotives of the developments from the founding of the 
Turkish Republic.  When we compare the share of families in an average Turkish 
firm with those of other countries, it would not be misleading to conclude that most 
of the Turkish firms are either owned or controlled by a family or a group of 
families.  Family ownership (FAM) in Europe extends from 6 percent to 30 percent.  
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Figure 9 Mean Values of Ownership Concentration Variables 
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Denmark has the highest family ownership (FAM) with the average of 30 percent; 
Belgium and Great Britain have the lowest family ownership (FAM) with 6 percent.   
On the foreign ownership (FRGN) side, Turkey does not have as high averages 
as in the family ownership (FAM) in Europe.  While the European average of full 
foreign ownership (FRGN) is 28 percent, 17 percent of Turkish firms have at least 10 
percent of their equity provided by their foreign partners.  When we examine the full 
ownership case, then this value drops to 4 percent.  It seems that Turkey is not an 
attractive country for direct foreign investors.   
Government ownership (GOV), with an average of 7.3 percent, is relatively 
lower in Turkey when compared to the European average of 15 percent.  However, 
non-publicly traded government-owned Turkish firms should not be overlooked.  
The decreasing trend in government involvement seems to be sign of ongoing 
privatization programs; however, Italy takes the leading role in government 
ownership (GOV) in Europe with an average of 29 percent.   
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Cross ownership is a governance mechanism mostly in conglomerate affiliates.  
Conglomerates prefer to keep control of their affiliates with cross ownership as well 
as pyramidal ownership structure.  We ignored pyramidal ownership structure in our 
analyses since conglomerates mostly create their pyramidal ownership structure with 
their banks or investment companies.  We only included non-financial firms in our 
analyses.  Even though we do not have numerical values on pyramidal ownership 
structure, it is considerable factor, especially in conglomerates.   
Firms without any distinct owner(s) are grouped under dispersed ownership 
(DISP).  Only 11 percent of our sample firms fall into this category.  This finding is 
consistent with the concentrated nature of Turkish firms.  
We also examined the differences in ownership structures of the thirteen 
industrial sectors.  As claimed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Zeckouser and 
Pound (1990), there are significant differences in the ownership structures of each 
industrial sector.  Commonalities within the industrial firms lead them to have 
similar preferences and dynamics as well as governance systems.   
When the size effect on ownership structure was examined, we found that size 
is significantly and positively related to ownership concentration.  This conclusion is 
inconsistent to both Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Prowse (1992).  On the other 
hand, Kettler (1997) also found positive relationship between size and ownership 
concentration in East Germany.  We doubt that developing countries show 
significant bias to the size of the firms and mostly, bigger firms in those countries 
have a concentrated nature.  Further research into this area is required to resolve this 
doubt. 
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In sum, Turkish firms are mostly concentrated, and families have significant 
involvement in the corporate governance systems of the firms.  Cross ownership and 
pyramidal structures are not unusual, especially in the conglomerate affiliates. On the 
other hand, we witness a decreasing involvement of the government and slightly 
increasing foreign partners in the ownership structures of Turkish firms.   
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CHAPTER – IV 
EQUITY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, RISK-TAKING,  
AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
performance as well as the risk-taking behavior of Turkish firms listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE).  Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), interest in 
the relation between corporate performance and the distribution of shares among the 
shareholders has attracted the attention of many academics and practitioners.  Studies 
that explore these relationships revealed adequate evidence in favor of the 
phenomenon and now it is commonly believed that ownership structure has 
important implications on corporate performance and risk-taking behavior.  
However, those studies mainly focus on developed markets because of data 
availability and market related concerns.  In addition to that, performance and 
ownership structure measures used in the literature show significant variations.   
The main contribution of this study is to explore the consequences of 
ownership structure in Turkey as an emerging market by using a combined 
measurement system and compare the findings with those of previous studies in 
different settings.  As Hun et al. (1999) claim, each country needs to be examined 
individually, since each country has her own characteristics and dynamics.  In this 
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respect, we believe that analyses conducted with the Turkish data may provide us 
with different insights on the consequences of ownership structure. 
We define combined measurement system by including both ownership 
concentration and ownership mix measures.  With this measurement system, we 
believe that we will be able to take into account all aspects of ownership structure.  
Most of the studies mainly focus on insider (managerial) ownership structure.  These 
studies do not include both the dispersion of shareholder stakes and the identity of 
owners at the same time.  By using the combined integrated ownership structure 
measures, we will examine their impacts on accounting and market performance 
measures as well as risk measures in order to reveal the relationships between 
performance, risk and ownership structure. 
Emerging markets are differentiated from developed markets with respect to 
their heterogeneous nature and inherent dynamics.  These are the markets 
characterized by high volatility and high average returns.  It has been shown that 
they are not integrated with the developed markets in the World as evidenced by very 
low correlation with the rest of the World and among themselves (Bekaert et. al., 
1998).  In this respect, we hypothesize that impact of ownership structure on 
corporate performance in Turkey as an emerging market may differ from the 
developed markets.  
4.2 DATA  
To test our hypotheses, we use the ISE’s yearbooks and electronic database 
containing information on ownership structures of nonfinancial Turkish firms listed 
on Istanbul Stock Exchange between 1992 and 1998.  Because of the increasing 
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number of firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), the number of firms 
included in the sample increases each year.  The number of firms in our sample is 
106 in 1992; it increases to 194 in 1998.  Most of the firms (73%) listed on the ISE 
are among the largest 500 companies compiled by the Istanbul Chamber of 
Commerce.  Banks, leasing companies, investment companies, holding companies, 
and insurance firms were excluded from the data set.  Investment companies are 
closed-end mutual funds that invest in a portfolio of securities and holding 
companies invest only in member firms of a conglomerate.  Some of the required 
data was obtained from the ISE’s electronic database, which can be downloaded 
from its web page (www.imkb.gov.tr).  The on-line database was selected on purpose 
in order to eliminate inconsistencies in the data set, which, otherwise, would be a 
problem with the ISE yearbook data.  However, the ISE yearbook data was mainly 
used for the ownership structure measures due to the unavailability of ownership 
information on electronic medium.   
4.2.1 Ownership Structure Variables 
Ownership structure is defined by the two broad groups of variables as defined 
in Chapter III.  These are ownership concentration and ownership mix variables.  
These measures will try to capture different dimensions of ownership structure.  
Those two categories of measures incorporate both the influence power of 
shareholders as well as identity of owners with their unique preferences and 
incentive mechanisms.   
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4.2.1.1 Ownership Concentration Variables 
Ownership concentration variables reflect the influence power of shareholders 
on management as measured by the distribution of shares among the shareholders.  
Ownership concentration variables are: 
• Total shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3) 
• Cumulative percentage of shares held by other diffused shareholders 
(OTHER) 
• Cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH) 
We selected the cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders 
(LSH3) and the cumulative percentage of shares held by other diffused shareholders 
(OTHER) as our main measures of ownership concentration.  As explained in 
Chapter III, market characteristics lead us to focus on only the three largest 
shareholders.  With these selected variables, we only disregard, on average, 7% of 
the shareholders from our consideration.  This makes up our error zone in the 
variable definition process. 
When we examined the seven year pooled data, summary statistics of the 
selected ownership concentration variables are presented in Table 49.  Turkish listed 
firms can easily be defined as highly concentrated firms. 
Table 49 Descriptive Statistics of the Concentration Variables. 
(%) Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
LSH3 62.13 64.00 19.07 0.82 99.30 
OTHER 31.86 28.84 18.52 0.70 99.15 
CASH 61.18 61.79 18.95 1.00 99.80 
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4.2.1.2 Ownership Mix Variables 
 Ownership mix measures intend to capture the distinct characteristics of the 
identity of the controlling owner(s).  Main motivation in including ownership mix 
into our analyses is to explore the consequences of their unique preferences and 
incentive mechanisms.  Owner identity groups are defined by considering their 
commonalities.  The following ownership mix variables are defined as binary 
variables: 
• The conglomerate affiliation (CONG) variable defines whether a firm is a 
member of a conglomerate or not. 
• The family ownership (FAM) variable captures the attributes of a firm 
that is controlled by a family or a group of families. 
• The group ownership (CFAM) variable combines both the variables of 
CONG and FAM.  With this approach, it is intended to differentiate 
between the firms that have family and/or conglomerate involvement with 
the others. 
• The foreign ownership (FRGN) variable measures the stake of foreign 
ownership within the company.  Direct foreign investments that are more 
than 10% of all shares are taken into account and considered as foreign 
partnership. 
• The government ownership (GOV) defines whether a firm is controlled 
by government agencies or not.  We do not include the private firms in 
which a small percentage of shares are retained by government agencies 
where the government is not the controlling shareholder.   
• The cross ownership (CROSS) variable is defined as firms with complex 
ownership networks.  It is not uncommon to encounter the name of 
another firm in the list of owners of a public corporation.  In this kind of 
ownership, the owned firm may own some percentage of the shares of his 
owner firm. 
• The dispersed ownership (DISP) variable categorizes the firms, which are 
owned by dispersed atomistic shareholders.  In this case, neither a single 
person nor a group has the privilege to control firms with dispersed 
ownership. 
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When the sample data is examined, we end up with material percentages for 
the ownership mix variables as reported in Table 50.  While the percentages of the 
conglomerate affiliates are decreasing through years, family ownership (FAM) is in 
an increasing trend.  This is mainly caused by the increasing number of firms listed 
on the ISE and new firms joining the stock market which are mostly family-owned 
firms.  We observe significant decline in the government ownership (GOV) and 
stable foreign ownership (FRGN) in our sample period.  With regard to cross 
ownership (CROSS), we witness a declining trend.  This is caused by either a real 
decline in the cross ownership or that most of the new comers do not fall into this 
classification.   
Table 50 Yearly Ownership Mix Variable Percentages 
 
(%) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 
CONG 33.3 31.4 30.1 30.5 29.1 27.3 27.3 29.9 
FAM 36.2 40.5 43.4 44.2 45.7 48.5 49.0 43.9 
CFAM 69.5 71.9 73.5 74.7 75.4 76.3 76.8 74.0 
FRGN 17.1 15.7 17.6 17.5 16.6 18.0 18.6 17.3 
CROSS 35.2 30.6 29.4 27.9 25.1 25.3 24.7 28.3 
GOV 10.5 8.3 7.4 7.1 7.4 6.2 6.2 7.6 
DISP 12.4 12.4 11.0 11.7 11.4 11.9 12.4 11.9 
 
4.2.2 Control Variables 
To arrange the experimental settings of the econometric analysis, we 
investigated the literature and examined the data sample for control variables.  
Corporate ownership structures are found to be influenced by nationality (Pederson 
and Thomsen (1997)) and industry effects (Pederson and Thomsen (1998)).  It is 
claimed that both nationality and industry factors may influence corporate 
performance either in a direct or indirect manner.  An alternative control measure is 
asserted by Jensen (1989) as capital structure.   
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Debt structure determines creditors’ power of influence on the corporate 
decision-making processes.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that a manager’s 
capital structure decisions based on the agency cost of debt against the agency cost 
of equity vary across the firms.  Williamson (1988) combines the discriminating use 
of equity and debt in his term of “dequity.”  He differentiates the use of dequity, 
based on the asset redeployability.  He asserts that debt is well suited to highly 
redeployable asset investments, while equity is preferred for less redeployable 
projects.   
The size effect is common and inevitable in corporate performance.  
Constand et al. (1998) report firm size as one of the determinants of ownership 
structure and claim that as firm size increases, the cost of control increases, resulting 
in a decreasing ownership concentration.  When we examine the size of the sample 
firms, we observe that firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange are relatively large.  
This creates an inherent bias in the data sample.   
In this study, we will use size and leverage as control variables.  As it can 
easily be seen in Table 51, there are significant correlations between performance 
measures and control variables of size and leverage.  Size is defined with the natural 
logarithm of total assets and leverage with debt to total assets ratio.  The natural 
logarithm of total assets is calculated in order to normalize the size variable.  In 
addition to those, we will also control market risk BETA in the market based 
performance models.  BETA is calculated by using three-year monthly stock return 
data. 
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Table 51 Cross-Correlation Analyses of the Control Variables. 
Figures in the body of the table are Pearson’s correlation coefficients with 
their significance levels.  “*” stands for significance at the 0.01 level. 
 Size Leverage 
ROA 0.120 -0.252 
 (0.000)* (0.000)* 
ROE 0.083 -0.411 
 (0.007)* (0.000)* 
P/E -0.084 0.049 
 (0.010)* (0.131) 
MBV 0.197 0.243 
 (0.000)* (0.000)* 
RETURN -0.123 0.091 
 (0.000)* (0.004)* 
4.2.3 Performance Variables 
Corporate performance is at the core of the managerial activities and can be 
best defined as the yield of the managerial efforts.  Corporate performance is 
measured with the two categories of variables.  The first category of measurements 
intends to capture the accounting-based performance of the firms.  However, 
measures based on historical figures are not sufficient to integrate the current and 
future potential of the firm.  For that reason, the second category, market-based 
performance has been taken into account.  These categories of performance measures 
are explained in detail in the following sections.  
4.2.3.1 Accounting-Based Measures 
 Accounting-based performance measures are defined by return on total assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) ratios.  The return on total assets (ROA) ratio is 
calculated by dividing net profit by total assets.  This ratio demonstrates the rate of 
net return on total assets.  Profitability must be considered separately according to 
the source of funding.  In addition to that, the return on equity (ROE) ratio is 
calculated by dividing profit before taxes by total equity.  This measure indicates the 
 
 
129
profits earned on the company’s total equity.  The return on equity ratio inherently 
captures the firm’s operating profit margin, asset turnover, interest burden, tax 
burden and leverage characteristics.  This kind of decomposition of ROE is known as 
the Du Pont system in the literature.  ROE is the accounting ratio often used to 
measure management’s effectiveness to reward the management. 
Accounting-based measures that depend on historical data reveal some 
insights.  However, historical data may not be a good indicator for the future 
performance potential.  Therefore, we also include the market-based performance 
measures in order to create a comprehensive performance measurement system.   
4.2.3.2 Market-Based Measures 
Because of the possible deficiencies in the accounting-based performance 
measures, we also include market-based performance measures.  These measures are 
the price to earnings ratio (P/E), market to book value (MBV) and stock returns.  The 
price-to-earnings ratio is calculated by dividing a company’s market value at the end 
of year to the year-end net profit.  This ratio is regarded as the relationship between 
the price of a share and the return on investment obtained by dividing the share price 
by the earnings.  In order to deal with the numerical problems inherent in the 
definition of P/E ratio, we chose to discard the observations with negative P/E 
values.   
Market-to-book value (MBV) ratio is another performance indicator.  This 
ratio is the proportion of the company’s market value to the company’s equity 
resources at the end of the year.  A low market-to-book ratio is often regarded as a 
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safety measure, and some investors prefer to eliminate the stocks with high market-
to-book ratio from their portfolios.   
The effect of ownership structure on corporate performance is also examined 
by using several stock return measures.  When we examine the stock return and 
ownership structure relationship in the literature, we observe that block ownership 
and managerial ownership have significant effects on a firm’s performance. (Jensen 
and Meckling (1976); Stulz (1988); Agrawal and Mandelker (1987); Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985); Shliefer and Vishny (1986, and 1997))  We will explore the 
relationship between ownership structure and stock returns by considering the return 
measures of: 
• Average monthly stock returns in 12 months (RET12) 
• Average monthly stock returns in 24 months (RET24) 
• Abnormal average monthly stock returns in a year (ABRET) 
• Average 3-month cumulative stock returns in a year (RET3) 
• Average 6-month cumulative stock returns in a year (RET6) 
 
Average monthly stock return in 12 months (RET12) is calculated by taking 
the average value of the monthly stock returns at a given year.  RET24 is calculated 
by taking the average value of the monthly stock returns of both given year and the 
following year.  With an additional return measure of ABRET (abnormal stock 
return), we remove market effect form the individual stock returns by subtracting 
monthly market returns from the related monthly stock returns. Abnormal stock 
return (ABRETi) of firm i is calculated by averaging monthly values of the 
difference between monthly stock returns (Ri) and monthly market returns (MRi) in a 
year. 
ABRETit = Rit – MRit      
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We calculate three and six month cumulative stock returns (RET3 and RET6) 
in a year with the following equation by including observations with no overlapping 
return horizons.  Hence, when we work with three-month ahead returns (RET3), we 
choose the monthly observations in January, April, July, and October of every year 
in the sample.  Similarly, we pick January and July for six-month ahead returns 
(RET6).  We then take the average of the return measures of RET3 and RET6 within 
a year time frame. 
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4.2.4 Risk Variables 
Almost all assets bear some type of risk.  In this study the level of risk taking 
by the corporation will be measured by the two risk measures.  These are total risk 
and market risk. 
Market Risk (BETA): Since the prediction of the general macro economic 
conditions with certainty is almost impossible, investors need to bear some levels of 
risk.  The risk that remains even after extensive diversification is called market risk.  
This kind of risk is also called systematic risk or nondiversifiable risk.  Risk depends 
on exposure to macroeconomic events and is defined as the sensitivity of a stock’s 
return to fluctuations in market returns and is commonly known as BETA.  BETA is 
calculated as the regression coefficient in a time series regression of three-year 
monthly stock returns on the return on Istanbul Stock Exchange Index respectively. 
Total Risk (STDEV):  Total risk is defined as the probability distribution of 
the expected future returns.  The tighter the probability distribution, the smaller is the 
risk.  The standard deviation of the returns measures the probability of not having the 
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expected return.  Total risk is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly stock 
returns for a three-year time series.   
To calculate STDEV and BETA, we employ monthly returns over the three-
year period prior to the time period in which other measurements are taken. 
Descriptive statistics of the risk measures of market risk BETA and total risk of 
STDEV are reported in the Table 52. 
Table 52 Descriptive Statistics of the Risk Measures. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Market Risk (BETA) 0.916 0.923 0.433 -0.891 2.041
Total Risk (STDEV) 0.266 0.248 0.084 .0202 .6143
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Performance Models 
We first investigated the impact of ownership structure on a firm’s 
performance.  Here, we used a multivariate regression approach, explicitly 
controlling other factors known to be important in determining a firm’s performance.  
Control variables are defined as size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and market risk 
(BETA) by considering the previous studies in the literature and the characteristics 
of the data sample. 
Two groups of variables are employed to measure corporate performance; 
accounting and market-based measures.  Accounting-based performance measures 
are the return on equity (ROE) and return on total assets (ROA).  Market-to-book 
value ratio (MBV), price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) and stock returns (RET) are the 
market value variables of performance.  Since the data entails a seven-year period, 
performance variables (ROA, ROE, MBV, P/E, RET) and control variables (SIZE, 
LEV and BETA) are pooled. 
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Ownership structure is regarded as an endogenous variable in this study as 
hypothesized by Demsetz (1983).  It is reasonable to assume ownership structure as 
an endogenous variable.  When we examined the changes in ownership structures, 
we observed quite a stable nature.  For the empirical testing, we calculated the 
change in both performance and ownership concentration measures and conducted 
cross-correlation analysis.  As it can easily be seen in Table 53, there is no 
significant correlation between the changes in both performance and ownership 
concentration variables.  This fact provides evidence that ownership structures do not 
adjust quickly to changing economic conditions. 
 
Table 53 Cross Correlation Analyses Between Changes in the Ownership 
Concentration and Performance Measures. 
Figures in the body of the table are Pearson’s correlation coefficients with 
their significance levels.  “*” stands for significance at the 0.01 level. 
 ∆LSH3 ∆OTHER 
∆ROA -0.049 0.036 
 (0.140) (0.279) 
∆ROE -0.077 0.047 
 (0.022) (0.156) 
∆EP -0.019 -0.001 
 (0.603) (0.970) 
∆MBV 0.006 -0.016 
 (0.847) (0.643) 
 
On the other hand, we also examined the possible endogeneity problem with 
leverage and ownership concentration measures.  For that reason, we calculated the 
changes in both leverage and ownership concentration measures and conducted a 
cross correlation analyses and reported the results in Table 54.  There are significant 
correlations between the levels of leverage and ownership concentration measures.  
The results of the correlation analyses between leverage and ownership 
concentration measures are reported in Table 55. 
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Table 54 Correlation Analyses Between the Changes in Leverage and Ownership 
Concentration Measures. 
Figures in the body of the table are Pearson’s correlation coefficients with their 
significance levels.  “*” stands for significance at the 0.01 level. 
 ∆LSH3 ∆OTHER 
0.065 -0.066 ∆LEV (0.115) (0.071) 
 
Table 55 Correlation Analyses Between Leverage and Ownership Concentration 
Measures. 
Figures in the body of the table are Pearson’s correlation coefficients with their 
significance levels.  “*” stands for significance at the 0.01 level. 
 LSH3 OTHER 
0.108 -0.126 LEV (0.000)* (0.000)* 
 
Instead of the changes, we focused on the levels of the selected variables.  
When we examine the correlation coefficients between the changes in both leverage 
(LEV) and ownership concentration measures, we do not find any significant 
correlation values.  However, when the results of the cross-correlation analyses on 
the levels of leverage (LEV), and ownership concentration measures are considered, 
we find all correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.01 significance level.  
These results lead us to include leverage as a control variable, and accept that there is 
no endogeneity problem between leverage and ownership concentration measures.  
Even if there is no impact of leverage on ownership concentration measures, (in our 
case leverage is significantly correlated with ownership concentration measures) 
there might be in the multivariate case, because of the likely interactions with the 
other variables included in the model. 
For empirical testing, we propose the following hypotheses in this study.  By 
controlling size and leverage, which have significant correlation coefficients with the 
performance measures, we will try to uncover the impact of both ownership 
concentration and ownership mix on corporate performance.   
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Hypothesis I: Corporate performance is a function of ownership 
concentration and, consequently, increased concentration results in an 
increase in performance. 
Performanceit = f (Sizeit, Leverageit, Ownership Concentrationit) 
 
Hypothesis II: Ownership identity determines its own incentive 
mechanisms and those are reflected in corporate performance.  
Performanceit = f (Sizeit, Leverageit, Ownership Mixit) 
 
The hypothesis that ownership concentration influences performance (H1) is 
tested by regressing an ownership variable on a performance variable in the presence 
of control variables within a multiple regression model: 
 
PERit = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit + β3 CONit + εit    (1) 
 
Where, PER is one of the performance variables of ROA, ROE, MBV, P/E or 
RET; SIZE and LEV variables are the two control variables to denote firm size, 
measured as the natural log of total assets, and leverage, measured as the ratio of 
debt to total assets, respectively.  In addition to those, we also include market risk 
BETA into market based performance models as an additional control variable. 
Ownership concentration variables, CON, are LSH3, OTHER or CASH.  In 
the above model, βi's are the parameters and εit the error term.  The model is 
estimated for each relevant combination of explanatory and dependent variables. 
We also investigated the impact of ownership mix on a firm’s performance.  
In particular, we were interested to see if affiliation with a conglomerate (CONG), 
family ownership (FAM), group ownership (CFAM), foreign ownership (FRGN), 
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government ownership (GOV), cross ownership (CROSS), and dispersed ownership 
(DISP) are related to performance.   
In the literature, there is evidence on the role played by institutional investors 
in monitoring corporate decisions, thereby, affecting performance.  For example, 
Smith (1996) finds institutional investors in the US, with or without seats on the 
board, monitor companies to improve their performance.  Similarly, Gorton and 
Schmid (1996) provide evidence of stronger operating results by German 
corporations owned by banks.  Two types of institutional investors with a potential 
for monitoring show up in large Turkish corporations.  They are foreign investors 
and the government.  Foreign ownership is usually the result of direct investment in a 
joint venture.  Government-owned firms are also available and they are subject to 
privatization programs.  In addition to those dominating ownership identities, we will 
also consider other ownership identities of conglomerate affiliation (CONG), family 
ownership (FAM), group ownership (CFAM), cross ownership (CROSS), and 
dispersed ownership (DISP). 
To test the hypothesis that ownership mix has an impact on performance, we 
regressed performance variables defined earlier on ownership mix dummies one at a 
time.  We controlled for size, leverage and beta as before.  The following model is 
estimated: 
 
PERit = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit + β3 MIXit + εit    (2) 
 
Where, MIXit as a dummy variable takes a value of "1" for a particular type of 
ownership mix, "0" otherwise.  Ownership mix types are conglomerate affiliation 
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(CONG), family ownership (FAM), group ownership (CFAM), government 
ownership (GOV), foreign ownership (FRGN), and cross ownership (CROSS).  Other 
terms in the model (2) are the same as before.  Hence, we run the above model for 
each relevant combination of ownership mix and performance variables.  
Since our sample consists of time series – cross sectional pooled data, we 
corrected OLS estimations by using GMM methodology.  Problems that are likely to 
be encountered in pooled data are generally resolved by applying a Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM).  GMM utilizes Newey and West (1987) methodology 
in correcting both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  GMM will not correct for 
cross-sectional dependence, leading to underestimation of standard errors.  One 
could employ Fama-MacBeth method to overcome this problem, however with only 
7 annual observations this is not feasible. 
4.3.2 Risk Models 
It is hypothesized in the study that ownership structure plays an important 
role in determining the level of risk taking by the corporation.  Ownership structure 
determines the governance mechanisms, which in turn derives corporate policies, and 
controls the implementation processes.  This strategic guidance should have some 
sort of impact on a firm’s risk taking behavior.   
Changes in both ownership concentration and risk measures were calculated 
and analyzed to test the endogeneity.  Considering the results of the cross correlation 
analysis that are presented in Table 56, we can consider ownership structure as an 
endogenous variable.  As it can easily be seen from the results, there are not any 
significant correlations between the changes in risk and changes in ownership 
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concentration variables.  This fact leads us to conclude that ownership structures do 
not adjust quickly to changing risk conditions. 
Table 56 Correlation Analysis Among the Changes in the Risk Measures. 
Figures in the body of the table are Pearson’s correlation coefficients with their 
significance levels.  “*” stands for significance at the 0.01 level. 
 ∆SH3 ∆OTHER 
-0.004 0.022 ∆BETA (0.903) (0.519) 
0.001 -0.030 ∆STDEV (0.980) (0.368) 
 
For empirical testing, we propose the following hypotheses in this study.  By 
controlling size and leverage, which are significantly correlated with risk measures, 
we will try to uncover the effects of both ownership concentration and ownership 
identity on corporate risk taking behavior.  
Hypothesis III: Corporate risk is a function of the ownership 
concentration and increased concentration causes a decline in risk. 
Riskit = f (Sizeit, Leverageit, Ownership Concentrationit) 
Hypothesis IV: Ownership identity determines its own incentive 
mechanisms and this reality is reflected in corporate risk.  
Riskit = f (Sizeit, Leverageit, Ownership Mixit) 
 
We employed capital market measurements such as total risk (STDEV) and 
market risk (BETA) of equity for risk taking behavior.  Hence, for ownership 
concentration and ownership mix, we use the same right hand side variables as in the 
models (1) and (2) with the risk measures as the dependent variable of the model. 
 
RISKit = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit + β3 CONit + εit     (3) 
RISKit = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit + β3 MIXit + εit     (4) 
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The variable RISK in the above models is either the standard deviation of 
monthly returns (STDEV) of the common stock of firm i, or the beta coefficient of 
the stock (BETA) estimated by the market model, both over the three-year period.  
Explanatory variables are the same as before.  Endogeneity concerns are identical as 
in the performance models. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique 
is also applied to risk models to deal with the potential problems of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
4.4 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
Corporate performance measurement and estimation methodologies are critical 
for investors, managers, and other firms’ stakeholders.  Policy makers are eager to 
take actions to increase corporate performance.  In this manner, including policy 
makers, all stakeholders are willing to know the factors affecting performance in 
order to manipulate and monitor.  The most critical of those factors is the governance 
mechanisms, which are mainly determined by ownership structure.   
In the modern capitalist arena, owners delegate their authority to professional 
managers assuming that they will protect their best interests.  The separation of 
ownership and control introduces us to a new conflict between managers and owners 
–agency conflict–.  To solve this puzzle, owners tend to build varying mechanisms to 
align the conflicting interests of the two groups.  Also, managers try to decrease their 
human capital risk by applying entrenchment policies.  Obviously, the efforts of the 
two groups are likely to affect – either in a positive or negative way – performance. 
When we have full ownership of a single owner, this is the perfect incentive 
case where we do not observe any type of agency cost and interest conflicts.  
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However, in the modern corporate ownership structure, we do not observe that kind 
of perfectionism, at least in large companies.  When we examine the literature, we 
encounter six arguments that explain the impact of ownership structure on 
performance.  As examined thoroughly in Chapter 2, these arguments are: 
• Incentive alignment argument 
• Takeover premium argument 
• Managerial entrenchment argument 
• Cost of capital argument 
• Monitor and influence argument  
• Nonlinearity argument 
In this literature review, we found that most of the ownership structure related 
studies are concerned with the insider (managerial) ownership.  (Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Chen et. al. (1993), Cubbin and Leech (1986), Demsetz (1986), 
Hermalin and Weisback (1991), Holderness et. al. (1999), Jarrel and Poulsen (1988), 
Keasey et. al. (1994), McConnell and Servaes (1995)).  All of those authors report 
significant relationship between insider (managerial) ownership and corporate 
performance.  Some of those authors claim that the relationship between insider 
(managerial) ownership and performance is not linear.  The findings of Stultz (1990), 
McConnell Servaes (1990), Hubbard and Palia (1995), Keasey et al. (1994), Morc, 
Shlleifer and Vishny (1988) and Holderness et al. (1999) provide significant 
evidence that there is a roof-shaped nonlinear relationship between insider 
(managerial) ownership and corporate performance.  This fact indicates that up to a 
certain point, insider (managerial) ownership contributes to corporate performance, 
but beyond that, managers choose to entrench themselves in order to protect their 
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positions.  This decline in the corporate performance can be explained as the efforts 
of risk-averse managers seeking to decrease their human capital risk.  
Large block equity holders took second stage among the ownership structure 
literature.  (Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Barclay and Holderness (1991), Cubbin 
and Leech (1986), Denis and Denis (1994), Holderness and Sheehan (1985), Lodere 
and Martin (1997), McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Pedersen and Thomsen 
(1999))  The interests of large block holders may be in conflict with those of other 
stakeholders.  This interest conflict leads large block holders to abuse their voting 
power and manipulate managerial decision-making for their own benefit.  Large 
block holders also have sufficient power to discipline managers to decrease agency 
cost, causing an increase in corporate performance.  Most of the authors found that 
the profitability of those firms with large block holders is relatively higher than the 
profitability of those with dispersed ownership.  In contrast, McConnell and Servaes 
(1995) could not find any impact of large block holders on performance.  There are 
obviously conflicting results considering the impact of large block ownership.   
When the association between ownership concentration and performance is 
examined, Berle and Means (1932) and Cubbin and Leech (1983) report a positive 
relationship.  However, Demsetz (1983) hypothesizes that ownership structure is 
endogenously determined by balancing the costs and benefits.  In favor of this 
hypothesis, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness and Sheehan (1988) present 
their findings, that there is no significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and performance.  In contrast to those findings, Lloyd, Hand, and 
Modani (1987), Leech and Leahy (1991) find positive ownership concentration 
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effect on performance.  Thus, conflicting findings are not uncommon in the literature 
regarding the impact of block ownership.   
4.4.1 Accounting-Based Performance 
Accounting-based performance measures reflect the historical performance of 
the firms.  Even though these measures are criticized on the grounds that they are far 
from reflecting future performance potentials, they are mainly based on accounting 
figures, which are audited by independent agencies.   
Accounting-based performance will be measured with the proxies of Return on 
Total Assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) ratios.  Tobin’s Q performance 
measure is not studied because of ongoing measurement debate.  As Önder (1998) 
mentioned in her study, there is not a sound methodology to define the market value 
of the replacement cost of assets.  Thus, suggested ways of measuring Tobin’s Q are 
approximations.   
4.4.1.1 Characteristics of the Accounting-Based Performance Measures 
When we examine the time series characteristics of the accounting-based 
performance measures of ROA and ROE, we observe slightly increasing linear 
trends in both measures having the peak values in 1994.  Descriptive statistics for the 
accounting-based performance variables of ROA and ROE is presented in Table 57.   
Table 57 Descriptive Statistics of the Accounting-Based Performance 
Variables. 
(%) Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 7.32 5.91 10.03 -42.97 87.78 
ROE 12.55 14.08 35.75 -350.27 275.00 
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In Table 58, yearly mean values and changes in performance measures ROA 
and ROE are documented.   
Table 58 Yearly Mean Values of Accounting-Based Performance Measures and their 
Changes. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 
ROA 5.228 5.937 8.745 7.326 6.841 8.059 8.030 7.166
∆ROA  14% 47% -16% -7% 18% -0.4% 9%
ROE 11.162 9.395 16.748 12.330 15.107 14.242 14.544 13.361
∆ROE  -16% 78% -26% 23% -6% 2% 9%
 
As it can be seen, we observe slightly increasing trend in both performance 
measures with a yearly average of 9%.  These slightly increasing trends do not 
provide any strong evidence in favor of a long-term increase in the profitability 
levels of the sample firms.  Although we witness slightly increasing mean values in 
the accounting-based performance measures, we also experience increasing level of 
dispersion.  
4.4.1.2 Ownership Structure and Accounting-Based Performance 
The relationship between ownership concentration variables (LSH3, OTHER, 
and CASH) and accounting-based performance measures (ROA and ROE) is 
examined by conducting multivariate OLS regression analyses with the model (1) 
and model (2), by correcting heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with the GMM 
methodology. 
4.4.1.2.1 Return on Asset (ROA) 
As a general guide to the profitability of a firm, analysts often look at the ratio 
of income to total assets.  Higher ROA ratio implies the efficient use of assets.  A 
high return on total assets ratio may indicate that profits are above their long-run 
equilibrium level.  However, ROA has its limitations since ROA is based on the 
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accounting data and the book values are defined based on their original cost (less 
depreciation).  Therefore, high ROA may also indicate that given the same profit 
level, assets have been heavily depreciated.  Because of this controversial nature of 
ROA ratio, the interpretation of the ratio needs to be handled with care. 
We first test the impact of ownership structure on performance by using model 
(1) and model (2) for the relevant combinations of ROA performance proxy.  In 
addition to control variables of size and leverage, we include independent variables 
one at a time in regression analyses.  These independent variables can be categorized 
into two main groups: ownership concentration and ownership mix variables. 
The correlation analyses with the performance proxy ROA and ownership 
structure measures are conducted and results are reported in Table 59.  When we 
examine the correlation values, we observe that performance proxy ROA is 
associated with all of the ownership concentration variables and most of the 
ownership mix variables. 
Table 59 Correlation Analysis of ROA 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; significance values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Size Lev Lsh3 Other Cash Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp 
0.118 -0.408 -0.116 0.088 -0.097 0.012 -0.081 -0.082 0.133 -0.028 -0.101 0.102
(0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.004)* (0.001)* (0.692) (0.008)* (0.007)* (0.000)* (0.362) (0.001)* (0.001)*
4.4.1.2.1.1 Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration proxies of LSH3, OTHER and CASH variables are 
regressed one by one against ROA by controlling size and leverage variables.  The 
regressions test the relationship between various measures of ownership 
concentration and profitability.  Test results of the model (1) are reported in Table 60 
with the coefficients and related t-statistics, R-square and F-test values.   
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When the overall performance of the model (1) is examined, we experience 
higher R-square values as well as significant F-test statistics at the 0.01 significance 
level. 
Considering the results documented in Table 60, control variable debt to total 
assets ratio (LEV) is significant at the 0.05 level.  Significant inverse relationship 
between leverage and ROA indicates that leverage does not contribute to corporate 
performance and increased leverage causes a decline in a firm’s profitability level.  
This inverse effect of leverage may occur because of higher interest expenses 
accrued in times of high inflation.  Control variable size is also significant and its 
coefficient carries positive sign.  From the profitability perspective, we can claim 
that larger firms with lower debt to total assets ratios seem to perform better.  
However, it should not be disregarded that this ratio is mainly concerned with 
accounting profits.  Note that accounting values are severely influenced by the 
inflation rates as well as accounting methods used.  Since Turkey has been 
experiencing high inflation during the selected time period, we expect to see 
distortions in accounting values. 
When we examine the relationship between ownership concentration variables 
and performance proxy ROA, we detect significant impact of LSH3.  The other 
concentration measures are insignificant but signs of their coefficients are consistent.  
The findings indicate an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and 
accounting-based performance measure ROA.  Considering this result, we can claim 
that widely-held large firms with lower debt levels have higher profitability levels. 
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Table 60 ROA and Ownership Concentration 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported 
respectively in parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level, and 
“**” specifies 0.10 significance level. 
Constant Lev Size Lsh3 Other Cash R2 F-Test 
9.118 -0.198 0.762 -0.039     0.188 81.965
(2.27)* (-8.00)* (3.19)* (-1.83)**         
6.144 -0.200 0.748   0.028   0.185 80.59
(1.54) (-8.10)* (3.10)*   (1.35)       
8.870 -0.198 0.732     -0.028 0.185 80.163
(2.18)* (-8.07)* (3.04)*     (-1.41)     
 
Since Istanbul Stock Exchange mainly consists of concentrated family and/or 
conglomerate controlled firms, we suspect that the real agency problem in Turkey is 
not between managers and owners but between minority and large shareholders.  In 
the given governance structures of the Turkish firms, owners – families – have close 
ties and controlling power over the firm management and most of the time, managers 
are selected from the family members.  It is thought that large shareholders have a 
tendency to abuse their voting power and manipulate decision-making processes in 
favor of their interests at the expense of other shareholders.  Lower accounting-based 
profitability levels might be due to the high taxes in Turkey.  These findings increase 
our doubt on the existence of agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders.   
4.4.1.2.1.2 Ownership Mix 
The relationship between ROA and ownership mix variables is examined with 
the model (2).  Separate regressions are conducted by including each ownership mix 
variable one at a time after controlling size and leverage.  The results of the 
multivariate OLS regression analyses are reported in Table 61. 
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Table 61 ROA and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Const. Lev Size Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test
7.880 -0.203 0.707 -0.124             0.183 79.239
(2.01)* (-8.24)* (2.86)* (-0.14)                 
8.327 -0.202 0.686   -0.532           0.183 79.58
(2.10)* (-7.92)* (2.76)*   (-0.62)               
8.699 -0.202 0.688     -0.870         0.184 79.974
(2.21)* (-7.93)* (2.79)*     (-0.78)             
8.641 -0.201 0.616       2.689       0.193 84.653
(2.23)* (-8.26)* (2.58)*       (1.91)**           
8.039 -0.203 0.704         -0.584     0.183 79.58
(2.04)* (-8.25)* (2.88)*         (-0.65)         
6.718 -0.201 0.791           -3.893   0.193 84.623
(1.77)** (-8.29)* (3.32)*           (-2.56)*       
7.632 -0.201 0.706             0.797 0.183 79.563
(1.92)** (-7.81)* (2.88)*             (0.59)     
 
When the results of ownership mix models are examined, we witness foreign 
ownership (FRGN) and government ownership (GOV) as significant ownership mix 
variables.  Significant positive impact of foreign ownership (FRGN) on profitability 
measure ROA shows that firms with foreign partners have relatively higher 
profitability levels than the other firms.  This incident shows that foreign investors 
either prefer firms with better performance or exert their influence to align the 
conflicting interests with major stakeholders.  It is more likely that, high stakes of the 
foreign owners require them to establish or at least influence governance 
mechanisms to protect their investments and long-term interests.  On the other hand, 
government ownership (GOV) is not beneficial for the firm.  As expected, 
government-owned firms do not operate as efficiently as the privately owned firms.  
This is mainly caused by the undesirable differences between the political 
expectations and economic necessities.  When we consider the OLS regression test 
results, we can claim that firms with foreign partners tend to operate efficiently 
contrary to government-owned firms.  When being a part of a group either a 
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conglomerate or a family is examined, we do not observe any significant difference 
in profitability.   
4.4.1.2.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
ROE ratio is a measure of profitability, which focuses on the return on 
shareholder’s equity.  It is often used to evaluate management’s effectiveness.  In 
this section, we will investigate the impact of ownership concentration and 
ownership mix on performance proxy ROE by conducting multivariate OLS 
regression analyses with models (1) and (2).  
Bivariate correlation analyses are conducted with ROE and ownership 
structure variables to get an insight about the associations between the variables on 
hand.  Correlation results provided in Table 62 reveal significant linear associations 
between ROE and the ownership structure variables of LSH3, OTHER, CASH, 
FRGN, and GOV. 
Table 62 Correlation Analysis of ROE 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; significance values are reported respectively 
in parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Size Lev Lsh3 Other Cash Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp 
0.082 -0.252 -0.133 0.101 -0.104 0.036 -0.043 -0.012 0.078 -0.039 -0.099 0.040
(0.007)* (-0.001)* (-0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.243) (0.154) (0.686) (0.011)* (0.205) (0.001)* (0.193)
4.4.1.2.2.1 Ownership concentration 
The impact of ownership concentration on performance measure of ROE is 
examined with the model (1).  The results of the regression analyses are reported in 
Table 63 with the coefficients, related t-statistics, overall R-square, and F-test values.  
Given the results presented in the Table 63, test results of the ROE model are similar 
to those of the ROA model.   
Control variable leverage (LEV) is significant at 0.05 level providing similar 
results with the ROA model.  Leverage is inversely related to ROE, indicating that 
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increased debt level triggers a decline in the corporate profits.  It is highly likely that 
this inverse relationship is the result of high interest expenses incurred during the 
sample period.  This finding is in harmony with the Myers’s (1984) suggestion that 
managers have a pecking order in which retained earnings presents the first choice, 
followed by debt financing then equity.  Size is also significant at the 0.01 
significance level.  These findings indicate that large firms with lower debt levels 
tend to have better profitability levels.   
Table 63 ROE and Ownership Concentration 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level, and “**” specifies 0.10 
significance level. 
Constant Lev Size Lsh3 Other Cash R2 F-Test 
16.376 -0.320 1.528 -0.132     0.078 29.921
(1.11) (-3.56)* (1.90)** (-2.04)*         
6.136 -0.326 1.482   0.097   0.074 28.226
(0.45) (-3.62)* (1.82)**   (1.63)       
14.785 -0.322 1.407     -0.075 0.072 27.261
(0.99) (-3.55)* (1.72)**     (-1.20)     
 
Regression analyses of the ownership concentration models yield significant 
coefficients for cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders 
(LSH3) variable.  Multivariate OLS regression test results show that ownership 
concentration is associated with lower performance.  This finding is consistent with 
the ROA models.  By considering the overall results we can claim that widely-held 
large firms with lower debt levels tend to have better accounting performance as 
measured with ROE. 
4.4.1.2.2.2 Ownership mix 
The relationships between ownership identity groups and performance measure 
ROE are investigated with the model (2) and results of the regression analyses are 
reported in Table 64.    
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Table 64 ROE and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Const. Lev Size Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test 
11.867 -0.336 1.303 2.129             0.07 27.05
(0.84) (-3.72)* (1.54) (0.88)                 
12.868 -0.335 1.302  -0.937           0.07 26.59
(0.93) (-3.67)* (1.57)   (-0.43)               
11.052 -0.344 1.352     1.093         0.07 26.60
(0.83) (-3.70)* (1.65)     (0.35)             
13.401 -0.334 1.185    4.521       0.07 28.12
(0.93) (-3.69)* (1.37)       (1.26)           
11.927 -0.337 1.333     0.552     0.07 26.51
(0.84) (-3.72)* (1.58)         (0.22)         
8.815 -0.329 1.581      -11.896   0.08 31.88
(0.69) (-3.70)* (2.12)*           (-1.97)*       
12.332 -0.339 1.333       -0.873 0.07 26.52
(0.86) (-3.74)* (1.58)             (-0.33)     
 
When we examine the relationship between ownership mix and accounting 
based performance variables we find the dominant impact of government ownership 
(GOV).  The results are consistent with the results of the ROA models.  On the other 
hand, we cannot find any significant effect of conglomerate affiliation (CONG) and 
family ownership (FAM). 
Government ownership (GOV) is inversely associated with the accounting-
based performance measures.  It seems that governance systems of the government-
owned or controlled firms do not lead to managerial efficiency.  Hence, it is not 
surprising to witness lower performance of those firms, given that economic 
necessities mostly take the second priority after the political expectations. 
4.4.1.3 Summary of Accounting Performance Relationships 
With the multivariate OLS regression analyses, we test the impact of 
ownership concentration and ownership mix variables on accounting-based 
performance measures.  In connection with the findings documented in the previous 
sections, it will not be misleading to conclude that ownership structure is strongly 
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related to accounting-based performance.  However, we witness ambiguous findings 
regarding performance and ownership structure relationship in the literature.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found the relationship 
between ownership concentration and accounting profitability to be insignificant.  
Alternatively, recent studies of Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) and Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1999) identify the impact of ownership structure on performance as 
significant. 
Taken from the leverage (LEV) perspective, we witness significant inverse 
relationship between leverage and accounting-based performance measures.  
Increasing leverage levels end up with the lower profitability levels of our sample 
firms.  High nominal interest expenses accrued by the high inflation rates seem to be 
one of the bases for the lower profitability levels. This finding is consistent with the 
Myers’s (1984) pecking order theory. 
Considering the results of ownership concentration variables, we can claim that 
increase in the ownership concentration leads a decline in the profitability levels of 
the sample firms.  Both negative sign of LSH3 and positive sign of OTHER support 
this conclusion.   
In order to determine the owner identities that exhibit differences in the 
profitability level of the firms, model (2) is estimated with the dummy variables of 
conglomerate affiliation (CONG), family ownership (FAM), group ownership 
(CFAM), foreign ownership (FRGN), government ownership (GOV), dispersed 
ownership (DISP), and cross ownership (CROSS).  Among those ownership mix 
variables, we witness government ownership (GOV) and foreign ownership (FRGN) 
as significant ones. 
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Foreign ownership (FRGN) has a positive significant relationship with the 
accounting-based performance measures.  This finding indicates that foreign 
investors either select better performers to invest or revise governance mechanisms 
of those firms to discipline managers and align the conflicting interests of the main 
stakeholders.  In either case, foreign ownership (FRGN) is associated with the higher 
return generation through efficient utilization of the corporate resources. 
Government ownership (GOV) is the second significant ownership mix 
variable that affects corporate performance.  Unlike foreign ownership (FRGN), 
government ownership (GOV) has an inverse relationship with both accounting-
based performance measures.  This fact justifies the ongoing privatization programs.  
Almost all of the government-owned firms are in the list of privatization programs.  
Main reason for this inverse relationship can be explained with the existing conflict 
between economic necessities and political expectations. 
4.4.2 Market-Based Performance 
It turns out that even accounting-based performance measures provide 
insightful information; those measures are not adequate to reflect all aspects of 
corporate performance.  When we examine the literature, we encounter contradictory 
results on the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure.  
We seek to investigate the relationship between the performance and ownership 
structure in Turkey by including two groups of performance measures.  Performance 
measures used so far in this study are all accounting ratios, which may not reflect the 
market’s assessment of a firm. 
For that reason, we will also include marked-based performance measures into 
our analyses in order to have a comprehensive performance measurement system.  
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We identify those measures as market to book value (MBV) ratio, price to earnings 
(P/E) ratio and stock returns (RET). 
4.4.2.1 Characteristics of the Market-Based Performance Measures 
Market-based performance measures are market to book value (MBV), price to 
earnings (P/E) ratio and stock returns (RET).  It is accepted that those measures, 
which are proxies for exposure to underlying risk factors are rationally priced in the 
market (market efficiency assumption).  Moreover, as Berk (1995) claims, because 
of the relationship between price and return, ratios, which include price, are expected 
to be related to stock returns. 
Impact of ownership structure on the market-based performance measures is 
examined thoroughly in the further sections.  These measures, which reflect market 
assessments, are determined by the expectations on a firm’s future performance 
potential.  As market efficiency theory indicates, market determines firm’s stock 
price by appraising all relevant and ascertainable information including the 
expectations.  Even though, there are imperfections in the market, these variables are 
still legitimate and unbiased proxies for a firm’s performance.   
Table 65 Descriptive Statistics of the Market-Based Performance Variables 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
P/E 8.713 7.488 6.674 0.010 52.083
MBV 5.386 3.730 6.847 0.260 89.160
RET12 6.964 6.039 9.007 -14.146 96.206
In Table 65 we provide descriptive statistics of the selected market-based 
performance variables.  Only RET12 is reported as a proxy for the return measures 
used in the analyses. 
When the results presented in Table 66 are examined, we witness a slightly 
increasing trend in both P/E and MBV ratio levels with a mean value of 12% and 
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11% respectively.  This shows us that the nature of the Turkish stock market seems 
to have minor changes throughout our analysis period.     
Table 66 Yearly Mean Values of Market-Based Performance Measures. 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Avg. 
MBV 3.455 4.284 6.674 4.264 4.678 5.303 5.180 4.834
∆MBV  24% 56% -36% 10% 13% -2% 11%
P/E 18.184 16.910 23.430 25.882 28.320 28.131 33.655 24.930
∆P/E  -7% 39% 10% 9% -1% 20% 12%
RET12 6.847 5.820 7.086 7.463 6.925 7.282 7.025 6.921
∆RET12  -15% 22% 5% -7% 5% -4% 1%
 
When the Table 66 is examined, it can be seen that stock returns are volatile 
during the analysis period.  These figures also reflect the crisis in stock markets 
between 1992 and 1998.  For example, in 1994, Turkey experienced significant 
turmoil in financial markets and this unpleasant incident is reflected in all of the 
market-based performance measures.   
4.4.2.2 Ownership Structure and Performance 
In connection with the evidence provided by the literature, it is commonly 
accepted that there is a significant relationship between ownership structure and 
market-based performance.  For example, findings documented by Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) in their recently published article support this argument.  However, 
this relationship has not been investigated thoroughly in the Turkish market.  This 
section is designed to investigate the impacts of ownership structure on market 
performance of the sample firms.  
4.4.2.2.1 Market to Book Value (MBV) Ratio 
Market to book value (MBV) ratio is one of the commonly accepted 
explanatory proxies that have significant positive effect on expected returns.  Beaver 
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and Ryan (1993) document that the MBV ratio is a function of current and lagged 
changes in market value.  Fama and French (1992) suggest that one dimension of 
stock risks is proxied by MBV ratio.  This ratio reflects the market’s assessments and 
is an indicator of the relative prospects of the firm.  Therefore, Fama and French 
claim that firms with low MBV ratios (a low stock price relative to book value) have 
low earnings relative to other firms.  In their article, Fama and French (1995) 
introduce MBV ratio as a corporate distress indicator.  They report in their findings 
that firms with low MBV ratios are among the candidates for being persistently 
distressed.  Conversely, high MBV ratios are associated with sustained strong 
profitability.  Fama and French (1995) also show that MBV ratio is more reliable 
measure than P/E ratio.  In this context, impact of ownership structure on corporate 
performance is questioned.  To examine this proposition, we estimate model (1) and 
(2) with the market-based performance proxy of MBV.   
Table 67 Correlation Analysis of MBV 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; significance values are reported 
respectively in parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Size Lev Lsh3 Other Cash Cong Frgn Cross Fam Gov Disp Cfam 
0.092 0.155 0.033 -0.056 0.029 0.090 0.045 0.041 -0.065 0.024 -0.068 0.018
(0.003)* (0.000)* (0.285) (0.065) (0.347) (0.003)* (0.138) (0.179) (0.032)* (0.429) (0.026)* (0.553)
 
Cross-correlation analyses of the MBV ratio with the ownership structure 
variables are conducted and findings are listed in Table 67.  In connection with the 
results presented in Table 67, both control variables of size and leverage are 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable MBV.  Among the independent 
variables, conglomerate affiliation (CONG), family ownership (FAM) and dispersed 
ownership (DISP) are significantly correlated with MBV.   
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4.4.2.2.1.1 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration and performance association is examined with model 
(1) and findings of the model are presented in Table 68.  When the market value 
measure market-to-book (MBV) ratio is employed as a market-based performance 
proxy, the model has a slightly lower explanatory power although F-value is 
significant at 0.01 level.  Coefficients of both control variables leverage and size 
carry positive signs, and both of them are significant at the 0.05 significance level.  
Increasing leverage leads an increase in the market performance of the sample firms.  
As Fama and French (1995) claims, increased MBV ratio implies decreasing level of 
distress with increasing return expectations.   
  Table 68 MBV and Ownership Concentration. 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Constant Lev Size Beta Lsh3 Other Cash R2 F-Test 
-12.716 0.104 1.003 -0.153 -0.039     0.122 25.88
(-2.94)* (4.06)* (3.70)* (-0.16)* (-1.98)*         
-14.653 0.099 0.961 -0.193   0.014   0.114 24.076
(-2.92)* (4.08)* (3.60)* (-0.20)   (0.80)       
-12.504 0.103 0.986 -0.234     -0.037 0.12 25.578
(-3.02)* (3.93)* (3.63)* (-0.26)     (-1.58)     
 
Ownership concentration measure of cumulative percentage shares of the 
largest three shareholders (LSH3) has a significant impact on market-based 
performance.  It seems that ownership concentration does not yield higher market 
performance.  However, we need to examine other market-based performance 
measures in order to derive any conclusions.   
4.4.2.2.1.2 Ownership Mix 
To develop more generalized insights into the effect of ownership structure on 
performance, we expand the domain of the study into seven ownership identity 
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groups.  We adopt a regression approach to investigate the relationships between 
MBV and ownership identity by applying model (2).  Leverage and size, as control 
variables, are significant and both carry positive signs as consistent with the results 
of the ownership concentration models.  Significant positive relationships of leverage 
and size with MBV ratio indicate that the market favorably appreciates large firms 
with higher leverage.  Additional control variable BETA, conversely, does not show 
any significant influence on MBV ratio. 
When the model (2) is estimated with the inclusion of ownership mix variables 
individually, we can recognize only one significant ownership identity variable 
CONG.  Significant positive conglomerate affiliation (CONG) provides insightful 
information regarding the ownership mix and market-based performance 
relationship.  We observe positive contribution of conglomerate affiliation (CONG) 
to market performance.  Since a conglomerate affiliate has a privilege to use the 
advantages of operating under a distinct conglomerate –namely, resource allocation– 
it is not surprising to witness the positive impact of conglomerate affiliation (CONG) 
on corporate performance.  Besides, control mechanisms created by the 
institutionalized conglomerates, in support of the managerial incentive mechanisms 
oblige managers to be effective and efficient.  These arrangements in a conglomerate 
affiliate’s governance system, unsurprisingly, increase the market performance.  
Market appreciates the advantage of operating under a distinct conglomerate and 
rewards the common stock prices of those conglomerate affiliates.  Operating as a 
part of a distinct conglomerate tends to increase the market expectations on the 
firm’s earnings patterns.  Since an institutionalized governance system of a distinct 
conglomerate will not let one of its affiliates to be a poor performer, market risk of 
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those firms are influenced by this market’s optimistic assessment.  Even if a 
conglomerate affiliate shows danger signs in its performance measures, 
conglomerate governance mechanisms will not hesitate to take required corrective 
actions.  In the overall evaluation, we can conclude that large conglomerate affiliates 
with higher debt levels tend to have higher market performance.  
Table 69 MBV and Ownership Mix 
“*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level, while “**” refers to 0.10 significance level. 
Const. Lev Size Beta Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test
-14.113 0.096 0.920 -0.083 1.752             0.125 26.824
(-3.05)* (4.23)* (3.72)* (-0.09) (1.91)**                 
-12.876 0.099 0.909 -0.276   -1.082           0.118 24.965
(-2.98)* (4.16)* (3.72)* (-0.29)   (-1.50)               
-14.413 0.095 0.943 -0.016     0.759         0.115 24.286
(-2.98)* (4.19)* (3.69)* (-0.02)     (1.11)             
-13.548 0.097 0.920 -0.136       0.326       0.113 23.869
(-3.05)* (4.15)* (3.65)* (-0.14)       (0.27)           
-13.976 0.096 0.940 -0.117         0.586     0.114 24.131
(-2.96)* (4.17)* (3.68)* (-0.12)         (0.64)         
-13.887 0.098 0.946 -0.100           -0.636   0.114 23.949
(-2.97)* (4.11)* (3.66)* (-0.10)           (-0.54)       
-13.382 0.094 0.927 -0.078             -0.771 0.114 24.067
(-2.95)* (4.03)* (3.68)* (-0.08)             (-1.57)     
4.4.2.2.2 Price to Earnings (P/E) Ratio 
Price to earnings (P/E) ratio is selected as a measure of market performance 
since; it has been a popular measure in the literature that helps investors to shape 
their investment strategies.  Given the findings presented in the literature, by Basu 
(1983), Goodman and Peavey (1986), and Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989) we 
have sufficient amount of evidence to conclude that low P/E investment strategies 
generate abnormal returns.  In 1992, Fama and French contribute to those findings by 
reporting significant positive relation between P/E and abnormal returns.  Rationale 
to low P/E strategies is offered as “Higgledy Piggledy Growth” by Fuller, Huberts, 
and Levinson (1992).  Authors claim that future earnings growth cannot be 
forecasted at all.  With this assumption, they assert that low P/E strategies should 
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provide above normal returns since, prices are only a function of future earnings 
growth.  They justify their reasoning by associating P/E ratio with the distribution of 
future earnings changes.  If one invests in low P/E stocks, he will pay relatively less 
for the same distribution of future earnings change.  Because of the problems that 
have been encountered such as near zero earnings and negative earnings figures, 
observations with negative values are discarded from the analyses. 
Considering the result of correlation analysis documented in Table 70, we can 
list the significantly correlated variables with P/E ratio as size, conglomerate 
affiliation (CONG), family ownership (FAM), cross ownership (CROSS), and 
dispersed ownership (DISP).   
When we look at the issue from the ownership structure perspective, P/E 
related recent studies report positive impact of ownership concentration.  Among 
these studies, Zeckhouser and Pound (1990) document that the P/E ratio increases 
with ownership concentration in easily monitored industries where owners may 
affect performance.  In this section, we will examine the impact of ownership 
structure on market performance proxy P/E with the utilization of ownership 
concentration and ownership mix models. 
Table 70 Correlation Analysis of P/E 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; significance values are reported 
respectively in parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Size Lev Lsh3 Other Cash Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp 
0.141 -0.013 -0.034 0.038 0.003 -0.082 0.080 0.005 -0.052 -0.102 -0.043 0.067
(0.001)* (0.683) (0.285) (0.244) (0.937) (0.011)* (0.013)* (0.872) (0.106) (0.002)* (0.186) (0.037)*
4.4.2.2.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
Model (1) with the inclusion of BETA as an additional control variable is used 
with P/E as the performance variable to test the relationship between ownership 
concentration and market performance.  In consideration of the regression results 
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presented in Table 71, we conclude that market performance proxy P/E is related to 
ownership concentration at the significance level of 0.10.  With regard to the control 
variables, both leverage and size are significant with their positive and negative signs 
respectively.  There is an inverse relationship between size and P/E ratio, as 
consistent with the literature.  It seems that large firms tend to have lower market 
prices even though they have similar earnings patterns with the smaller ones.  
Negative sign of the size variable is in harmony with the size anomaly commonly 
known in the literature.   
Among the ownership concentration measures, cumulative percentage share of 
the largest three shareholders (LSH3) is significant at the 0.10 significance level.  
The significant ownership concentration measure consistently indicates that 
concentrated ownership is associated with higher market performance.  Even though, 
we witness an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and accounting-
based performance, market performance proxy P/E increases with the concentrated 
ownership. 
Table 71 P/E and Ownership Concentration. 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level, while “**” refers to 0.10 
significance level. 
Constant Lev Size Beta Lsh3 Other Cash R2 F-Test 
44.693 0.194 -2.572 1.393 0.124     0.027 4.873
(3.00)* (2.14)* (-2.11)* (0.31) (1.60)**         
53.753 0.194 -2.523 1.836   -0.092   0.025 4.507
(3.03)* (2.22)* (-2.05)* (0.39)   (-1.05)       
45.911 0.204 -2.412 1.614   0.054 0.024 4.291
(3.16)* (2.20)* (-2.00)* (0.35)     (0.59)     
 
Positive coefficient of LSH3 indicates that increase in ownership concentration 
causes an increase in the P/E ratio.  Stock prices of concentrated firms tend to be 
higher when compared to those of dispersed firms, even if they have the same 
earnings levels.   
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4.4.2.2.2.2 Ownership Mix 
The relationship between ownership mix and market-based performance proxy 
P/E ratio is investigated with the model (2) with the inclusion of BETA as an 
additional control variable.  The regression analyses are conducted to detect whether 
ownership identity groups have any significant differences as reflected in a firm’s 
market performance.  Both size and leverage as control variables are significant and 
their signs are consistent with the ownership concentration model.  Smaller firms 
with higher debt to total assets ratio tend to have higher stock prices. 
Relationship between ownership mix variables and market-based performance 
measure of P/E is examined with the model (2) by including ownership mix variables 
individually.  Taken from this respect, significant ownership mix variables are 
conglomerate affiliation (CONG), and cross ownership (CROSS) with positive signs, 
and family ownership (FAM) with a negative sign. 
Table 72 P/E and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  An “*” denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level, while “**” refers to 0.10 
significance level. 
Const. Lev Size Beta Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2  F-Test
45.836 0.199 -2.380 1.736 7.576             0.033 6.091
(3.03)* (2.29)* (-2.05)* (0.39) (1.98)*                 
51.357 0.221 -2.433 0.673   -5.902           0.03 5.362
(3.30)* (2.54)* (-2.09)* (0.15)  (-2.12)*               
46.251 0.201 -2.331 1.788     1.734         0.018 4.244
(3.02)* (2.26)* (-2.00)* (0.39)   (0.54)             
48.383 0.207 -2.408 1.504       1.520       0.023 4.211
(3.16)* (2.35)* (-2.04)* (0.33)    (0.46)          
43.944 0.199 -2.222 1.674         6.496     0.031 5.538
(2.96)* (2.31)* (-1.95)** (0.37)*     (1.69)**         
48.380 0.205 -2.384 1.301           2.586   0.023 4.229
(3.10)* (2.30)* (-2.02)* (0.29)      (0.41)       
48.713 0.194 -2.359 1.668             -2.303 0.024 4.241
(3.09)* (2.13)* (-2.01)* (0.37)             (-0.58)     
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Market prices of the sample conglomerate affiliates are higher than those of the 
family-owned sample firms.. This finding is also consistent with the results of MBV 
performance proxy. 
Cross ownership (CROSS), which is frequently observed in conglomerate 
affiliates show similar results of conglomerate affiliation (CONG).  Most of the 
conglomerates utilize cross ownership (CROSS) as a governance mechanism to keep 
control of their affiliates.  This fact is reflected on the relationship between 
ownership mix and performance.  When the results of the multivariate regression 
analyses are examined, we conclude that firms with complex networks of ownership 
relationships have lower P/E. 
4.4.2.2.3 Stock Returns 
We extend the analysis by including stock returns into our study since stock 
returns are mainly determined by the market on the basis of the investors’ 
assessments and they are good indicator of a firm’s market performance.  Holl 
(1977) examines the return on stocks of owner or manager controlled firms.  He 
reports that owner-controlled firms are significantly more profitable than 
management-controlled firms.  When we examine the literature, we find significant 
positive relationship between insider (managerial) ownership and stock returns.  This 
relationship is explained by the incentive alignment argument in the literature.  As a 
governance mechanism, owners try to align and protect their interests by allowing 
manager to hold some portion of shares with some restrictions.  Stulz (1988), 
Hermalin and Weisback (1991), Holderness et al. (1999), Hubbard and Palia (1995), 
and Keasey et al. (1994) are among the authors that conclude in favor of a roof 
shaped relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance.  This 
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fact indicates that insider ownership is useful to some extent and aligns the interests 
of the conflicting sides, beyond that point; it decreases performance because of the 
increased entrenchment incentives of the managers.  Holderness and Sheehan (1985) 
and Barclay and Holderness (1991) examine the effect of ownership structure on 
abnormal stock returns.  These authors document that large shareholders are 
associated with significant abnormal stock returns.  Since short-term stock returns 
are too volatile to be used as a reliable measure of a firm’s performance, long-term 
returns may well capture that phenomenon.  In order to cover the comprehensive 
effect of ownership structure on corporate performance, several return measures are 
used.  We explore the relationship between ownership structure and stock returns by 
including return measures of: 
• Average monthly stock return in 12 months (RET12) 
• Average monthly stock return in 24 months (RET24) 
• Abnormal average monthly stock return in a year (ABRET) 
• Average cumulative 3-month stock return in a year (RET3) 
• Average cumulative 6-month stock return in a year (RET6) 
Average monthly stock return in 12 months (RET12) is calculated by taking 
the average value of the monthly stock returns at a given year.  We intend to define a 
reliable measure of a firm’s performance by decreasing volatility with the central 
tendency measure of mean.  We also consider the average of the stock returns in 24 
months (RET24).  By including RET24 into our return measure basket, we intend to 
capture the dynamics of the relationship between ownership structure and stock 
returns in a moderately longer time horizon.  In order to remove market effect form 
stock returns we also calculated abnormal stock returns (ABRET) by subtracting 
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monthly market returns from the monthly stock returns.  Average three and six 
month cumulative returns (RET3 and RET6) in a year are computed assuming that 
cumulative returns may better capture the relationship between stock returns and 
ownership structure.  As return measurement periods in successive months overlap, 
we select only those observations with no overlapping return horizons.  Hence, when 
we work with three-month ahead returns (RET3), we choose the monthly 
observations in January, April, July, and October of every year in the sample.  
Similarly, we pick January and July for six-month ahead returns (RET6).  We then 
take the average of the return measures of RET3 and RET6 within a year time frame.   
Descriptive statistics of the return measures are reported in Table 73.  Note that 
volatility of both RET12 and RET24 return measures are lower than the others.  
Stock return and ownership structure relation is examined with models (1) and (2) 
with the inclusion of market risk of BETA as an additional control variable.   
 
Table 73 Descriptive Statistics of Return Measures 
 
% Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RET12 6.964 6.039 9.007 -14.146 96.206 
RET24 4.936 4.784 3.968 -14.108 19.340 
ABRET 1.180 0.543 7.277 -30.203 90.963 
RET3 23.072 18.948 32.160 -38.467 327.133 
RET6 60.502 42.817 84.052 -70.633 1106.880 
4.4.2.2.3.1 Ownership Concentration 
We adopt model (1) with the inclusion of market risk as an additional control 
variable to explore the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its stock returns.  
Accordingly, we define five separate stock return measures in order to capture the 
different dimensions of the phenomenon.  Results of the analyses are presented in 
Table 74.  When we examine the regression results, we encounter size as a 
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significant control variable.  Size is negatively related to stock return measures 
indicating that small firms have higher stock returns.  As cited in the literature, this 
inverse relationship between size and stock returns is known as size anomaly. 
As regards to the ownership concentration measures, cumulative percentage 
shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3) and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate 
controlling owner(s) (CASH) variables consistently carry significant positive 
coefficient values in each model.  These results are also supported with the 
significant negative coefficients of the cumulative percentage shares held by diffused 
shareholders (OTHER) variable.  These findings show that increase in the ownership 
concentration leads an increase in the stock returns.  As listed on Table 49, we 
observe the concentrated nature of the cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling 
owner(s) with the mean value of 61.2%.  We will not be mistaken by claiming that 
managers tend to be concerned with the interests of the ultimate controlling owner(s) 
instead of diffused small stockholders.  This fact is also intuitively realistic.  When 
we consider the managerial compensation systems, we find that most of the 
companies use managerial incentive mechanisms to motivate managers to align the 
interests of the main stakeholders.  In the concentrated firms, we find the dominant 
representation of large shareholders in the board of directors.  Since board of 
directors will determine the level and type of the managerial compensation system, it 
is likely that managers will be eager to satisfy the expectations of those large 
shareholders.  Naturally, small and unorganized shareholders will be the first to pay 
the price in this governance system.  In the longer time horizons, we observe more 
results that are significant.   
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Table 74 Stock Returns and Ownership Concentration 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is 
marked with “**”.   
 Constant Lev Size Beta Lsh3 Other Cash R2 F-test 
18.045 0.029 -0.949 0.935 0.019    
(6.88)* (1.95)** (-6.20)* (1.20) (1.23)    
0.037
 
7.331
 
20.428 0.028 -0.973 1.043 -0.027  
(7.82)* (1.90)** (-6.39)* (1.35)  (-1.78)**  
0.037
 
7.647
 
17.379 0.026 -0.965 1.027  0.036
RE
T1
2 
(6.68)* (1.73)** (-6.44)* (1.32)    (2.31)*
0.039
 
8.106
 
10.577 0.005 -0.455 0.461 0.014    
(6.72)* (0.54) (-4.68)* (1.21) (1.59)    
0.036
 
6.647
 
12.114 0.004 -0.464 0.541 -0.018  
(7.20)* (0.50) (-4.71) (1.43)  (-1.95)**  
0.033
 
7.069
 
10.426 0.004 -0.446 0.503  0.015
RE
T2
4 
(6.69)* (0.48) (-4.62)* (1.32)    (1.67)**
0.036
 
6.673
 
4.411 0.015 -0.217 -0.410 0.006    
(1.99)* (1.28) (-1.72)** (-0.65) (0.56)    
0.007
 
1.357
 
5.282 0.015 -0.228 -0.369 -0.010  
(2.44)* (1.26) (-1.80)** (-0.59) (-0.88)  
0.007
 
1.442
 
3.757 0.012 -0.241 -0.343  0.024
AB
RE
T 
(1.72)** (1.02) (-1.94)** (-0.55)    (2.19)*
0.011
 
2.161
 
61.023 0.098 -3.648 6.514 0.099    
(6.27)* (1.81)** (-6.41)* (2.51)* (1.73)**    
0.044
 
9.133
 
72.278 0.095 -3.729 6.988 -0.127  
(7.81)* (1.77)** (-6.57)* (2.71)*  (-2.23)*  
0.046
 
9.519
 
58.787 0.086 -3.663 6.836  0.147
RE
T3
 
(5.99)* (1.61)** (-6.47)* (2.64)*    (2.53)*
0.048
 
9.943
 
72.736 0.333 -3.154 3.931 0.255    
(2.75)* (2.38)* (-2.13)* (0.60) (1.82)**   
0.013
 
2.705
 
96.419 0.334 -3.198 4.815 -0.249  
(3.86)* (2.41)* (-2.17)* (0.75)  (-1.81)**  
0.013
 
2.639
 
67.391 0.304 -3.178 4.725  0.367
RE
T6
 
(2.53)* (2.19)* (-2.16)* (0.73)    (2.60)*
0.016
 
3.312
 
 
In sum, we conclude that stock returns are positively related to ownership 
concentration measures, indicating that increase in ownership concentration 
contributes to stock returns.  Small concentrated firms tend to have higher stock 
returns.  
4.4.2.2.3.2 Ownership Mix 
It is hypothesized that ownership identity has important implications on the 
corporate governance structures, which eventually influence corporate performance.  
To test the relationship between ownership mix and performance, multivariate OLS 
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regression models (2) will be used with the selection of stock returns as a market 
performance proxy.  Market risk measure of BETA is also incorporated into the 
model in order to control all relevant dominant factors for analyzing the effects of 
ownership mix on stock returns. 
Several measures of stock returns will be included into our analyses to capture 
the various nature of the proxy.  Each stock return measure is included individually 
into the model and results are reported in separate tables.  In the Table 75, the results 
of the first stock return measure of RET12 is reported.  Regression results show that 
group ownership (CFAM) and government ownership (GOV) variables are 
significantly and positively related to RET12.  This fact implies that stocks of the 
government-owned firms in the sample are performing comparatively better than the 
others.  This incident can be justified by either higher expectations of market on 
government-owned firms because of the ongoing privatization programs.  
Interestingly, firms which are controlled by either a conglomerate or a family have 
relatively lower stock returns.  Both control variables of leverage and size are 
significant and carry positive and negative coefficients respectively.  When we 
consider the results of the OLS multivariate regression tests, we can assert that small 
government-owned firms with higher debt levels tend to have higher stock returns as 
measured with RET12.   
In the second run, we replace RET12 (average monthly stock returns in 12 
months) with RET24 (average monthly stock returns in 24 months) as stock return 
measure.  We expect to see the impact of ownership mix on stock returns in 
relatively longer periods.  Considering the regression results of RET24 presented in 
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Table 76, we observe family ownership (FAM), group ownership (CFAM), and 
government ownership (GOV) ownership mix variables as the significant ones.   
Table 75 Stock Returns (RET12) and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported 
respectively in parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 
0.10 significance level is marked with “**”.   
Const. Lev Size Beta Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-test 
18.673 0.032 -0.913 0.927 -0.456            0.034 7.148
(7.21)* (2.11)* (-5.85)* (1.19) (-0.91)                
19.117 0.033 -0.931 0.817 -0.786          0.036 7.407
(7.38)* (2.24)* (-5.98)* (1.03) (-1.55)              
20.067 0.033 -0.942 0.704    -1.512        0.039 8.189
(7.36)* (2.27)* (-6.09)* (0.86)  (-2.10)*            
18.713 0.032 -0.932 0.938   0.452      0.034 7.104
(6.97)* (2.14)* (-5.61)* (1.20)   (0.52)          
18.929 0.032 -0.927 0.924    -0.671    0.035 7.286
(7.24)* (2.13)* (-5.90)* (1.19)    (-1.34)        
19.634 0.029 -0.984 0.738     3.235  0.044 9.239
(7.97)* (1.99)* (-6.76)* (0.93)     (3.35)*      
18.769 0.029 -0.919 0.981      -0.664 0.034 7.144
(7.20)* (1.92)** (-5.88)* (1.25)      (-0.90)    
 
Average monthly stock returns (RET24) of the family-owned and group-owned 
sample firms are significantly lower than those of other firms.  It seems that market 
does not appreciate the potentials of the family and group owned firms.  It is thought 
that market does not have confidence on those firms, since they are controlled and 
governed by mutual interest groups, namely families.  It is highly likely that there 
will be interest conflicts between those interest groups and minority shareholders.  
When we consider the governance mechanisms of family owned firms, we do not 
observe institutionalization but intense influence of families.  Since families are 
highly involved in even daily decision-making, it seems that, market is suspicious 
about the protection of investors’ rights in those firms.  Obviously, this fact reveals 
negative coefficient for the family ownership (FAM) variable in our ownership mix 
model.  This finding supports our belief that the real agency conflict in Turkey is 
between majority and minority shareholders not managers and shareholders. 
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Table 76 Stock Returns (RET24) and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is 
marked with “**”.  
Const. Lev Size Beta Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test 
10.788 0.006 -0.427 0.478 0.352            0.033 6.127
(6.88)* (0.77) (-4.32)* (1.25) (1.19)                
11.637 0.008 -0.449 0.347 -0.861          0.043 8.058
(7.53)* (1.00) (-4.71)* (0.89) (-2.79)*              
11.60 0.01 -0.44 0.36    -0.66        0.037 6.862
(7.37)* (0.92) (-4.55)* (0.90)    (-1.93)**            
10.935 0.006 -0.430 0.474   0.137      0.031 5.804
(6.93)* (0.77) (-4.29)* (1.23)   (0.36)          
10.787 0.006 -0.421 0.470    0.168    0.032 5.848
(6.88)* (0.75) (-4.27)* (1.23)    (0.58)        
11.641 0.004 -0.469 0.327     1.727  0.047 8.854
(7.62)* (0.58) (-5.01)* (0.84)     (3.12)*      
10.912 0.006 -0.425 0.479      -0.119 0.031 5.788
(6.94)* (0.70) (-4.31)* (1.23)      (-0.30)    
 
Significant government ownership (GOV) coefficient supports the findings of 
the RET12 model.  Government-owned firms have higher stock returns as measured 
with RET24.  It will not be erroneous to accept the positive impact of government 
ownership (GOV) on stock returns. 
The impact of ownership mix on stock returns is also examined by considering the 
abnormal stock returns.  Abnormal stock return (ABRET) is calculated as the 
average of the difference between monthly stock return and market return in a year.  
With this approach, it is intended to examine relationship between stock returns and 
ownership mix variables by removing the market influence.  ABRET is regressed 
with the ownership mix variables separately by controlling size, leverage, and market 
risk.  Results are presented in Table 77.  Entire performance of the ABRET 
regression models is the lowest among the analyses conducted so far.  We find that 
government ownership (GOV) and dispersed ownership (DISP) are significantly 
related to abnormal returns (ABRET).  This finding is consistent with the findings of 
both RET12 and RET24.  Government ownership (GOV) has a dominant positive 
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impact on all stock return measures.  Furthermore, we observe the negative impact of 
dispersed ownership (DISP).  Firms without any dominant owners have significantly 
lower abnormal returns compared to the other firms. 
Table 77 Stock Returns (ABRET) and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively 
in parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance 
level is marked with “**”.   
Const. Lev Size Beta Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test
4.753 0.016 -0.203 -0.419 -0.620            0.008 1.668
(2.17)* (1.34) (-1.59) (-0.67) (-1.44)                
4.744 0.017 -0.210 -0.444 -0.217          0.007 1.347
(2.12)* (1.41) (-1.63)** (-0.70) (-0.49)              
5.545 0.023 -0.222 -0.562    -0.974        0.01 2.08
(2.29)* (1.49) (-1.71)** (-0.86)  (-1.54)            
4.665 0.016 -0.214 -0.409   0.207      0.007 1.326
(2.05)* (1.37) (-1.57) (-0.65)   (0.26)          
4.938 0.016 -0.216 -0.419    -0.636    0.008 1.679
(2.22)* (1.38) (-1.67)** (-0.67)    (-1.50)        
5.457 0.014 -0.261 -0.565     2.573  0.017 3.565
(2.59)* (1.19) (-2.14)* (-0.89)     (3.48)*      
4.932 0.013 -0.215 -0.338      -0.945 0.008 1.699
(2.25)* (1.08) (-1.67)** (-0.53)       (-1.66)**    
 
In addition to stock return measures discussed above, we also consider the 
average cumulative return of each stock in a three-month (RET3) and six-month 
(RET6) period in a year respectively.  
Each stock return measure is regressed on ownership mix variables in model 
(2).  According to the results presented in the Table 78, we witness the dominance of 
the government ownership (GOV) as consistent with the other return measures.  
Firms under the control of a family or any group have relatively lower returns than 
the other firms.  This finding is also supported with the findings of the other return 
measures. 
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Table 78 Cumulative Stock Returns (RET3 and RET6) and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance 
level is marked with “**”.   
Const. Lev Size Beta Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test
PANEL A: RET3it = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit +β3 BETAit + β4 MIXit + εi 
63.645 0.112 -3.464 6.442 0.234            0.041 8.419
(6.71)* (2.08)* (-5.78)* (2.46)* (0.13)                
66.350 0.118 -3.538 5.971 -3.616          0.044 9.086
(7.04)* (2.21)* (-5.97)* (2.25)*  (-1.96)**              
67.953 0.122 -3.531 5.852    -4.233        0.044 9.182
(6.86)* (2.20)* (-5.96)* (2.16)*    (-1.69)**            
64.565 0.113 -3.554 6.525   2.185      0.041 8.565
(6.63)* (2.10)* (-5.60)* (2.47)*   (0.70)          
64.377 0.112 -3.484 6.430    -1.184    0.041 8.484
(6.82)* (2.08)* (-5.81)* (2.46)*    (-0.66)        
67.297 0.103 -3.689 5.809     10.487  0.049 10.354
(7.39)* (1.93)** (-6.60)* (2.17)*     (2.61)*      
64.545 0.105 -3.484 6.624      -2.292 0.041 8.538
(6.82)* (1.90)** (-5.84)* (2.51)*      (-0.89)    
PANEL B: RET6it = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit +β3 BETAit + β4 MIXit + εit 
79.526 0.367 -2.680 3.746 0.439      0.010 2.109
(3.05)* (2.60)* (-1.74)** (0.57) (0.08)                
85.997 0.382 -2.856 2.613 -8.697          0.013 2.595
(3.29)* (2.71)* (-1.85)** (0.40)  (-1.79)**              
89.792 0.382 -2.831 2.344    -10.121        0.013 2.659
(3.13)* (2.71)* (-1.81)** (0.34)  (-1.45)            
80.608 0.368 -2.779 3.836   2.456      0.011 2.131
(3.04)* (2.63)* (-1.69)** (0.57)   (0.24)          
83.007 0.370 -2.779 3.691    -5.964    0.012 2.323
(3.22)* (2.62)* (-1.79)** (0.56)        (-1.31)        
88.637 0.343 -3.243 2.156     26.324  0.018 3.644
(3.47)* (2.44)* (-2.18)* (0.32)          (2.64)*      
81.436 0.352 -2.722 4.135      -4.911 0.011 2.178
(3.15)* (2.41)* (-1.77)** (0.62)      (-0.78)    
4.4.2.2.3.3 Summary on Stock Return Effects 
The relationship between ownership structure and stock return performance is 
examined in this section.  Considering the results of the multivariate OLS regression 
analyses with the inclusion of ownership structure variables separately, we can 
conclude that ownership structure of the sample firms are significantly related to 
stock returns.  Stock returns are defined with five different measures in order to 
capture the different natures of the stock return dynamics.  In the ownership 
concentration models, all ownership concentration variables are found as statistically 
significant.  The results of the OLS regression analyses indicate the same conclusion 
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that ownership concentration is related to higher stock returns.  The positive impact 
of the cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3) and 
cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH) can be justified by 
the interest protection efforts of the large shareholders who have considerable 
privileges and influence on corporate governance systems.  It is found that, neither 
the voting nor cash flow rights of the block holders do affect stock returns.  As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out, with their influence on management, large 
shareholders may impose governance mechanisms which motivate managers to 
follow their own interests not hose of dispersed shareholders.  This finding also 
implies that managers tend to violate their legal duty of loyalty to shareholders, 
especially small shareholders who are anonymous and diffused. 
When the results of the ownership mix models are examined, we observe the 
robust impact of government ownership (GOV).  It is found that government-owned 
firms have consistently and statistically significantly higher stock returns when the 
results of all stock return measures are considered.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
define government ownership (GOV) as an example of concentrated control without 
any cash flow rights.  From this point of view, the inefficiency of the government-
owned firms is not that surprising.  Even though there are inefficiencies in the 
government-owned firm, surprisingly we witness high stock returns.  The positive 
influence of government ownership (GOV) can be justified either by the higher 
expectations caused by ongoing privatization programs, or high market risk of the 
government-owned firms in the sample.   
In addition to those independent variables, control variable leverage (LEV) 
provides consistent positive effect on stock returns while we observe negative impact 
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of size variable.  It will not be misleading to conclude that concentrated smaller firms 
with higher debt levels tend to have higher market performance akin to government-
owned firms.   
Contrary to the expectations, BETA carries positive sign in the return models.  
Even though positive sign of BETA seems as an anomaly in the analysis, it is 
believed that sign of the coefficient may vary depending on the nature of the 
information available as well as overall economic conditions.  Interestingly, both the 
signs of leverage and BETA are positive, again against the expectations.  
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) explain offsetting effect of increased leverage on beta 
in their study.  Because of the higher risk premiums on the market during the bad 
economic conditions, leveraged firms will likely have higher market risks (BETA).  
On the other hand, if uncertainty as well as the value of the future growth 
opportunities can be reduced in bad times, then this may offset the effect of increased 
leverage on BETA.  Contribution of increased leverage on future growth 
expectations in recession times may go beyond the contribution of leverage on 
market risk.   
4.4.2.3 Summary of Market Performance Effects 
In this section, we investigated the impact of ownership structure on market 
performance.  It will not be misleading to conclude that ownership structure has a 
significant impact on market performance.   
When the results of ownership concentration models are examined, we witness 
conflicting findings.  All market based performance variables except MBV ratio 
provide consistent results.  Those variables show positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and market-based performance.  However, significant 
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negative coefficient of cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders 
(LSH3) in the MBV model leads us to define MBV anomaly.  One possible cause of 
the MBV anomaly might be the higher book values of those concentrated sample 
firms.  Beyond that, six out of seven variables indicate positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and market-based performance.  Among those variables 
P/E, RET3, and RET6 carry significant positive coefficients.  Consistently, 
insignificant RET12, RET24, and ABRET variables have also positive coefficients.  
The positive relationship between ownership concentration and market-based 
performance is strongly supported by both the significant positive coefficients of 
CASH and the significant negative coefficients of OTHER.   
The positive effect of cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) 
(CASH) is supported with the negative impact of percentage share of diffused 
shareholders (OTHER).  These results indicate that concentrated ownership is 
positively related to high market performance.  Widely held firms yield relatively 
lower market performance.  We claim that large owners contribute to market 
performance of the concentrated firms in the sample.  Even though there is ambiguity 
in the literature, we witness beneficiary role of block holders in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange.   
The findings of the ownership mix models reveal the dominant positive impact 
of government ownership (GOV) on all market-based performance measures.  
Although, we observe lower accounting performance in government-owned firms as 
consistent with the literature, we detect positive impact on market performance.  It is 
thought that this is caused by the ongoing privatization programs.  All government-
owned firms in our sample are subject to privatization programs.  Expectations of the 
 
 
175
market with respect to the timing and method of privatization may play a role in the 
valuation of those companies.   
We also observe the advantages of being a conglomerate affiliate as well as the 
disadvantages of family ownership which are reflected in the models’ coefficients.  
Since conglomerates bring certain advantages in efficient allocation of resources 
within the group, market rewards the common stocks of conglomerate affiliates.  
Conversely, family-owned firms may be open to family power abuse at the expense 
of small shareholders, and this seems to deriving lower market performance.   
4.4.3 Concluding Remarks on Performance and Ownership Structure 
We first investigated the impact of ownership structure on a firm’s 
performance.  Basically, two groups of variables are employed to measure 
performance: accounting and market based.  Accounting-based variables of 
performance measure are return on equity (ROE) and return on total assets (ROA).  
Price to earnings ratio (P/E), market to book value (MBV) and stock returns are the 
market-based variables of performance.   
In the literature, we witness variety of proxies used to measure ownership 
structure phenomenon.  We include all those proxies into two main groups: 
ownership concentration and ownership mix variables.  Ownership concentration 
(CON) is defined with three related measures: (1) cumulative percentage shares of 
the largest three shareholders (LSH3), (2) cumulative percentage of shares held by 
the stockholders, who are anonymous, diffused and relatively less powerful in the 
one-share-one-vote system and those with shares less than 1% (OTHER), and (3) 
cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH).   
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The impact of ownership mix on firm performance is examined with the 
inclusion of ownership mix variables of foreign ownership (FRGN), government 
ownership (GOV), cross ownership (CROSS), dispersed ownership (DISP), family 
ownership (FAM), group ownership (CFAM), and affiliation to a conglomerate 
(CONG).  In the literature, there is evidence on the role played by institutional 
investors in monitoring corporate decisions, thereby affecting performance.  For 
example, Smith (1996) finds institutional investors in the US, with or without seats 
on the board, monitor companies so as to improve their performance.  Similarly, 
Gorton and Schmid (1996) provide evidence on stronger operating results by 
German corporations owned by banks. 
We find out significant impact of both ownership concentration and ownership 
mix on a firm’s performance.  Among the ownership concentration variables 
percentage share of diffused shareholders (OTHER) with a negative sign and 
cumulative shares held by the largest three shareholders (LSH3) and cash flow 
right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH) with positive signs are robustly 
significant in most of the ownership concentration models.  Specifically, as the 
concentration in ownership increases, we experience lower accounting-based 
performance, and higher market-based performance.  This is consistent with the 
findings reported in other emerging markets such as China (Xu and Wang, 1997) and 
Czech Republic (Claessens, 1997).   
In addition to the influencing power of shareholders, identity of the owners is 
considered for the categorization of ownership structure.  Noticeably, each 
ownership identity class will have common goals and interests.  These common 
goals and interests will generate the same type of incentive mechanisms which will 
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guide them to act in some certain formats of actions.  Two types of institutional 
investors with a potential for monitoring stand out in large Turkish corporations.  
They are the foreign investors and the government.  Foreign ownership is usually the 
result of direct investment in a joint venture.  Portfolio investments by foreign 
investors are hard to keep track of unless their share exceeds 10%.  Even then, 
foreign shareholders do not get involved in monitoring corporate decisions.  On the 
government side, 7.6% of our sample is owned by the government.  Almost all of 
those government-owned firms are subject to privatization program.  Those with less 
than 50% government ownership have already been privatized.  Others have offered 
shares to the public, but the government still controls the management.  However, 
they, too, are targeted for further privatization by either public offering or private 
placement of their shares. 
When the effects of ownership mix variables are considered, we observe the 
impact of conglomerate affiliation (CONG), family ownership (FAM), foreign 
ownership (FRGN), and government ownership (GOV) in Istanbul Stock Exchange.   
While firms with foreign ownership display better accounting performance, 
government-owned firms tend to have higher market performance with lower 
accounting performance.  On the other hand, family-owned firms seem to have 
relatively lower accounting and market performance compared to conglomerate 
affiliates.  Beneficial contributions of conglomerates are witnessed as reflected in 
higher accounting performance indicators.  This implies that distinct conglomerates 
in Turkey create their own governance systems that reward managerial effectiveness 
reflected in corporate profitability levels.  On the other hand, lower market 
performance of those family owned or controlled firms reflects unfavorable impact 
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of family ownership (FAM).  Even though government owned or controlled firms 
experience lower accounting performance, those firms consistently have higher 
market performance.  This may be caused by the high expectations on the ongoing 
privatization program.  
4.5 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND RISK 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The relationship between ownership structure and performance is examined in 
the previous sections.  Since performance and risk are twin brothers, in this part of 
the chapter, we will examine whether the concentration of ownership and ownership 
mix have any impact on the risk taking behavior of the Turkish non-financial 
companies listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange.   
The owners of the firm have a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike 
price equal to the value of the firm’s liabilities.  Option pricing comparative statistics 
demonstrates that the value of the call option is greater for more risky firms.  (Downs 
et al., 1999)  Many economic provisions that involve problems of risk sharing and 
incentives may be described in terms of the principal and agent relationship.  Agency 
Theory is defined by Eisenhardt (1989) as its relationships that mirror the basic 
agency structure of a principal and its agent that are both engaged in cooperative 
behavior, but have different goals and differing attitudes toward risk.  Problem 
domain of the agency theory lies in the relationships in which the principal and agent 
have partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, 
leadership, impression, management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing). 
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Managers and owners have intrinsically different risk preferences, because of 
the contradictory diversification opportunities of the risk endured by each side.  As 
Holl (1975) states, in the neoclassical theory, the owner (risk bearer) and the 
manager (risk taker) is the same person.  However, after the separation of ownership 
and control of the firm in the 19th century, we begin to discuss the agency conflict, 
which is mainly caused by different incentive systems of the stakeholders.  Pike et al. 
(1986) explain this confrontation with the justification that managers’ increasing 
concern on their own welfare rather than that of their shareholders’ lead them to 
adopt low-risk-survival strategies and satisfying decision behavior.  Shareholders 
have an option of reducing the risk by diversifying their investments.  Managers are 
risk averse, because they have more to lose from failure, and unlike shareholders 
they cannot diversify their risk across a range of investments.   
When the literature beginning from the publication of Berle and Means’ The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) is examined, all stakeholders 
concentrated their effort to find a way to decrease the agency conflict and align the 
conflicting interests of the main stakeholders.  With this motivation, stakeholders are 
mainly concerned with the corporate governance systems in order to find the best 
governance mechanisms that minimize likely agency conflicts.  Reflections of 
“good” governance are studied by Felton et al. (1996) and concluded that good 
governance will reduce risk.  However, the definition of “good” governance system 
varies from corporation to corporation, and country to country.  There are some 
guidelines but there is not a single pill that cures all illnesses. 
On the other hand, debt is defined as a governance structure that works out of 
rules and is well suited to projects where the assets are highly redeployable.  Equity, 
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on the other hand, is another governance structure that allows discretion and is used 
for projects where assets are less redeployable.  Asset redeployability is the one of 
the main drivers of the project risk, since redeployability level determines flexibility 
of the investment.   
It is hypothesized in this study that ownership structure plays an important 
role in determining the level of risk taking by the corporation.  Owners and managers 
generally have differing risk preferences.  Agency theory predicts that managers, 
who have invested their non-diversifiable human capital in the firm, are going to pass 
up risky projects that are desirable from the perspective of a diversified stockholder.  
Owners tend to take relatively higher risks than managers.  For example, Saunders  
that owner controlled banks exhibit higher risk taking behavior than manager 
controlled banks.  On the other hand, viewing the common stock of a firm as a call 
option, stockholders have the incentive to take higher risks at the expense of 
creditors if the latter cannot monitor shareholders.  Downs et al. (1999) examined the 
managerial ownership and risk taking relation and concluded that there is a 
significant positive relation between managerial ownership and risk.  By giving 
managers an ownership stake, risk preferences of managers can be altered in order to 
align the conflicting interests of managers and owners.   
4.5.2 Risk and Ownership Concentration 
We investigate whether ownership concentration is related to risk-taking 
behavior of our sample companies.  We estimate model (3) with standard deviation 
of monthly returns (STDEV) and market model beta (BETA) as dependent variables 
and the same set of explanatory variables.  To calculate STDEV and BETA, we 
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employ monthly returns over the three-year period prior to the time period in which 
other measurements are taken.   
Results of the multivariate OLS regressions, as summarized in Table 79, 
indicate that risk models with BETA and STDEV as the capital market risk and total 
market risk measures are significantly related to ownership concentration measures.  
As regards to R-square and F-test values, we witness slightly better model estimates 
than the previous models including performance variables.  According to the results, 
market risk, and total risk measures are significantly related to ownership 
concentration measures but in an opposite direction.  While LSH3 lacks significance, 
percentage of shares held by diffused shareholders (OTHER) carries a positive sign 
in the market risk model.  This is in sharp contrast with the models where STDEV is 
the dependent variable.  Here, percentage of shares owned by largest three 
shareholders, LSH3, is positively related to risk whereas coefficient for OTHER is 
negative but insignificant.  Hence, we observe that firms with concentrated 
ownership have higher total risk and lower market risk than companies with diffused 
ownership.  If we bear in mind that firms with diffused ownership are usually run by 
professional managers with little or no interest in the firm, low market risk can be 
explained in terms of risk-averse managers who cannot diversify their human capital.  
Moreover, presence of large shareholders is expected to increase the incentive to take 
higher risk by those shareholders at the expense of creditors.  Significant positive 
coefficient for ownership concentration (LSH3) is consistent with this argument as 
well.  It is also interesting to note that both control variables SIZE and LEV have 
expected signs in the STDEV models.  Larger firms have less total risk and higher 
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leverage.  BETA models, however, have counterintuitive signs, especially for 
leverage. 
Table 79 Risk and Ownership Concentration 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level 
is marked with “**”.   
 Constant Lev Size Lsh3 Other Cash R2 F-Test 
0.231 -0.001 0.050 -0.001    0.047 13.423
(1.28) (-1.65)** (4.42)* (-0.12)        
0.074 -0.001 0.054  0.002  0.056 16.095
(0.36) (-1.33) (4.80)* (2.12)*      
0.275 -0.001 0.052    -0.001 0.051 14.527
BE
TA
 
(1.49) (-1.41) (4.68)*  (-1.36)    
0.390 0.001 -0.012 0.001    0.088 29.193
(10.49)* (2.99)* (-5.59)* (2.13)*        
0.438 0.001 -0.012  -0.001  0.09 29.719
(11.36)* (3.02)* (-5.63)*  (-2.37)*      
0.392 0.001 -0.012    0.001 0.084 27.488S
TD
E
V
 
(10.59)* (3.01)* (-5.39)*  (1.58)    
4.5.3 Risk and Ownership Mix 
Finally, we consider the role of ownership identity as it relates to risk taking.  
It is hypothesized that different ownership groups with their unique incentive 
mechanisms and preferences, should have different risk attitudes.  For that purpose, 
we estimate model (4) that incorporates all ownership mix dummies.   
As before, RISK in the above model is either standard deviation (STDEV) of 
three-year monthly returns of the common stock of firm i, or beta coefficient (BETA) 
of the stock estimated by the market model, considering three-year monthly stock 
returns.  Explanatory variables are the same as before. 
Results of the multivariate OLS regression analyses are presented in Table 80.  
As with models involving ownership mix, family ownership (FAM), group 
ownership (CFAM), government ownership (GOV), and dispersed ownership (DISP) 
variables have significant coefficients in the capital market risk model.   
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Table 80 Risk and Ownership Mix 
Figures in the body of the table are coefficient estimates; t-values are reported respectively in 
parentheses.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is 
marked with “**”.   
Const. Lev Size Cong Fam Cfam Frgn Cross Gov Disp R2 F-Test
PANEL A: BETAit = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit +β3 MIXit + εit. 
0.229 -0.001 0.050 -0.007            0.048 13.435
(1.26) (-1.71)** (4.58)* (-0.19)                
0.300 -0.001 0.047 -0.104          0.062 17.801
(1.67)** (-1.53) (4.43)*  (-2.50)*              
0.352 0.001 0.051    -0.132        0.067 19.367
(2.03)* (-1.51) (4.54)*    (-3.28)*            
0.220 -0.002 0.051   -0.018      0.048 13.488
(1.20) (-1.72)** (4.53)*      (-0.38)          
0.232 -0.001 0.050    -0.008    0.048 13.435
(1.26) (-1.709** (4.55)*        (-0.18)        
0.269 -0.002 0.047     0.125  0.055 15.531
(1.53) (-1.84)** (4.39)*          (1.79)**      
0.179 -0.001 0.051      0.126 0.057 16.234
(0.98) (-1.26) (4.66)*            (2.51)*    
PANEL B: STDEVit = β0 + β1 LEVit + β2 SIZEit +β3 MIXit + εit. 
0.407 0.001 -0.011 -0.012            0.082 26.868
(11.03)* (3.39)* (-5.12)* (-1.60)                
0.406 0.001 -0.011 -0.002          0.077 25.312
(11.09)* (3.45)* (-5.22)*  (-0.28)              
0.421 0.001 -0.012    -0.022        0.085 28.073
(11.49)* (3.62)* (-5.44)*    (-2.08)*            
0.402 0.001 -0.011   -0.004      0.078 25.391
(10.91)* (3.41)* (-5.05)*      (-0.48)          
0.409 0.001 -0.011    -0.011    0.081 26.668
(11.09)* (3.43)* (-5.23)*        (-1.55)        
0.422 0.001 -0.013     0.052  0.104 34.948
(12.19)* (3.31)* (-6.23)*          (4.65)*      
0.404 0.001 -0.011      -0.001 0.077 25.261
(10.85)* (3.35)* (-5.12)*            (-0.06)    
 
Both family ownership (FAM), and being part of a group (CFAM) variables 
are negatively related to market and total risk.  These results indicate that family 
ownership (FAM) or operating as a part of a group (CFAM) decreases market risk.  
Family-owned firm is either managed by a family member or a manager who has 
close ties with the family.  This causes an alignment with the risk preferences of 
managers and owners, leading a decrease in a firm’s market risk.  Firms that are not 
operating under any group are considered as relatively more risky firms.  This makes 
sense, because those firms do not have any chance of using corporate resources as 
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well as advantage of vertical integration possibilities.  These findings are consistent 
with the performance relationships. 
Since government ownership (GOV) is positively related to market risk 
BETA, government-controlled firms are considered as relatively high-risky firms in 
the market. This finding is consistent with the relatively higher market-based 
performance of the government-owned firms in the sample.  Hence, the profile of 
firms with government held shares can be described as large enterprises with high 
risk and high P/E ratio.  Drawbacks of government ownership as a corporate 
governance system are well known in the literature.  They would help explain why 
these companies have lower accounting based performance measures.  Yet, high risk 
despite their large size deserves further explanation.  In our opinion, the ambiguities 
as to the timing and method of privatization of government shares in those firms add 
to the return variability.  It is not uncommon to read or hear about conflicting news 
on if or when a government-owned company is going to be privatized. Method of 
privatization is also a subject of market gossip.  It makes a huge difference whether a 
large company is going to be sold by a public offering of equity or privately placing 
its majority shares as a block sale.  Amidst all the uncertainties, fluctuation in these 
shares is not at all surprising.   
Firms without any distinct ultimate owners (DISP) are mainly managed by 
professional managers.  It is not uncommon to encounter agency conflicts in the 
firms with dispersed ownership.  This argument is supported with the significant 
positive relation between dispersed ownership (DISP) and market risk BETA.  
Dispersed-firms are rated in the market as relatively high risky firms.  This fact is 
also implicitly indicates the importance of the regulatory role of large shareholders.  
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Since there is no single controlling or governing authority in those widely held firms, 
it is not surprising to witness the disadvantageous implications of the likely agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
4.5.4 Concluding Remarks on Risk and Ownership Structure 
Owners and managers generally have differing risk preferences.  Agency 
theory predicts that managers, who have invested their non-diversifiable human 
capital in the firm, are going to pass up risky projects that are desirable from the 
perspective of a diversified stockholder.  To the extent that they can diversify, 
owners tend to take relatively higher risks than managers.  It is expected to observe 
different risk preferences between owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms.  
On the other hand, viewing the common stock of a firm as a call option, stockholders 
have the incentive to take higher risks at the expense of creditors if the latter cannot 
monitor shareholders.   
When we examine the relationship between ownership structure and risk-
taking behavior of the sample firms, we find sufficient evidence to conclude that 
ownership structure has a significant impact on risk-taking behavior.  Consistently, 
whereas cumulative share owned by largest three shareholders, LSH3, is positively 
related to risk, OTHER carries negative coefficient.  Therefore, we witness that 
concentrated firms have relatively lower market risk compared to diffusely owned 
companies.  If we recall that diffusely owned firms are mostly run by professional 
managers without any major stake in the firm, low market risk can be explained in 
terms of risk-averse managers who cannot diversify their human capital.  Besides, 
presence of large shareholders is expected to increase the incentive to take higher 
risk by those shareholders at the expense of creditors.   
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Diverse governance systems are mainly determined by different owner 
identity groups.  Since each owner identity group has its own homogenous 
expectations and interests, owners will create mechanisms, which make up a 
governance system to protect their interests.  Obviously, it is expected that this setup 
will be reflected in risk-taking behaviors.   
We observe lower risk in firms with family ownership (FAM), supposedly 
initiated by an achievable alignment with the risk preferences of managers and 
owners.  It is not surprising to observe risk alignment, since family-owned firm is 
either managed by a family member or a manager who has close ties with the family.  
Government ownership (GOV) is positively related to market risk BETA.  This 
finding is consistent with the positive impact of government ownership (GOV) on 
stock return measures.  Government-owned firms are rated as risky firms in the 
market.  It is thought that the ambiguities as to the timing and method of 
privatization of government shares in those firms increase return variability.  Those 
evidences convince us to conclude that ownership structure has a significant impact 
on risk-taking behavior of Turkish firms. 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of ownership structure on both 
performance and risk-taking behavior of Turkish listed firms on Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE).  We define ownership structure along two dimensions: ownership 
concentration and ownership mix.  Those two categories incorporate both the 
influence power of shareholders as well as the identity of owners with their unique 
incentive mechanisms and preferences.  Ownership concentration is defined as 
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cumulative percentage shares of the largest three shareholders (LSH3), percentage 
share of diffused shareholders (OTHER), and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate 
controlling owner(s) (CASH).  To develop more generalized insights into the impact 
of ownership structure on firm performance, we expand the domain into the six 
major ownership identity groups defined as ownership mix variable.  These 
ownership mix measures refer to the type of shareholders defined by their 
commonalities.  Hence, we identify ownership identities (mix) as conglomerate 
affiliation (CONG), family ownership (FAM), group ownership (CFAM), 
government ownership (GOV), foreign ownership (FRGN), dispersed ownership 
(DISP), and cross ownership (CROSS).  In our empirical models, ownership mix 
variables are taken as dummy variables.  We also employ control variables to 
account for differences in firm size, leverage, and market risk BETA.      
When the overall results of the OLS regression models are examined, we can 
conclude that ownership structure is significantly related to both accounting and 
market performance of Turkish listed firms.  In the literature, agency conflict is 
defined in several ways.  It can be seen as a conflict between managers and 
shareholders or between majority and minority shareholders.  In Turkey, we mostly 
observe the latter.  Since, most of the Turkish listed firms have a concentrated nature 
and dominantly controlled by families, we suspect and find evidence that there is an 
agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders.  In some cases, we 
observe the positive impact of large shareholders, and in some cases opposite. 
When the findings of the models are examined, we find significant relationship 
between the ownership concentration and corporate performance.  Findings show 
that increase in the ownership concentration causes a decline in the accounting-based 
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performance but increase in the market-based performance levels of our sample 
firms.  This conclusion is consistent with the findings reported in other emerging 
markets such as China (Xu and Wang, 1997) and Czech Republic (Claessens, 1997).   
When the impact of ownership mix variables on performance is examined, we 
witness the beneficial contribution of conglomerate affiliation (CONG) as well as 
foreign ownership (FRGN) to accounting-based performance.  On the other hand, we 
only observe the positive impact of government ownership (GOV) and conglomerate 
affiliation (CONG) on market-based performance. 
Concerning the risk-taking behavior of our sample of companies, our results 
reveal that highly concentrated and less diffused firms have lower market risk as 
suggested by lower BETA.  We witness that the dominance of large shareholders in 
the corporate governance systems to protect their high stakes on the firms.  Most of 
the concentrated firms are either part of a conglomerate or a family.  In those firms 
large shareholders will try to incorporate their financial resources to deal with any 
possible risks.  Low market risk can be explained in terms of the presence of large 
shareholders that are expected to decrease the bankruptcy risk. 
It is highly expected to observe the impacts of different owner identity groups 
on risk-taking behavior.  Since each owner identity group has its own homogenous 
priorities and interests, owners will create mechanisms, which make up a governance 
system to protect their interests.  We observe lower market risk in firms with family 
ownership (FAM), supposedly initiated by an achievable alignment with the risk 
preferences of managers and owners.  On the other hand, government-owned firms 
and widely held firms in our sample display higher risk, although they are larger on 
the average.   
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The overall findings in this chapter are consistent with the empirical findings in 
the literature in general.  While we observe concentration of ownership as a 
significant determinant of corporate governance mechanism, identity of controlling 
owners also seem to have a vital role in performance-ownership relationship.  In 
sum, we conclude that ownership structure has significant implications on both 
performance and risk-taking behavior of Turkish listed firms. 
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CHAPTER – V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
5.1 SUMMARY 
5.1.1 Introduction 
In conjunction with the massive privatization efforts in former Eastern block 
countries as well as experiences of developed countries, emerging markets like 
Turkey has been experiencing significant improvements in the financial markets as 
well as business environment during the last two decades.  As a consequence of 
liberalization and globalization trends, corporate governance systems are having 
utmost importance in the world along with Turkey.  It is not surprising to observe 
extraordinary interests of practitioners and academicians from the various disciplines 
on corporate governance issues because of their vital consequences.  Corporate 
governance is taken as an integrating term of directing and controlling system in an 
organization and it entails strategic and long-term focus.  Disciplines of strategic 
management, economics, finance, and law are some of the major disciplines that 
concern with the corporate governance issues.  Since, boundaries of corporate 
governance issues have vast extensions; we only focus on the consequences of equity 
ownership structure to understand the effectiveness of alternative corporate 
governance systems.   
 
 
191
Separation of ownership and management gives rise to a conflict of interest 
between owners and managers as their agents.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) explore 
the costs of agency relationship on the corporation.  Separation of ownership and 
management causes a decline in the influential power of shareholders on 
management.  It is assumed that managers would follow the best interests of owners 
but against the expectations, this is not the case in real life scenarios.  Hence, this 
fact causes an unending conflict between agents and principals.  When the origins of 
the dispute and incentive mechanisms of the conflicting sides are examined, this 
outcome is not surprising.  This claim can be justified that; (1) managers are mostly 
risk-averse compared to owners, because they have more to lose from failure, and 
unlike shareholders they cannot diversify their risk across a range of investments, (2) 
managers will reach decisions that are acceptable to organizational group, (3) 
managers will pursue survival policies where owners prefer profit maximization 
policies, (4) owners have a tendency of investing in risky projects, because of their 
diversified and easily transferable investments unlike managers.  As Downs et al. 
(1999) states the long-term value of the nondiversifiable, firm-specific human capital 
of managers may be maximized by ensuring the survival of the firm rather than 
seeking to maximize the value of the firm.  Thus, managers may tend to act in a risk-
averse manner even if this is not in the best interests of shareholders.   
Moreover, lack of diversification on the part of a large shareholder will 
expose him to unnecessarily high risks with a considerable power.  Thus, large 
shareholders feel themselves obliged to intervene corporate governance issues in 
order to protect their best interests sometimes at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  Separation of ownership and control decreases the power of 
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shareholders.  As a result, we witness power games among managers, large 
shareholders, minority shareholders, and institutional investors as well as other 
stakeholders in the corporate governance arena.  It is not surprising to observe 
variety of reflections of different corporate governance structures on corporate 
behavior as well as corporate performance and risk-taking. 
Ownership structure is one of the most dominant factors that shape the 
corporate governance system of a firm.  Policies and strategies determined by a 
firm’s governance system derive the corporate performance and its risk-taking 
behavior.  Consequently, ownership structure has a moderating role in a firm’s 
performance and risk-taking behavior through its impact on corporate strategies and 
policies regarding growth, diversification, capital investment, research and 
development, and financing decisions.  (Hill and Snell (1988); Gedajlovic (1993); 
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993); Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994))  Goals and priorities 
of firms may change as their ownership structures change because of the incentive 
mechanisms and preferences of the dominant owner group(s) in their corporate 
governance systems.  Thus, ownership structure may affect performance and risk-
taking behavior indirectly through its impact on corporate governance system that 
shapes corporate strategies. 
5.1.2 Research Questions 
The main contribution of this study is to explore the ownership structure 
characteristics of nonfinancial Turkish listed firms, and investigate the consequences 
of ownership structure in Turkey by using integrated measurement systems and 
compare findings with those of other countries.  As Hun et al. (1999) claims, each 
country needs to be examined individually, since each country has her own 
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characteristics and dynamics.  Istanbul Stock Exchange is an emerging market with 
its high volatility and high average returns.  It has been shown that emerging markets 
are not integrated to the developed markets of the World as evidenced by very low 
correlation with the rest of the World and among themselves (Bekaert et al., 1998).  
When we examine the literature, we mostly observe studies conducted on developed 
markets because of data availability and market related concerns.  However, we 
hardly find any studies on emerging markets, which investigate the consequences of 
ownership structure.  In this study, we intend to determine the main ownership 
structure characteristics of the nonfinancial Turkish firms and compare the findings 
with those of other countries.  For empirical testing, we examine the following 
research questions in this study.   
e. What are the distinct characteristics of the ownership structures of 
Turkish listed firms? 
f. What are the differences between the characteristics of ownership 
structures of Turkish listed firms and those of other countries? 
g. Does ownership structure have any significant impact on 
performance? 
h. Does ownership structure have any significant impact on risk-taking 
behavior? 
5.1.3 Data 
Data sample consists of all Turkish listed nonfinancial firms from a wide 
range of industries mostly including the firms (73 percent of all) among the largest 
500 manufacturing companies compiled by Istanbul Chamber of Industry.  Banks, 
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leasing companies, investment companies, holding companies, and insurance firms 
are excluded from the data set.  The observation time is between 1992 and 1998.  
The number of companies included increases each year.  The source of the data is 
obtained from Istanbul Stock Exchange database.   
We define ownership structure along two dimensions: ownership concentration 
and ownership mix.  Ownership concentration refers to the distribution of the shares 
owned by a certain number of individuals, institutions, or families.  Ownership mix, 
on the other hand, is related to the presence of certain institutions or groups such as 
government or foreign partners among the shareholders.  These two categories of 
measures incorporate both the influence power of shareholders as well as identity of 
owners with their unique incentive mechanisms and preferences.  Ownership 
concentration variables are cumulative percentage shares of the largest three 
shareholders (LSH3), cumulative percentage of shares held by diffuse shareholders 
(OTHER), and cash flow right(s) of the ultimate controlling owner(s) (CASH).  In 
addition to those ownership concentration variables, ownership mix variables are 
defined as conglomerate affiliation (CONG), family ownership (FAM), group 
ownership (CFAM), government ownership (GOV), foreign ownership (FRGN), 
cross ownership (CROSS), and dispersed ownership (DISP).    
Corporate performance is measured with the two categories of variables.  The 
first category of measurements intends to capture the accounting-based performance 
of the firms with the proxies of return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) 
ratios.  Since, accounting-based performance measures are based on historical data, 
they may not be sufficient to integrate current and future potential of the firm.  For 
that reason, with the second category, market-based performance was taken into 
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account with the proxies of price to earnings ratio (P/E), market to book value 
(MBV) and stock returns.  In addition to performance, risk-taking behavior of 
Turkish listed firms is represented with the proxies of total risk (STDEV) and market 
risk (BETA) measures. 
5.2 FINDINGS 
5.2.1 Ownership Structure Characteristics of Turkish Firms 
The first primary research question is to determine the main characteristics of 
the Turkish listed firms’ ownership structures and compare the findings with those of 
other countries.  Concentrated ownership is a dominant characteristic of a Turkish 
firm.  This fact comes from the historical roots of the firms.  Since, most of the firms 
are exploring the benefits of equity financing lately, they prefer selling some portion 
of their equity without relinquishing the control.  For that reason, most of the firms 
have concentrated ownership structure.  On average 43 percent of the shares are 
owned by a single owner and this value increases to 62 percent when we consider 
three largest shareholders.  On the other hand, cumulative shares of the dispersed 
minority shareholders who own less than 1 percent of the shares make up only 32 
percent. 
When the historical development of the Turkish corporations is examined, we 
observe the dominance of the government in the business life since the foundation of 
the Republic.  Families also began to take part in business life with their limited 
capital.  Beginning from the early 1980s, Turkey preferred liberalization policies in 
her economy.  Based on the changes in the policies, we witness considerable 
improvements in the economy and financial markets.  1980s are primarily the rebirth 
 
 
196
of Istanbul Stock Exchange although its existence dates back to the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic.  The significant changes in the economy began to shape the 
ownership structure of a Turkish firm.  We observe significant increases in the 
number of listed firms as well as trading volume of Istanbul Stock Exchange.  
Controlling ultimate owners have learnt to utilize equity as a new capital source by 
opening their firms to public trade.  Even though families transform their firms into 
publicly traded firms, they design governance mechanisms to keep control of the 
firms at their hands.  Families control 74 percent of the overall Turkish listed firms.  
30 percent of the listed firms are operating under the umbrella of a conglomerate, 
which is controlled or owned by a family or a group of families.  Those are relatively 
more institutionalized and run by the professional managers.  On the other hand, 44 
percent of the listed firms are directly controlled by a family or a group of families.  
Cross ownership and pyramidal ownership structures help ultimate owners to keep 
control of their public firms.  Cross ownership with an average percentage of 28 
percent, is especially common in conglomerate affiliates, which are mainly 
controlled by distinct families.  In this setup, it is not surprising to see the dominance 
of the families in the Turkish corporate governance scene.  When we look at the 
issue from the government side, trends in privatization and globalization tend to limit 
the role of government in business life.  Decrease in the involvement of government 
is reflected in the decreasing ownership percentages in the publicly traded 
government-owned firms.  Unfortunately, Turkey is not good at attracting foreign 
capital.  There is a slightly increasing trend in foreign ownership in the ownership 
structures of the nonfinancial Turkish listed firms.  Only 17 percent of the listed 
firms have foreign partners who own more than 10 percent of the firm’s equity.  
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When we compare foreign direct investment in Turkey with Europe and the World, 
the picture is not as encouraging as expected.  When we redefine foreign ownership 
as full control by foreigners, Turkish foreign ownership rate drops to 3 percent.   
However this figure is 61 percent in Belgium and 45 percent in Spain. 
When the results of the descriptive data analyses as presented in Chapter III 
are examined, we can conclude that Turkish firms are mostly concentrated, and 
families have significant involvement in the corporate governance systems of the 
firms.  Cross ownership and pyramidal structures are not unusual, especially in the 
conglomerate affiliates.  On the other hand, we witness decreasing involvement of 
the government and slightly increasing foreign partnership in the ownership 
structures of Turkish firms. 
When the impact of size on ownership structure is examined, we found that 
size is significantly and positively related to ownership concentration.  This 
conclusion is inconsistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Prowse 
(1992).  On the other hand, Kettler (1997) also found positive relationship between 
size and ownership concentration in East Germany.  We doubt that developing 
countries show significant bias on the size of the firms and mostly, bigger firms in 
those countries have concentrated nature, but it needs to be examined further.   
We also examine the differences in ownership structures of thirteen industrial 
sectors.  As claimed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Zeckouser and Pound (1990), 
there are significant differences in the ownership structures of each industrial sector.  
Commonalities within the industrial firms lead them to have similar preferences and 
dynamics in terms of governance systems.  When the industrial differences are 
examined, we find that transportation sector has the highest concentration in the 
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ownership structure.  This is followed by chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic 
products sector.  Those sectors are the ones that require significant amount of capital 
to run the business.  In those sectors, we observe the dominance of government and 
foreign ownership.  On the other hand, wholesale and basic metal industries are the 
ones with the lowest ownership concentration.  Family ownership and foreign 
ownership is common in the wholesale sector.  As expected, we also observe the 
intensity of the cross ownership in this sector, because of the high involvement of the 
conglomerates.  As regards to those results, our findings support the industrial 
differences of ownership structure as literature provides consistent evidence. 
5.2.2 Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of ownership structure on 
corporate performance provides controversial findings.  Most of the studies are 
mainly focused on managerial (insider) ownership, which is specifically designed to 
resolve agency conflict as a governance mechanism.  (Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Chen et. al. (1993), Cubbin and Leech (1986), Demsetz (1986), Hermalin and 
Weisback (1991), Holderness et. al. (1999), Jarrel and Poulsen (1988), Keasey et. al. 
(1994), McConnell and Servaes (1995)).  However, we believe that only managerial 
ownership is not sufficient to cover all aspects of a firm’s ownership structure.  With 
this respect, we define ownership structure by considering two groups of variables as 
explained in the data section.   
When the association between ownership concentration and performance is 
examined, Berle and Means (1932) and Cubbin and Leech (1983) report positive 
relation.  However, Demsetz (1983) hypothesizes that ownership structure is 
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endogenously determined by the balancing costs and benefits.  In favor of this 
hypothesis, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness and Sheehan (1988) present 
their findings that there is no significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and performance.  In contrast to those findings, Lloyd, Hand, and 
Modani (1987), Leech and Leahy (1991) find positive ownership concentration 
effect on performance.  Thus, conflicting findings are not uncommon in the literature 
regarding the impact of ownership structure.  Main reasons for those diverse findings 
are different ownership structure measurement systems used in the literature and 
country specific differences. 
In the literature, there is evidence on the role played by institutional investors 
in monitoring corporate decisions, thereby affecting performance.  For example, 
Smith (1996) finds institutional investors in the US, with or without seats on the 
board, monitor companies so as to improve their performance.  Similarly, Gorton and 
Schmid (1996) provide evidence on stronger operating results by German 
corporations owned by banks.  For that reason, the impact of ownership structure on 
firm performance is examined with the inclusion of ownership mix variables. 
5.2.2.1 Ownership Concentration and Performance 
Hypothesis that ownership concentration influences performance (H1) is 
tested by regressing an ownership variable on a performance variable in the presence 
of control variables within a multiple regression model (1). By conducting 
multivariate OLS regression analyses, we test the impact of ownership concentration 
of a firm on accounting and market performance.  Findings of the ownership 
concentration and performance models are summarized in Table 81. 
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Table 81 Summary of the Ownership Concentration and 
Performance Models 
Figures in the body of the table are the significant t-statistics in 
the regression models.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is 
denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is marked with “**”. 
 LSH3 OTHER CASH 
Panel A: Accounting Performance 
ROA (-1.83)**   
ROE (-2.04)*   
Panel B: Market Performance 
MBV (-1.98)*   
P/E (1.60)**   
RET12  (-1.78)** (2.31)* 
RET24  (-1.95)* (1.67)** 
ABRET   (2.19)* 
RET3 (1.73)** (-2.23)* (2.53)* 
RET6 (1.82)** (-1.81)** (2.60)* 
 
We experience negative coefficients for the LSH3 variable in the accounting 
performance models consistently. Considering the results of ownership concentration 
variables, we can claim that increase in the ownership concentration leads decline in 
the accounting profitability levels of the sample firms.   
When the results of the market performance models are examined we witness 
positive effects of LSH3 and CASH supported with the negative impact of OTHER.  
However, MBV model gives us contradictory findings.  It is believed that the MBV 
anomaly is mainly caused by the high book values of the concentrated firms in 
contrast to widely held firms.  These results indicate that concentrated ownership is 
positively related to higher market performance.  Stocks of the concentrated firms 
have relatively higher market prices compared to those firms who have similar 
earnings patterns.   
Leverage as a control variable is inversely related to accounting performance 
while we observe positive contribution to market based performance.  The other 
control variables of size and market risk are insignificant in the concentration 
models. 
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We witness ambiguous findings regarding performance and ownership 
structure relationship in the literature.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) found the relationship between ownership concentration and 
accounting profitability to be insignificant.  On the other hand, recent studies of 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) and Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) identify the 
impact of ownership structure on performance as significant.  Even though, there is 
ambiguity in the literature, we witness beneficiary role of concentrated ownership 
especially on market-based performance in Turkey.  In sum, we conclude that as the 
concentration in ownership increases, we experience lower accounting-based 
performance, and higher market performance.  This is consistent with the findings 
reported in other emerging markets such as China (Xu and Wang, 1997) and Czech 
Republic (Claessens, 1997).   
5.2.2.2 Ownership Mix and Performance 
In addition to the influencing power of shareholders, identity of the owners is 
also considered for the categorization of ownership structure.  Noticeably, each 
ownership identity class will have common goals and interests.  These common 
goals and interests will generate same type of incentive mechanisms, which may 
guide them to act in some certain formats of actions.   
To test the hypothesis that ownership mix has an impact on performance, we 
regress performance variables defined earlier on ownership mix dummies one at a 
time.  We control for size, leverage and market risk beta as before.  Findings of the 
ownership mix and performance models are summarized in Table 82. 
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Table 82 Summary of the Ownership Mix and Performance Models 
Figures in the body of the table are the significant t-statistics in the regression models.  
Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is marked with 
“**”. 
 CONG FAM CFAM FRGN CROSS GOV DISP 
Panel A: Accounting Performance 
ROA    (1.91)**  (-2.56)*  
ROE      (-1.97)*  
Panel B: Market Performance 
MBV (1.91)**       
P/E (1.98)* (-2.12)*   (1.69)**   
RET12  (-2.10)*   (3.35)*   
RET24  (-2.79)* (-1.93)**   (3.12)*  
ABRET      (3.48)* (-1.66)** 
RET3  (-1.96)* (-1.69)**   (2.61)*  
RET6  (-1.79)**    (2.64)*  
 
When the effects of ownership mix variables are considered, we observe the 
dominant effect of family ownership (FAM), and government ownership (GOV) in 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange.   
The positive coefficients of conglomerate affiliation (CONG) in the market 
performance models of P/E and MBV reflect the benefits of operating as a 
conglomerate affiliate.  This finding implies that distinct conglomerates in Turkey 
tend to create their own governance systems that reward managerial effectiveness 
reflected in market performances.  On the other hand, we witness quite the opposite 
consequences with respect to ownership measures in family ownership (FAM).  
Family ownership (FAM) has a significantly negative impact on market 
performance.  In those family-owned firms, it seems that market does not have 
confidence on those family owned or controlled firms.  This may be caused by the 
possible tendency that owner managers abuse their power at the expense of minority 
shareholders.    
Two types of institutional investors with a potential for monitoring stand out in 
large Turkish corporations.  They are the foreign investors and the government.  
 
 
203
Foreign ownership (FRGN) is usually the result of direct investment in a joint 
venture.  Portfolio investments by foreign investors are hard to keep track of unless 
their share exceeds 10 percent.  Even then, foreign shareholders may not get 
involved in monitoring corporate decisions.  On the government side, on average, the 
government owns 7.6 percent of our sample firms.  Almost all of those government-
owned firms are subject to privatization program.  Those with less than 50 percent 
government ownership have already been privatized.  Others have offered shares to 
the public, but the government still controls the management.  However, they, too, 
are targeted for further privatization by either public offering or private placement of 
their shares. 
While firms with foreign ownership display better accounting performance, 
government-owned firms tend to have higher market performance but lower 
accounting performance. Expectations of the market on government owned or 
controlled firms with respect to the timing and method of privatization may play a 
role in the valuation of those companies.  Firms with foreign partners seem to have 
governance mechanisms that reward accounting performance but not market 
performance.  
Dispersed ownership (DISP) and cross ownership (CROSS) are providing 
weak evidence for the type of relationships between ownership concentration and 
performance.  Firms with dispersed ownership (DISP) yield lower abnormal returns.  
Besides, cross ownership (CROSS) contributes to increases in the stock prices of the 
firms with mixed networks of ownership structure, compared to the other firms with 
similar earnings patterns. 
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In connection with the findings documented, it will not be misleading to 
conclude that ownership structure is significantly related to accounting and market 
performance of the Turkish listed firms.   
5.2.3 Ownership Structure and Risk 
The owners of the firm have a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike 
price equal to the value of the firm’s liabilities.  Option pricing comparative statistics 
demonstrates that the value of the call option is greater for more risky firms.  (Downs 
et al., 1999)  Many economic provisions that involve problems of risk sharing and 
incentives may be described in terms of the principal and agent relationship.  It is 
generally accepted that manager of a firm is risk-averse or at most risk-neutral but 
definitely not risk-lover because of his undiversifiable human capital investment.  
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) claim that 
managers may become risk averse as their nonhuman wealth investment in the firm 
increases.  Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) document in their study that managers 
with higher levels of stock ownership have stronger incentives to increase risk-taking 
behavior of the firm.  When we look at the issue from the entrenchment theory as 
defined by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), managers tend to protect their firm-
specific benefits at the expense of shareholders.  This behavior might also contribute 
to managers becoming more risk-averse with higher levels of equity ownership.  
These claims support the roof-shaped relation between managerial (insider) 
ownership and corporate performance.  Evidence provided by the previous studies 
indicates that managerial ownership may contribute corporate performance to a 
certain point, but beyond that, we observe the negative effect of it.  In this study, we 
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extend the definition of ownership structure from managerial ownership to much 
more comprehensive ownership structure measurement system. 
Impact of ownership structure is examined by considering two groups of 
variables, noticeably ownership concentration, and ownership mix.  Conclusions 
regarding each ownership structure groups are discussed in detail in the further 
sections. 
It is hypothesized in the study that ownership structure has an impact on risk-
taking behavior of the nonfinancial Turkish listed firms.  Ownership structure 
determines the governance mechanisms, which in turn defines corporate strategies 
and policies.  This strategic guidance and control process is expected to have an 
impact on a firm’s risk-taking behavior.   
Risk is measured with the two proxies.  These are total risk as quantified with 
standard deviation of monthly returns (STDEV) of the common stock of firm i, and 
market risk beta coefficient of the stock (BETA) estimated by the market model, 
both over the three-year period between.  Endogeneity concerns are identical as in 
the performance models.  Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique is also 
applied to risk models to deal with the potential problems of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
5.2.3.1 Ownership Concentration and Risk 
We investigate whether ownership concentration is related to risk-taking 
behavior of our sample companies.  We estimate model (3) with standard deviation 
of monthly returns (STDEV) and market model beta (BETA) as dependent variables 
and the same set of explanatory variables.  Regressions test the relationship between 
various measures of ownership concentration and risk proxies by controlling both 
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leverage and firm size.  Findings of the ownership concentration and risk models are 
summarized in Table 83. 
Table 83 Ownership Concentration and Risk 
Figures in the body of the table are the significant t-statistics in 
the regression models.  Statistical significance level 0.05 is 
denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is marked with “**”. 
 LSH3 OTHER CASH 
BETA  (2.12)*  
STDEV (2.13)* (-2.37)*  
 
When we examine the results of the regression analyses, conflicting findings 
prevail.  We find that firms with concentrated ownership have higher total risk but 
lower market risk compared to widely held companies.  If we bear in mind that 
widely held firms are usually run by professional managers who have conflicting 
interests and goals with the shareholders, and those managers intend to follow 
survival policies instead of growth policies.  This structure may generally derive 
lower market risks for widely held firms as justified in terms of risk-averse managers 
who cannot diversify their human capital.  Moreover, presence of large shareholders 
is expected to increase the incentive to take higher risk by those shareholders at the 
expense of creditors.  Significant positive coefficient for ownership concentration 
(LSH3) is consistent with this argument as well.  It is also interesting to note that 
both control variables SIZE and LEV have expected signs in the STDEV models.  
Larger firms have less total risk and higher leverage.   
5.2.3.2 Ownership Mix and Risk 
Different ownership identity groups are expected to have similar preferences, 
incentive mechanisms, and risk attitudes.  To uncover the reflections of the different 
risk preferences, we use the ownership mix models.  Hence, for ownership mix, we 
use the same right hand side variables as in the previous model with the risk 
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measures as the dependent variable of the model.  Findings of the ownership mix and 
risk models are summarized in Table 84. 
Table 84 Ownership Mix and Risk 
Figures in the body of the table are the significant t-statistics in the regression models.  
Statistical significance level 0.05 is denoted with “*” and 0.10 significance level is marked with 
“**”. 
 CONG FAM CFAM FRGN CROSS GOV DISP 
BETA  (-2.50)* (-3.28)*   (1.79)** (2.51)* 
STDEV   (-2.08)*   (4.65)*  
 
Multivariate OLS regression analyses indicate that ownership mix variables 
do not show any significant variations in the total risk model.  On the other hand, 
market risk model provides insightful information regarding different risk 
preferences of ownership identity groups.   
Both family ownership (FAM) and group ownership (CFAM) variables are 
negatively related to market risk.  These results indicate that family ownership 
(FAM) is associated with lower market risk.  Family-owned firm is managed by 
either a family member or a manager who has close ties with the family.  This causes 
an alignment with the risk preferences of managers and owners, leading a decrease in 
a firm’s market risk.  Firms that are not operating under any group are considered as 
risky firms.  This makes sense, because, those firms do not have any chance of using 
corporate resources as well as advantage of vertical integration possibilities.  These 
findings are consistent with the performance relationships. 
Both government ownership (GOV) and dispersed ownership (DISP) are 
positively related to market risk beta.  Hence, the profile of firms with government 
held shares can be described as large enterprises with high market risk.  Drawbacks 
of government ownership as a corporate governance system are well known in the 
literature.  They would help explain why these companies command a low earnings 
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multiple.  Yet, high risk despite their large size deserves further explanation.  In our 
opinion, the ambiguities as to the timing and method of privatization of government 
shares in those firms add to the return variability.  It is not uncommon to read or hear 
about conflicting news on if or when a government-owned company is going to be 
privatized.  Method of privatization is also a subject of market gossip.  It makes a 
huge difference whether a large company is going to be sold by a public offering of 
equity or privately placing its majority shares as a block sale.  Amidst all the 
uncertainties, fluctuation in these shares is not at all surprising.   
Firms without any distinct ultimate owners (DISP) are mainly managed by 
professional managers.  It is not uncommon to encounter agency conflicts in those 
widely held firms.  This argument is supported with the significant positive relation 
between dispersed ownership (DISP) and market risk BETA.  Dispersed-firms are 
rated in the market as relatively high risky firms.   
5.3 FINAL REMARKS 
In this study, we explore the ownership structure characteristics of the Turkish 
listed firms and examine the consequences of ownership structure on both corporate 
performance and risk-taking behavior.   
We conclude that Turkish listed firms are mostly concentrated family-owned 
or controlled firms attached to a group of companies generally owned by the same 
family or a group of families.  Some of the very largest companies are government 
owned monopolies.  Although professional managers run these companies, family 
members are highly actively involved in strategic as well as daily decisions.  
However, we lately began to observe less and less involvement of the government 
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and slightly increasing foreign ownership percentages in the firm’s ownership 
structure.  It is not uncommon to witness cross ownership and pyramidal ownership 
structure in Turkish listed firms.  Firms within the same industrial sector show 
similar characteristics, which diversify significantly between other industrial sectors.   
In sum, we conclude that ownership structure with its subgroups of ownership 
concentration and ownership mix variables; have a significant impact on both 
corporate performance and risk-taking behavior. 
As the concentration in ownership increases, we experience lower accounting-
based performance, and higher market-based performance.  This is consistent with 
the findings reported in other emerging markets such as China (Xu and Wang, 
(1997)) and Czech Republic (Claessens, (1997)).   
When the effect of ownership mix is considered, we observe the dominant 
effect of family ownership, and government ownership in the Turkish market.  While 
firms with foreign ownership display better accounting performance, government-
owned firms tend to have higher market performance with higher risk.  On the other 
hand, family-owned firms seem to have lower accounting and market performance 
with lower market risk.   
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following research questions might serve as a basis for further studies in 
this area of research: 
• What types of patterns exist for ownership structure variables in the emerging 
markets and developed markets? 
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• Are there any commonalities within the emerging markets and developed 
markets regarding ownership structure characteristics? 
• Are there any significant differences between emerging markets and 
developed markets regarding ownership structure characteristics? 
• What are the consequences of ownership structure in emerging markets and 
are those findings are consistent and applicable to all emerging markets? 
• What are the differences and similarities in the consequences of ownership 
structure between emerging and developed countries? 
• Among the ownership mix variables, conglomerate affiliation is the most 
complex governance mechanism.  While the market rewards this mechanism, 
is this form of ownership economically efficient?  
• Is there any significant bias on the size of the concentrated firms in 
developing countries? 
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